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Essays In Housing Markets And Public Finance
Abstract

This dissertation comprises three research papers on topics at the intersection of housing markets, taxation,
and the provision of local public goods.
In Chapter 1, I study the economic incidence of the mortgage interest tax deduction -- a widespread,
expensive, and regressive tax expenditure -- by combining a sufficient-statistics approach with direct estimates
of the induced effect on house prices. I start with a flexible economic framework that expresses the policy’s
distributional impact in terms of a key parameter: the capitalization effect, or the extent to which the
deduction increases house prices. I then directly estimate this parameter, drawing on a national database of
housing transactions and exploiting sharp variation in tax rates and itemization rules at state borders.
Comparing the sale prices of observationally identical homes purchased on either side of a border, I find that a
one percentage point increase in the tax rate applied to mortgage interest increases house prices by 0.8%,
which is sufficient to erase the tax savings for a first-time borrower when their loan-to-value ratio is under
60%. Finally, I combine the empirical result and the derived incidence expressions to show the distribution of
the policy’s impacts among new home-buyers. Accounting for non-itemization rates indicates that average
buyers at most incomes do not benefit from the MID, though there is some heterogeneity across income
levels and housing markets.
Chapter 2 (joint with Fernando Ferreira) proposes and measures a new mechanism underlying the 41% real
increase in per-pupil spending between 1990 and 2009. ''Housing disease'' is a fiscal externality originating in
local housing markets in which unexpected booms generate extra revenues that schools administrators have
incentives to spend, independent of local preferences for provision of public goods. We establish the
importance of housing disease by: (i) assembling a novel microdata set containing the universe of housing
transactions for a large sample of school districts; and (ii) using the timelines of school district housing booms
to disentangle the effects of housing disease from reverse causality and changes in household composition. We
estimate housing price elasticities of per-pupil expenditures of 0.16-0.20, which accounts for approximately
half of the rise in public school spending. School districts did not boost administrative costs with those
additional funds. Instead, they primarily increased spending on instruction and capital projects, suggesting
that the cost increase was accompanied by improvements in the quality of school inputs.
Finally, Chapter 3 (joint with Blake Heller) provides evidence on the long-term impacts of educational inputs.
While it is well-known that certain charter schools dramatically increase students' standardized test scores,
there is considerably less evidence that these human capital gains persist into adulthood. To address this
matter, we match three years of lottery data from a high-performing charter high school to administrative
college enrollment records and estimate the effect of winning an admissions lottery on college matriculation,
quality, and persistence. Seven to nine years after the lottery, we find that lottery winners are 10.0 percentage
points more likely to attend college and 9.5 percentage points more likely to enroll for at least four semesters.
Unlike previous studies, our estimates are powerful enough to uncover improvements on the extensive margin
of college attendance (enrolling in any college), the intensive margin (persistence of attendance), and the
quality margin (enrollment at selective, four-year institutions). We conclude by providing non-experimental
evidence that more recent cohorts at other campuses in the network increased enrollment at a similar rate.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC FINANCE
Matthew Davis
Fernando Ferreira
This dissertation comprises three research papers on topics at the intersection of housing
markets, taxation, and the provision of local public goods.
In Chapter 1, I study the economic incidence of the mortgage interest tax deduction –
a widespread, expensive, and regressive tax expenditure – by combining a sufficientstatistics approach with direct estimates of the induced effect on house prices. I start with
a flexible economic framework that expresses the policy’s distributional impact in terms
of a key parameter: the capitalization effect, or the extent to which the deduction increases
house prices. I then directly estimate this parameter, drawing on a national database of
housing transactions and exploiting sharp variation in tax rates and itemization rules at
state borders. Comparing the sale prices of observationally identical homes purchased
on either side of a border, I find that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate applied to mortgage interest increases house prices by 0.8%, which is sufficient to erase the
tax savings for a first-time borrower when their loan-to-value ratio is under 60%. Finally,
I combine the empirical result and the derived incidence expressions to show the distribution of the policy’s impacts among new home-buyers. Accounting for non-itemization
rates indicates that average buyers at most incomes do not benefit from the MID, though
there is some heterogeneity across income levels and housing markets.
Chapter 2 (joint with Fernando Ferreira) proposes and measures a new mechanism underlying the 41% real increase in per-pupil spending between 1990 and 2009. “Housing
disease” is a fiscal externality originating in local housing markets in which unexpected
booms generate extra revenues that schools administrators have incentives to spend, in-
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dependent of local preferences for provision of public goods. We establish the importance
of housing disease by: (i) assembling a novel microdata set containing the universe of
housing transactions for a large sample of school districts; and (ii) using the timelines of
school district housing booms to disentangle the effects of housing disease from reverse
causality and changes in household composition. We estimate housing price elasticities
of per-pupil expenditures of 0.16-0.20, which accounts for approximately half of the rise
in public school spending. School districts did not boost administrative costs with those
additional funds. Instead, they primarily increased spending on instruction and capital
projects, suggesting that the cost increase was accompanied by improvements in the quality of school inputs.
Finally, Chapter 3 (joint with Blake Heller) provides evidence on the long-term impacts
of educational inputs. While it is well-known that certain charter schools dramatically
increase students’ standardized test scores, there is considerably less evidence that these
human capital gains persist into adulthood. To address this matter, we match three years
of lottery data from a high-performing charter high school to administrative college enrollment records and estimate the effect of winning an admissions lottery on college matriculation, quality, and persistence. Seven to nine years after the lottery, we find that lottery
winners are 10.0 percentage points more likely to attend college and 9.5 percentage points
more likely to enroll for at least four semesters. Unlike previous studies, our estimates
are powerful enough to uncover improvements on the extensive margin of college attendance (enrolling in any college), the intensive margin (persistence of attendance), and the
quality margin (enrollment at selective, four-year institutions). We conclude by providing non-experimental evidence that more recent cohorts at other campuses in the network
increased enrollment at a similar rate.
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CHAPTER 1 : The Distributional Impact of Mortgage Interest Subsidies: Evidence
from Variation in State Tax Policies
1.1. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis alerted many economists and policy-makers to the costs faced by
households who have heavily invested in the housing market, often taking on significant
debt in the process (Mian and Sufi 2011; Mian, Rao, and Sufi 2013; Ganong and Noel 2018).
While subsequent years have seen a robust discussion of possible remedies (Piskorski and
Seru 2018), an under-emphasized policy factor is the fact that governments often subsidize
home purchases through the tax code. Indeed, mortgage interest deductions (MIDs) are
found throughout developed economies despite their considerable fiscal burdens and oftmaligned distributional properties (Bourassa et al., 2013).1 While often understood as a tax
benefit for middle-income homeowners, economists and policy analysts have long argued
that the MID is massively regressive; after all, tax deductions are most valuable to those in
high tax brackets, and no tax relief is provided to renters or non-itemizing homeowners,
who are less wealthy on average. Hence, understanding the distribution of the policy’s
impacts – not just the total economic distortion – is a question of first-order economic
importance, yet one for which we have very little direct evidence.
This paper measures the economic incidence of the mortgage interest deduction by combining a flexible theoretical framework with direct empirical estimates of the induced
change in house prices. I start by deriving incidence expressions from a model that places
very few restrictions on the structure of household decision-making while allowing for
a rich characterization of the household’s cost of capital. These formulas show that the
distribution of policy impacts depends critically on a key sufficient statistic: the capitalization effect, or the extent to which the policy increases house prices. Next, I directly
estimate capitalization, deploying a border design that relies on variation in state tax rates
1

In the United States, the mortgage interest deduction (MID) provided homeowners with $77 billion of tax
relief in 2015, more than four times the amount allocated to housing vouchers for low-income households.

1

and itemization policies. Finally, I bring the theoretical and empirical portions together to
map out the distribution of costs and benefits across the population, drawing on a large
and detailed housing transactions dataset.
The theory serves as a guide to tracking the policy’s costs and benefits among various
agents in the economy. Importantly in this setting, the impacts are likely to be unequally
distributed across households, so the set-up allows for different tenure choices, credit constraints, and debt levels. The results show that, as with any tax or subsidy, the deduction’s
economic incidence is the sum of two effects: a direct monetary transfer and the ensuing
change in equilibrium prices. The relative magnitudes of these two terms determines the
ultimate distribution of benefits. In other words, the capitalization response is a sufficient
statistic for the policy’s effect on the distribution of resources (Chetty and Finkelstein 2009).
Measuring capitalization has proved challenging for empiricists, owing to challenges in
both research designs and data availability. Prior work has either relied on structural general equilibrium models (Sommer and Sullivan 2018) or expressed incidence in terms of
existing estimates of the elasticities of supply and demand for homes (Rappoport 2016,
Hanson and Martin 2016). The use of these indirect approaches largely reflects a dearth
of credible research designs for directly estimating the level of capitalization. Appropriate policy experiments are rare; in the United States’ case, the federal MID policy has not
substantially changed since its inception.2 At the most basic level, analysis requires plausibly exogenous, market-level variation in the level of the subsidy, combined with data on
market prices under these differing policies.3
2

While time series variation in federal tax rates creates variation in the value of the deduction, such policy
changes are confounded by a host of macroeconomic and time-series factors that prevent credible identification of the capitalization effect. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) also show that state-level homeownership rates
are not correlated with tax rates.
3
Some papers use household-level variation in tax incentives to estimate causal effects on outcomes other
than from market-level prices, the effect of interest here. Gruber et al. (2017) consider a policy change that
had heterogeneous affects across the income distribution in Denmark, and Hilber and Turner (2014) show that
households are not more likely to purchase a home after moving to a state with a larger tax subsidy. Both find
a null effect on overall homeownership. Finally, Berger et al. (2000) estimate the price impacts of an interest
subsidy tied to specific buildings in Sweden, finding results consistent with full capitalization.

2

I overcome the lack of federal policy experiments by turning to a new source of identifying
variation. State tax rules vary substantially both in the cross-section and over time, and my
identification strategy exploits the fact that different tax treatments induce sharp variation
in borrowing costs at state borders, due to either differences in personal income tax rates or
state-specific itemization policies.4 Specifically, I construct a sample of census tract-pairs
that share a common border but lie in different states. Within these pairs, I compare the
sale prices of observationally identical houses that transact in the same time period on
either side of the state border. Relating the difference in prices to the difference in effective
tax rates yields an estimate of the capitalization of the deduction.
The border design is made possible by a national database of housing transactions, notable
for both its breadth and its detail. The broad data coverage ensures that I have sufficient
sample near state borders to execute the border design; by 2015, the data includes deeds
records from over 90% of U.S. counties and a total of 4.2 million residential transactions.
In addition, the detailed house-level characteristics allow me to construct house-type-bygeography fixed effects that ensure the estimates are driven by like-for-like comparisons.
Finally, I deploy a simulated instruments strategy to ensure that my estimates are driven
by policy variation rather than to differences in the local tax base (Currie and Gruber 1996,
Gruber and Saez 2002). The key “treatment” variable in my regressions is the average
marginal tax rate, which is a function of both tax rules and the composition of the taxpaying population. The latter may respond directly to tax policy, due to sorting or other
economic effects of tax variables. Solving this issue requires instruments that predict local
rates but are not related to demographics. I therefore use the National Bureau of Eco4
The level of state income taxes is highly variable, ranging from a high of 12.3% for high-income filers in
California to zero in 17 states. (Because state tax payments may be deducted from one’s federal tax return,
the true rate is less than the statutory rate during my sample period. I use effective tax rates that account
for federal deductibility throughout my analysis. See Section 1.4.2 for details.) Differences in rates generate
variation in the after-tax cost of mortgage interest, since reducing one’s taxable income is more valuable in
a high-tax state. Furthermore, differences in state itemization rules induce variation in the specific tax rate
applied to mortgage interest. In 2015, ten states collected income taxes but did not allow residents to deduct
mortgage interest on their state return. Three other states placed a cap on the value of total deductions,
effectively eliminating the subsidy at the margin for taxpayers claiming significant deductions.

3

nomic Research (NBER) TAXSIM programs to compute statutory tax rates that are not
influenced by population sorting. By using these simulated rates to instrument for the local average rate, I eliminate the endogeneity associated with changes in the tax affecting
the non-statutory determinants of local effective rates.
The results show that the mortgage interest deduction induces large changes in house
prices. Specifically, a one percentage-point increase in the tax rate applied to mortgage
interest results in a 0.8 percent increase in house values. These estimates are consistent
across specifications using a variety of strategies to control for local price trends, regional
variations in the valuation of different housing amenities, and the interaction between the
two.
This level of capitalization significantly reduces the tax benefits for itemizing homeowners. For a typical itemizer who finances her first home purchase at 80% LTV and faces
a 25% marginal tax rate, the price increase wipes out 84% of the subsidy value. Because
roughly half of homeowners do not itemize on their tax returns – and therefore cannot
claim the deduction – the policy does not help new homebuyers, on net. Existing homeowners are largely insulated from the price effects, as any capital gains or losses are offset
by an increase in future housing costs.
Other parties that do not claim deduction are nevertheless affected by the price increase. I
do not directly estimate impacts on rents, but under plausible assumptions about housing
market efficiency renters suffer a proportional increase in housing costs. Housing developers see an increase in profits; rising prices imply that they capture a portion of the subsidy
value.
The capitalization estimates are robust to several potential threats to the border strategy.
First, one naturally worries about unobserved factors that might affect house prices. Focusing on variation within small geographic areas allays many of these concerns. The
border design effectively partials out local economic conditions, provided that they do not

4

also vary sharply at the state border. Furthermore, directly controlling for measures of local economic performance does not substantively change the point estimates. Exposure to
certain amenities and fiscal policies is more likely to coincide with state borders, however.
I therefore estimate models that control for education spending, state fiscal conditions,
and inter-governmental transfers. These approaches show similar levels of capitalization,
suggesting that the original specification successfully isolates variation in deduction value
rather than these potential confounders.
Using income tax rates for identification raises two other concerns. First, it is possible that
households may sort in response to tax rates, and that the resulting redistribution of households could change house prices. Second, higher tax rates lead to lower after-tax income,
which could directly shift housing demand.5 To address these concerns, I estimate models
that rely solely on variation induced by state itemization policies, rather than variation in
income tax rates. The resulting estimates are consistent with earlier results. Unless households are sorting between states to take advantage of itemization rules, the two concerns
discussed here are alleviated.
My most robust models use state fixed effects to identify capitalization through a limited
number of changes in state tax policies. These difference-in-difference style models place
significant strain on the housing transactions dataset, which contains a sufficiently broad
sample near state borders for a relatively short duration. Nevertheless, the estimates are
similar to those in the cross-sectional border design (though they are less precise). Furthermore, they survive state-level economic and policy controls – suggesting that endogenous
rate changes are not driving the estimates – and are similar when using time-series variation in itemization policies instead of tax rates.
The final step in the analysis uses the incidence expressions to take the capitalization estimates to the data. I add demographic information by combining the housing transaction
5
Note that this second effect is distinct from the “income effect” commonly associated with analyses of
tax changes. At issue is a change in income independent of changes in prices and/or tax rates, rather than a
change in effective spending power due to a change in prices.
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dataset with data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Crucially,
HMDA filings report household income, which I use to impute household-level marginal
tax rates and the likelihood that households itemize. Accounting for observed itemization
rates and larger estimated capitalization effects for more expensive homes shows that incidence is negative for homebuyers across the income distribution, though the estimates are
for the most part not statistically differentiable from zero.
These findings contribute direct empirical evidence of capitalization effects to the extensive theoretical literature on the effects of the MID, which has grown significantly since
Poterba’s (1984) user-cost model. Many papers have extended this framework to analyze
the impacts of various MID policy reforms,6 though the degree of price sensitivity varies
widely with assumptions about the supply response. Hanson and Martin (2016) show that
adding a supply side reduces the price sensitivity by 64% from the full-capitalization case.
Rappoport (2016) demonstrates theoretically that the MID might hurt borrowers in closed,
inelastically-supplied housing markets (though his calibration suggests that it is rare in
practice). Sommer and Sullivan’s (2018) structural estimates predict that eliminating the
MID would increase homeownership by reducing prices to the point where more potential
buyers could afford down payments. The empirical results in this paper do not require assumptions about the supply side or the elasticity of demand; they estimate price sensitivity
directly using natural policy variation.
I also contribute to a literature that emphasizes the important role that mortgage payments
and housing debt play in household financial well-being. Mian and Sufi (2011) and Mian,
Rao, and Sufi (2013) show that households with higher mortgage debt suffer greater consumption declines and increased default rates after a housing downturn. Ganong and
Noel (2018) identify cash flow constraints as a key contributor to mortgage default for un6
Poterba and Sinai (2008) find that eliminating the MID would reduce user costs of capital by 40 basis
points on average, with larger effects for younger and wealthier households. Other papers analyze the spatial
distribution of the deduction’s benefits (Gyourko and Sinai 2003), the deduction’s effect on household portfolio decisions (Poterba and Sinai 2011), and the deduction’s role in determining household location decisions,
(Albouy and Hanson 2014).
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derwater borrowers. MID capitalization likely contributes to this effect, as higher prices
result in higher monthly payments, but the tax benefit is not realized until the following
year.
Finally, this paper’s findings are relevant to the broader literature on the effect of capital market conditions on asset prices. Garrett et al. (2017) find municipal bond prices
over-capitalize differences in state tax rates, finding evidence of more-than-complete capitalization, and Argyle et al. (2018) show that the benefits of favorable car loan terms are
often subsumed by induced price increases.7 My results show that a similar form of capitalization effects is vital to understanding a $29 trillion asset class owned by more than 60
percent of households in the United States.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 outlines notable features
of the MID in the United States and walks through a theoretical framework that traces
how price changes affect various parties participating in the housing market. Section 1.3
explains my approach to estimating the price response, and Section 1.4 describes the data
I use. I present my results and robustness checks in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 combines these
estimates with national data on characteristics of borrowers and owners to analyze the
distribution of the policy’s impacts, and Section 1.7 concludes.

1.2. Background and a Framework for Distributional Analysis
1.2.1. MID Basics
When the income tax was first instituted in the United States, individuals could deduct
all interest on personal debts from their taxable income. This status quo persisted until
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated the preferential tax treatment for all forms
of personal interest aside from mortgage interest. The MID also survived 2017’s Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act (TCJA), though the law reduced the maximum deductible balance from $1
7

See Glaeser, Gottlieb, and Gyourko (2013); Adelino, Schoar, and Severino (2012); and Bhutta and Ringo
(2017) for discussions of the relationship between house prices and mortgage interest rates.
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million to $750,000. More importantly, the bill doubled the standard deduction, making
the MID less attractive for many homeowners.8
Today, the MID enjoys a privileged position in American politics. The New York Times
labeled the deduction “sacrosanct” after 93 percent of respondents to a 2011 poll described
it as either “very important” or “somewhat important.” It is widely praised by industry
representatives and leaders of both political parties, who frequently emphasize the importance of middle class tax relief.9
It should be noted that the economics literature takes a somewhat different view of the true
source of the subsidy to owner-occupied housing (perhaps unsurprisingly). As I discuss
at greater length in the following subsection, housing economists have long emphasized
the non-taxation of imputed rent, i.e. the “dividend” produced by housing assets (Hendershott and Slemrod, 1982). My focus is somewhat different than these papers, however, and
more in line with current policy proposals. Specifically, this paper analyzes the impact of
reducing the deductibility of mortgage interest in isolation, rather than reforming the tax
code to treat owner-occupiers like landlords. Hence, I often use the word “subsidy” to refer to the tax expenditure created by the MID, rather than the non-taxation of the housing
dividend.
Despite the political rhetoric surrounding the policy, several features of the MID’s design
combine to concentrate the policy’s benefits among the wealthy. First, at a very basic level,
8
CBO (2018) and JCT (2018) estimate that the number of itemizers will fall by roughly 60% in response to
the reform, and JCT (2018) projects an equal decline in the total MID tax expenditure. The decline is primarily
driven by the increase in the standard deduction, effectively zeroing out the benefits for many middle-income
claimers. Some high-income claimers see somewhat smaller tax reductions due to the reduced cap.
9
When asked asked about tax benefits for homeowners at an event for constituents, Democratic Senate
Minority Leader Chuck Schumer recently promised “no reductions in your deductions.” Both the National
Association of Realtors (NAR) and the National Association of Homebuilders (NAHB) highlight their lobbying on the issue on their websites, with the NAR claiming that “to even mention policy changes that would
reduce the tax benefits of homeownership could endanger property values.” The NAHB site also claims “the
mortgage interest deduction helps make the tax code more progressive and primarily benefits middle class
taxpayers ... 82 percent of households who benefit from the mortgage interest deduction have incomes of less
than $200,000.” The NAR’s site notes that “almost two-thirds (64 percent) of the families who claim the mortgage interest deduction have household incomes between $50,000 and $200,000, and 42 percent have incomes
of less than $100,000.”
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the deduction only provides value to homeowners, who are wealthier than renters on average. Second, among homewners, the deduction’s value increases with the size of one’s
mortgage. Then, because the subsidy is a tax deduction – not a credit – its value increases
with the filer’s marginal tax rate, as reductions in taxable income generate larger decreases
in taxes in higher tax brackets. Finally, the option to claim the standard deduction prevents
many lower-income homeowners from benefiting. In 2015, the last year of my sample, tax
filers only benefited from itemizing if they could claim at least $6,300 (single filers) or
$12,600 (joint filers) in total deductions. The TCJA’s near-doubling of the standard deduction will only further stratify the benefits from 2018 forward.
In other words, the MID is not designed to target the middle class. To this point, Figure 1.1
compares the distribution of taxpayer income to the distribution of federal MID value (i.e.
the reduction in tax obligations generated by the deduction) using IRS Statistics of Income
data from 2015. Filers with Adjusted Gross Incomes (AGI) over $200,000 collect roughly
one third of the benefits, despite the fact that they file only 4.5 percent of tax returns. Filers
with AGIs under $100,000 also collect one third of the total benefits, despite comprising
over 85% of tax units.
Figure 1.2 depicts how the distribution of deduction value has changed in recent years.
Since the trough of the housing cycle in 2008, the benefits have increasingly concentrated
among high earners, as house prices in high-income areas have increased and new mortgage issuance to middle and lower-middle income households has stalled.
Static calculations like those in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 tell only part of the distributional story;
after all, statutory incidence is not economic incidence. Like any tax or subsidy, the primary distributional impact is the sum of two effects: the direct transfer of funds (in this
case in the form of a reduced tax bill) and the ensuing change in market prices (Kotlikoff
and Summers 1987). The next subsection provides a theoretical framework for tracing
the effects of price changes through the population in order to analyze the distributional
impacts of the subsidy.
9

1.2.2. Incidence
The primary goal of the empirical part of this paper is to measure the sensitivity of house
prices to the tax rate applied to mortgage interest. While this parameter is interesting and
important in its own right, it is also a necessary input for analyzing how the deduction’s
impacts are divided among various participants in the housing markets.
This section presents a straightforward, public finance-style model that makes this connection explicit. Making few structural assumptions, this sort of theory allows me to translate
these reduced-form estimates into quantities that are informative about the policy’s welfare impacts. These “sufficient statistics”-style models are common in the empirical public
finance literature (see Chetty and Finkelstein (2009)), though this setting differs in two important respects. First, only certain consumers are subsidized, as renters and non-itemizers
receive no tax benefits. Second, the tax benefit is applied in the capital markets, rather directly to final goods. Thus, even though much of the intuition follows from workhorse
treatments of economic incidence (e.g., Kotlikoff and Summers (1987)), it is necessary to
formally model the relevant decisions and institutional factors.10
The User Cost of Owner-Occcupied Housing
The decision to purchase a home depends on a host of prices, tax rates, and features of the
mortgage market. Accordingly, calculating the true economic cost of homeownership is a
non-trivial exercise. The dominant method among housing and public finance economists
is to group the various prices, institutional factors, and non-monetary costs associated
with a home purchase into a single flow cost known as the user cost of housing. As shown
by Poterba (1984), the user cost formulation facilitates analysis of various aspects of the
tax regime on the true economic cost of homeownership. In the ensuing years, empirical
10
Rappoport (2016) uses a similar set-up to derive incidence expressions for itemizing home-owners. The
approach here differs in several respects. First, it incorporates a more fully developed treatment of the user
cost of capital, as described in the following subsection. Second, it explicitly accounts for impacts on renters
and non-itemizers. Finally, as emphasized earlier, capitalization effects are estimated directly, not calibrated.
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analyses of the cost of homeownership have largely converged on an agreed specification
of the user cost, discussed in detail in Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Poterba and
Sinai (2011) and Albouy and Hanson (2014).
Following those authors, the economic cost of purchasing an additional dollar’s worth of
housing under can be written as follows:
citemize = [1 − τy φm λ − τy (1 − λ)]rf − φm τy λ(rm − rf ) + (1 − φp τy )τp + m + σ − πe (1.1)

where rf and rm are the interest rates on a risk-free asset and mortgages, respectively; λ
denotes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio; τy and τp are income and property tax rates; φm and
φp indicate the proportion of mortgage interest and property taxes that are deductible; m
stands for combined maintenance and depreciation, assumed to be a fixed proportion of
house value; σ is a risk premium; and πe denotes the expected rate of capital gains on
housing.
This formulation allows for separate marginal tax rates on income and the deductions. The
marginal tax rate on interest income τy is assumed to be equal to the rate on labor income.
To allow for restrictions on deductions, I introduce a parameter φm ∈ [0, 1], which governs
the portion of mortgage interest that may be written off. Hence, (1 − φm τy ) denotes the
effective after-tax price of mortgage interest, which some authors refer to as the mortgage
subsidy rate (Hilber and Turner 2014). The joint cost of debt and equity is therefore discounted by an LTV-weighted average of the two tax rates. This gives rise to the first term
in (1.1).
Mortgages include the option to default or pre-pay if the economic environment changes,
and as a result borrowers are charged a premium above the risk-free rate. This option
is a benefit to buyers, and its value should be accounted for in the user cost. I follow
Poterba and Sinai (2011) and assume that those options are priced fairly, implying that
interest expenses above the risk-free rate are exactly offset by the value of the option.
11

Hence, the second term reflects only the the tax savings generated by interest deductibility:
φm τy λ(rm − rf ).
Households pay property taxes equal to a fraction τp of house value, and some portion
of those taxes may be deducted from income tax returns. I allow property tax deduction
policy to differ from mortgage interest deduction policy (i.e. φp may not equal φm ), though
in practice they are usually the same. Maintenance m includes both physical depreciation
and the costs of upkeep, and the risk premium σ reflects the costs of additional risk created by a larger housing position in the portfolio. Expected housing capital gains πe are
presumed to be untaxed, as is the case for the vast majority of American homeowners.11
Note that when mortgage interest is fully deductible (φm = 1), Equation (1.1) implies that
there is no tax-advantage to debt financing relative to equity. Because the cost of equity
is taxed at the same rate as debt, changes to marginal tax rates affect each side of the
capital structure identically. This has led housing economists to conclude that the true
subsidy to owner-occupied housing is the non-taxation of imputed rent – i.e. the value of
of housing services provided by the home. As this value is the dividend produced by the
housing asset, it would be taxed under a system that treated housing like other incomeproducing assets (or, equivalently, a system that treated owner-occupiers like landlords).
Under this view, the value of the total tax subsidy to owner-occupied housing is computed
by comparing the expression in Equation (1.1) to the user cost under such an alternative
system (see Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), Gyourko and Sinai (2003), and Himmelberg,
Mayer, and Sinai (2005) for examples and further discussion.)
This paper focuses on a different margin of policy adjustment, and I therefore use the term
subsidy to refer to a different quantity than this strand of the literature. Specifically, I
am ultimately interested in the tax subsidy to mortgage interest – or, more precisely, the
reduction in user costs attributable to variation in φm holding other tax quantities constant.
11
Capital gains on owner-occupied homes are not taxed until they exceed $250,000 (for single filers) or
$500,000 (for married filers). Accordingly, most papers in this literature make the simplifying assumption that
housing capital gains are untaxed (Poterba and Sinai 2011, Albouy and Hanson 2014).
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I focus on interest deductibility primarily because it is the more policy-relevant margin of
adjustment. Calls for reducing or eliminating the MID have become more frequent in
recent years, and indeed the recent TCJA moved policy along this dimension. Conversely,
few if any mainstream political actors lobby for the taxation of homeowners’ imputed
rental income.
Thus far, the user cost formulation has focused on homeowners who itemize. When filing
taxes, however, roughly half of households claim the standard deduction instead of itemizing. These filers do not benefit from the tax subsidy to mortgage interest or property
taxes, though they may feel their impacts via capitalization effects. The user cost for these
households can be expressed as follows:
cnon−itemize = [1 − τy (1 − λ)]rf + τp + m + σ − πe

(1.2)

It should be noted that Equations (1.1) and (1.2) reflect the marginal user cost – i.e. the
price of the last unit of housing consumption – rather than the average user cost. This is
a deliberate choice; the ultimate goal of introducing the user cost framework is to allow
me to compute how small changes in various tax parameters affect borrowers, so the relevant variation is at the margin. In general, though, the average user cost may be different
from the marginal user cost. Computing average user costs would require netting out the
portion of mortgage interest below the standard deduction, accounting for the progressivity of the income tax schedule, and recognizing that households may choose a different
debt-equity mix at different levels of housing expenditure. These considerations become
relevant when modeling the impacts of large overhauls of the tax system; see Martin (2018)
and Follain and Ling (1991) for further discussion.
Finally, when analyzing the effects of changing tax parameters in the following sections,
I assume that pre-tax interest rates are not affected. This amounts to assuming that the
impacts of small changes in the tax treatment of United States mortgages are negligible
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in the face of global capital markets, as is commonly asserted in empirical work on the
MID.12 Furthermore, I do not explicitly solve for induced changes in households’ preferred
capital structure. The literature has not reached a consensus on the magnitude of these
responses (see Poterba and Sinai (2011) for an extended discussion). In my setting, the
impacts of changes to mortgage balances are negligible due to envelope conditions that I
discuss in Section 1.2.2. One might also worry that other features of the mortgage market,
such as loan-to-value restrictions or the availability of pre-payment options, might respond
to changes in tax policy. This consideration is mitigated by restricting the analysis to small
perturbations of current policy parameters.
The Household Problem
With this formulation of the cost of purchasing housing in hand, I can now turn to the individuals’ decision. In addition to housing, households consume a numeraire consumption
good c to maximize an increasing, concave, and twice-differentiable flow utility function
u(Ct , Ht ) with a positive cross-partial derivative. Housing services can be either rented or
owned. Renters pay a per-unit price of ρt for HtR units of rental housing, while owners
procure HtO of housing by paying ci (Mt )pt . ci , with i ∈ {itemize, non-itemize} denotes the
user cost of housing as defined in the last subsection, which may vary with the level of
mortgage debt Mt . Owner-occupied and rental housing are assumed to be perfect substitutes in the utility function.
Household balance sheets are comprised of mortgage debt, owned housing, and liquid
savings denoted by Dt . Financial allocations are subject to two constraints. First, mortgage
debt cannot exceed a fixed fraction of housing wealth, denoted by κ. Second, deposits must
be positive, preventing households from borrowing at the lower risk-free interest rate. All
borrowing occurs through the mortgage market.
Formally, then, the household solves the following problem:
12

Poterba and Sinai (2011), Albouy and Hanson (2014), Rappoport 2016, Martin (2018), and and Sommer
and Sullivan (2018) all assume pre-tax interest rates are not affected by taxes or deductions.
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max

Ct ,HtO ,HtR ,Mt ,Dt



u(Ct , HtO + HtR ) + βEt Vt+1 (Dt , Mt , HtO )
subject to:

Ct + ci (Mt )pt HtO + ρt HtR + Dt ≤ yt (1 − τy ) + (1 + rf (1 − τy ))Dt−1
Mt ≤ κpt HtO
Dt ≥ 0

In this setting, a household may choose to rent a home instead of owning for two reasons.
First, renting may be a cheaper option for certain individuals. User costs ci are heterogeneous across individuals; they decrease with marginal tax rates and access to credit (via
lower offered mortgage rates).13 Hence, lower-income households face a higher cost of
financing a home purchase. Second, some households might prefer to buy a home at an
LTV greater than κ, but are instead bound by the credit constraint. These households may
build up savings and purchase a home in the future.
The continuation value Vt+1 (Dt , Mt , Ht ) is left unspecified for tractability. For the key
results in this section to hold, I do not need to impose additional structure on expectations,
the evolution of income, or terminal budget constraints. One cost of this simplification is
that these results only apply to the first year after a policy change.
The Incidence of Mortgage Interest Deductibility for Households
In this framework, the first-order welfare impact of a small change in the mortgage subsidy
rate on household welfare is as follows. Precisely, I consider the impact of a increasing the
mortgage deductibility parameter φm by an amount (1 − τy )dφm , which produces a change
13

For parsimony, I have written the budget constraint using the user cost notation developed in the previous
subsection. The full budget constraint for itemizers is: Ct + pt HtO + ρt HtR − Mt−1 (1 + rm φm (1 − τy )) + Dt +
0
τp φp (1 − τy ) ≤ yt (1 − τy ) + (1 + rf (1 − τy ))Dt−1 + Mt (1 + rm φm (1 − τy )) + pt−1 Ht−1
(1 − δ − m − πe ) For
non-itemizers, φm and φp are set to zero. Note that the risk aversion σ and the value of the default option are
not explicitly included in the decision problem, but I include them in all empirical user cost calculations.
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in the total mortgage subsidy rate of d(1 − τ M ID ). The following Proposition details the
resulting changes in buyers’ value functions:
Proposition 1 In the consumer maximization problem described in the previous subsection, a
change to the mortgage subsidy rate (1 − τ M ID ) induced by a small change in deductibility φm has
the following effect on the welfare of itemizing buyers when the capital constraint does not bind:


dp
dVt
itemize O
Ht
= `t Mt rm + c
d(1 − τ M ID )
d(1 − τ M ID )
where `t denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and citemize is defined in Equation 1.1. For non-itemizing buyers, the first term in brackets is dropped and citemize is replaced
with cnon−itemize , defined in Equation 1.2.
dpt
When the borrowing constraint is binding, incidence is increased by the amount `t (rm −rf )HtO d(1−τ
M ID )

The two terms in brackets convey the subsidy’s key tradeoff. Mt rm is the total mortgage
interest, i.e. the target of the subsidy. This term captures the direct effect of the change in
the subsidy rate. The second term is the user cost of housing multiplied by the capitalization effect. Because the strength of the subsidy increases as (1 − τ M ID ) decreases, this
term is negative. Therefore, analyzing the relative magnitudes of these two terms is key to
understanding how the policy affects buyers.
When the LTV limit binds, capitalization imposes an additional cost on borrowers who
are not able to select their optimal debt level. These buyers are forced to take on even
more debt to cover the purchase when prices rise. For unconstrained buyers, envelope
conditions ensure that the cost of this additional debt is second-order. However, these
conditions do not hold for constrained buyers; they would increase their borrowing if the
constraint were loosened. They therefore suffer a first-order cost associated with the need
to acquire additional financing at a sub-optimal LTV. This cost is proportional to the spread
between costs of debt and equity, as shown in the term in the sentence of the proposition.
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Finally, the budget constraint multiplier `t is the marginal value of an additional dollar of
after-tax income at the optimum. It converts the term inside the brackets – the total change
in income generated by the policy change – into utility terms.
Notably, the incidence expression does not show the impacts of many possible dimensions
of adjustment, such as changes in housing consumption, debt, or tenure. This is a direct
consequence of the envelope theorem. Because they are chosen optimally, small changes
in quantities have no first-order effect on welfare; their marginal benefit is exactly offset
by their marginal cost. Prices, however, are not chosen optimally, and thus changes in p
have first-order bite. Put differently, this result shows that the effect of subsidies on prices
is a sufficient statistic for the first-order welfare impact, and we can make well-grounded
welfare statements without specifying the full structure of the model.
Other Parties
To connect rents and prices, I assume a competitive rental market in which absentee landlords can borrow at rate rl , pay property taxes at rate τp , and incur efficiency costs equal
to γ percent of house value. A zero-profit condition for landlords therefore implies that
ρ = p(rl + τp + γ). Hence, the effect on rents can be inferred from the change in prices.
Because renters are not subsidized, their incidence only reflects the increase in rental costs
HtR d(1−τdρM ID ) .
Finally, I assume that new houses are supplied by a competitive home construction sector with increasing and convex costs of construction. Incidence for suppliers is simply
the change in housing prices multiplied by the total magnitude of new housing services
produced that period.
Summary
To summarize the key results of this section, Table 1.1 reports the first-order effects of
a small change in the magnitude of the tax rate, commonly referred to as the economic
17

Table 1.1: Summary of Incidence Expressions
d ln(p)
citemize d(1−τ
M ID ) + rm ∗ LT V

Itemizing First-Time Buyers

d ln(p)
cnon−itemize d(1−τ
M ID )

Non-Itemizing First-Time Buyers
Additional Cost for Constrained Buyers

d ln(p)
(rm − rf ) d(1−τ
M ID )

rm ∗ LT V

Itemizing Existing Owners
Non-Itemizing Existing Owners

0
d ln(ρ)
d ln(p)
= d(1−τ
M ID )
d(1−τ M ID )
d ln(p)
d(1−τ M ID )

Renters
Suppliers

Notes: The first five rows show the incidence of a small change to the mortgage subsidy rate (1 − τ M ID ),
normalized by house values. Renters’ and suppliers’ incidence is normalized by rents and the total value of
housing supplied, respectively.

incidence, for various parties. To ease interpretation, it is useful to normalize each term
by the value of local housing and to suppress the individual’s marginal utility of wealth.
The normalization serves two purposes. First, dividing out the value of housing converts
the capitalization effects to semi-elasticities. This form facilitates comparisons to the rest of
the literature and is has attractive empirical properties, as logging observed house prices
reduces their considerable dispersion. It also eases interpretation of empirical estimates.
Once the capitalization semi-elasticity has been estimated, the degree of incidence can be
inferred from information on mortgage rates and user costs. In particular, the parameters
in the main expressions are all on similar scales.
The first two rows show the normalized incidence effects for first-time homebuyers, presuming that they are not subject to the borrowing constraint. Row 1 begins with the incidence for itemizing first-time buyers. Home purchasers suffer from financing more expensive houses (the first term in their formula) but this cost is offset by the value of the subsidy
(the second term). By contrast, homebuyers who do not itemize, however, are subjected
to the price increase without a corresponding increase in the subsidy. To the extent that
buyers are constrained by borrowing limits, they suffer an additional cost of being driven
further away from their ideal debt-equity mix. The magnitude of this quantity is difficult
to assess. Explicit down-payment requirements likely vary across lenders and individuals,
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but I do not observe these terms in my data. Fortunately, this term is likely small relative
to the primary capitalization effect, as it is proportional to both the interest rate spread and
the probability that a borrower is constrained.
Existing homeowners, on the other hand, are insulated from the price increase. While they
may benefit from an increase in the price of their asset, the change is offset by the increased
cost of purchasing their next home. Hence, itemizers are exclusively affected by the change
in subsidy value, while non-itemizers are completely unaffected. I assume existing homeowners are unlikely to be LTV-constrained. The vast majority of US mortgages amortize
over time, which would lead borrowers away from the constraint.
Finally, renters and suppliers are exposed to the price effect but do not receive any direct
subsidy payments. Developers and homebuilders capture some of the subsidy value when
prices increase.14 While I can not observe rents directly, I can infer renter incidence from
the estimated price effect. Under the assumption that the landlord sector is competitive
and the supply of capital is inelastic, the price-to-rent ratio is constant. Thus, the increase
in log rents equals the increase in log prices.
From an empirical perspective, the most important feature of the Table 1.1 is the prominence of the capitalization effect

d ln(P )
.
d(1−τ M ID )

In particular, it is the only quantity that cannot

be directly inferred from data. Credible estimates of this parameter are therefore essential
for understanding distribution of the subsidy’s impacts. While prior work has obtained
values for the price effect either by imposing significantly more structure on the problem
(Sommer and Sullivan 2018) or by drawing existing supply and demand elasticities from
the literature (Rappoport 2016), this project generates the first direct evidence of its magnitude.
It should be note that the incidence results in the previous subsection apply to a closed
housing market, in which individuals must purchase or rent a home without considering
14

The specific implications of the MID for developers and homebuilders is an interesting topic that I defer
to future research.
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alternative communities. In practice, of course, residents can choose to move in response
to policy or price changes. The degree to which residents can opt out of the local market
has important implications for our interpretation of capitalization effects.
For intuition, consider the limiting case of perfect mobility. If we believe that individuals
are indifferent between living in either of two housing markets, then the law of one price
will hold across these areas. Houses in either environment must sell for the same after-tax
price, or everyone would live in the cheaper market. Thus, perfect mobility would seem
to guarantee full capitalization, regardless of the elasticities of supply and demand.
I formalize this intuition in Appendix A1.2 via a local labor markets model in which homeowners can choose to live in various cities, which may have different tax policies that affect
the user cost of financing home purchases. Idiosyncratic tastes for locations generate limited mobility, as homeowners with a preference for a certain city will not immediately
move in response to a favorable tax policy in another location. The model recovers the intuitions outlined above. In the closed-economy (zero-mobility) case, we recover identical
predictions of capitalization rates as in the closed-economy model. As location preferences
become less important, however, capitalization effects increase. Specifically, capitalization
decreases with the variance of the location taste shock, which governs the extent to which
mobility frictions reduce individuals’ ability to arbitrage tax differences across markets by
moving.

1.3. Empirical Approach
The primary empirical goal of this paper is to estimate the degree to which more generous
mortgage interest subsidies drive up house prices – often referred to as capitalization. A
simple approach to estimating capitalization might start with the following regression, in
which the price Pit of house i transacting at time t is regressed on the state’s net-of-tax rate
M ID ) and a vector of house characteristics X :
applied to mortgage interest (1 − τst
i
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M ID
ln(Pist ) = θ(1 − τst
) + βXi + εist

Depending on the contents of the control vector Xi , this equation nests the hedonic and
repeat-sales specifications common in empirical studies of house prices. These designs are
most likely to be valid when they examine variation within a single small geographic area.
In these cases, it is reasonable to assume that other local determinants of house prices, such
as access local public goods or weather, are common to all observations.
My sample spans much of the contiguous United States, however. At this level, there
is surely heterogeneity in the local attributes that affect housing prices, and one might
reasonably expect that such attributes are correlated with state tax policies. I therefore
require an empirical approach that holds local confounders constant. A natural approach
to controlling for unobserved local confounders is to add fixed effects for small geographic
units. Restricting identifying variation so that if falls within, say, census tracts ensures
that differences in prices is not being driven by amenities or economic conditions that are
approximately constant within tracts.
Of course, MID policy does not vary within census tracts, as these tax rules are set at
the state level. Thus, capitalization effects are not identified in models with tract, city, or
county fixed effects. Any control strategy that relies on geographical fixed effects to control for unobserved local confounders must examine housing markets that lie in multiple
states. In other words, plausible identification requires looking closely at variation near
state borders.
I therefore exploit cross-border variation to estimate the impact of tax-induced differences
in borrowing costs. By focusing on properties close to borders, these specifications are
robust to local economic and geographic shocks that might be correlated with state tax
policies. To begin, I construct all pairs of census tracts that border each other but lie on
either side of a state border. To ensure that estimates are not affected by differences in
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the housing stock, I also also identify all houses within each pair that transact in the same
quarter and match on observable characteristics.15 Indexing matched house types by m,
bordering county pairs by b, and states by s, I estimate variants of the following regression
model:

M ID
ln(Pihsbt ) = θ(1 − τst
) + γhb + δbt + εihsbt

(1.3)

The log-linear specification allows us to interpret θ as a semi-elasticity, consistent with the
empirical literature estimating price responses to changes in interest rates (Adelino, Schoar,
and Severino 2012; DeFusco and Paciorek 2017). γhb is a house-type-by-market effect, allowing the implicit price of individual housing characteristics to vary non-parametrically
across markets. δbt is a flexible, market-level time trend that absorbs any local shocks
common to each side of the border. Standard errors allow for arbitrary correlation within
state-year combinations (the level at which treatment varies).16 See Kroft et al. (2017) and
Ljungqvist and Smolyansky (2014) for similar approaches to estimating the effects of local
taxes using a border design.
Because marginal tax rates vary widely across the population, the specific construction of
M ID deserves some discussion. First, the log-linear
the dependent variable of interest τst

specification allows me to focus exclusively on state tax policies, as the time-varying fixed
M ID is the state subsidy rate above
effects control for changes in federal tax policy. Hence, τst

and beyond the federal rate. Second, the marginal tax rate includes all relevant information
for the states’ tax treatment of mortgage interest. In addition to the state marginal tax rate,
I incorporate information on state rules governing itemization, federal tax deductibility,
and various caps and clawbacks in state tax codes. In the simplest case, this implies that
15

Specifically, I sort houses into coarse age bins before matching exactly on the age bin, number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, condominium status, and whether the house is in a subdivision. I control directly for a
quadratic polynomial in square footage in the regression.
16
When estimating the panel models discussed in Section 1.5.3, I cluster standard errors at the state level,
per the recommendation of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
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states that do not allow the deduction of mortgage interest are assigned a value of zero.17
Finally, the ideal treatment variable would be the marginal effective tax rate for the marginal
homebuyer in each market. The characteristics of the true marginal buyer are not known,
however, so I approximate her rate by calculating the average marginal tax rate in each
state, the smallest geographic identifier available in the TAXSIM/SOI files. I discuss how
I compute local average marginal rates in Section 1.4.2.
Figure 1.3 depicts the identifying variation I exploit to measure capitalization. The map
plots the combined (state plus federal) top marginal tax rate applied to mortgage interest
for all counties in my housing dataset that border a state with a different mortgage tax rate
in 2015. The cross-border difference can result from either a difference in state tax rates or
itemization rules. Redder (or darker) counties have higher effective tax rates; states with
white counties either have no state income tax or do not allow their residents to claim the
MID. As the map shows, there is considerable variation in tax policies at state borders.
Local effective tax rates are a function of both policy rules and the local population, since
marginal rates depend on income and household size. If local populations sort to one
side of the border, either in response to tax rules or other state-specific factors, then the
local average tax rates will reflect both policy rules and endogenous population responses.
Accordingly, I estimate instrumented specifications that rely solely upon policy-induced
variation.
17

Because the empirical variation in τ M ID combines both variation in tax rates and variation, the estimated
parameter is not necessarily identical to the theoretical capitalization effect discussed in Section 1.2.2, which
considered the impact of varying itemization exclusively. It is straightforward to show the effect of varying the
marginal income tax rate τyhequals the original incidence expression
plus several additional terms. Precisely,
i

dgt
O
dV
= d(1−τ
M ID ) + λt −rf (pt Ht − Mt ) + yt + d(1−τy ) . The first term in brackets reflects changes in
the after-tax price of equity (the term is negative because increasing the tax rate reduces the opportunity cost
of housing equity). The final two terms are the direct increase in income due to the tax change (yt ) and the
change in lump-sum government transfers gt , which will be negative as long as the government balances its
budget.
If the sum of all three terms is non-zero, they represent a wedge between the estimated quantity and the
parameter derived from theory. While the magnitude of this wedge is difficult to assess theoretically, its relevance can be tested empirically. I assess its importance by estimating models that rely solely on variation in
itemization rules. Fortunately, these specifications deliver similar results, suggesting that the primary specifications effectively targets the theoretical parameter of interest.
dV
d(1−τy )
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My primary specification uses simulated state tax rates computed for fixed populations to
instrument for the true average marginal rate of the states’ residents. The characteristics of
these populations do not vary across states. As a result, any variation in these instruments
is driven purely by differences in policy. I choose three populations to target different
moments of the income tax schedule: a taxpayer in the highest tax bracket, a stylized firsttime homebuyer, and the entire national population. I discuss the the construction of these
variables in more detail in Section 1.4.2
With these simulated instruments in hand, the first-stage equation is as follows:
HighIncome
Homebuyer
M ID
(1 − τst
) = β1 (1 − τst
) + β2 (1 − τst
)

(1.4)

N ationalAvg.
+ β3 (1 − τst
) + ηbt + αhb + νihsbt

This equation is over-identified, though I will also show estimates that use each instrument
individually. All over-identified models are estimated via efficient two-stage generalized
method of moments (GMM), though the two-stage least squares estimator produces almost identical results.
A separate concern is that household sorting might directly impact housing prices. There
is considerable evidence that the characteristics of one’s neighbors affects house values;
see Wong (2013) and Bayer et al. (2007) for examples and discussion. In my setting, one
might expect richer households to sort to the low-tax side of the border, and these changes
might well be capitalized into house prices. I address this threat to identification by using
a state’s itemization policies – which include no direct information about the state tax rates
– as an instrument for the mortgage subsidy rate in a two-state least squares specification.
This approach purges estimates of equation (1) of any potential endogeneity associated
with the sorting based on tax rates. These specifications will deliver consistent results as
long as households do not choose their home state to take advantage of itemization rules.
Even in the instrumented model, the necessary identifying assumption is that MID de-
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ductibility does not correlate with any local-area unobservables. To address this concern,
I take advantage of the fact that, in addition to varying spatially, state tax policies also
change during my analysis period. Panel A of Figure 1.4 shows a different source of variation: changes in policy over time. The six red triangles indicate changes in the mortgage
subsidy resulting from phasing out the state deduction. Changes to state income tax rates
are more frequent, but often small. The seven labeled dots show changes of at least 2.5
percentage points to the top state income tax rate. Panel B highlights all of the counties
exposed to change in tax rules, due to a policy change in their own state or a border state.
Adding a state fixed effect to Equation 1.3 soaks up any unobserved local effects and uses
these policy changes to identify θ.18 Because I continue to include border-pair fixed effects,
this procedure estimates the change in the cross-border price differential after either state
changes effective tax rates. The cost of this approach is statistical power, since much of
the potentially useful cross-sectional variation is absorbed. I therefore expand my sample to include all border counties (rather than tracts) when estimating specifications with
state fixed effects. While this weakens the case that across-border houses are true substitutes, the difference-in-differences estimator is consistent under the weaker assumption
that identical houses in adjacent counties exhibit parallel trends in prices.

1.4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
1.4.1. Housing Transaction Data
The primary data source for this project is a detailed dataset of residential property transactions assembled from public deeds records by CoreLogic. While historical coverage varies
geographically, by 2015 the dataset records transaction details for properties in 2,853 out of
the 3,141 counties in the United States. The dataset provides basic descriptive information
about the property, including square footage, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms,
etc.; detailed geographic information; and details of any transactions occurring during the
18

I obtain similar results if I use county or tract fixed effects instead of state effects, but the computations are
considerably more burdensome and the estimates are slightly less precise.
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coverage period, including sale price, date, and the details of any liens placed on the property.
To add demographic information about borrowers, I merge the transaction records with
data reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). The loan-level HMDA
data are anonymized, but, following methods in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and DeFusco (forthcoming), I am able to determine most homeowners’ race and household income as reported on the mortgage application by matching on the identify of the lender,
loan amount, origination year, and the property’s census tract. Most importantly, the income variable allows me to impute marginal tax rates and the likelihood that a household
itemizes.
The dataset offers an unusual amount of breadth and detail, both of which are necessary
for my research design. The full dataset contains over 4.2 million residential transactions in
2015 alone, dwarfing smaller survey datasets used in previous analyses (Hilber and Turner
(2014), Hanson (2012)). Furthermore, the detailed transaction information – in particular
the recording of exact sale prices, loan balances, and transaction dates – is not available
in large public datasets like the American Community Survey, and its transaction-level
granularity allows much more detailed study than the county-level averages published in
the IRS Statistics of Income database.
The top panel of Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for the housing transactions sample. To facilitate comparisons between the border sample and states’ interiors, Column (1)
shows averages for non-border tracts, and (2) reports values for tracts on state borders. As
reflected in their housing stock, border tracts are somewhat less well off than non-border
tracts. The average house in a border region sells for $21,800 less than the average interior
home, and it is 135 square feet smaller. Border homes are also slightly older and less likely
to have three or more bathrooms. These differences are statistically significant, but their
magnitudes do not raise grave concerns about representativeness.
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My empirical approach requires a strict filter on data quality, particularly with respect to
characteristics that affect the value of housing. I therefore do not include housing transactions for which I do not observe the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the
house’s age, or its square footage. 50.4% of transactions in border tracts are affected by
this screen, reducing my final analysis sample to 425,017 transactions. Column (3) shows
descriptive data for this sample. Houses in the final sample are noticeably larger than
those in the full border sample (1,920 square feet on average, relative to 1,562), but other
characteristics are well balanced.
1.4.2. Tax Data
I collect the details of state tax policies from TAXSIM, a software package that allows users
to calculate federal and state income tax burdens for a wide range of taxpayer characteristics.19 Importantly, the calculations incorporate much of the complexity of state tax
codes that is not captured by state income tax rates alone. This includes information about
mortgage interest deductibility as well as adjustments to effective tax rates attributable to
the deductibility of state taxes on federal tax returns. Hence, for a given set of taxpayer
characteristics, I can compute a reliable measure of the true after-tax price of mortgage
interest.
In addition to the program that calculates tax obligations, I make use of the underlying SOI
data files that detail the tax-filing characteristics of a representative sample of taxpayers.
The finest level of geographic information is state of residence, so I can only compute averages within states, rather than the tract or county.20 By varying the amount of mortgage
interest reported by a small amount, I can infer the effective subsidy rate for all taxpayers
in the sample.
19
Originally developed by Feenberg and Coutts (1993), the model and associated files are available at www.
nber.org/˜taxsim.
20
State of residence is only explicitly recorded through 2008. In subsequent years, home states are imputed
with the goal of matching the state-level distribution of key tax characteristics. I use these imputations in my
main results, though my estimates are quite similar when I use 2008 population characteristics instead.
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Average marginal tax rates reflect characteristics of local populations that are potentially
endogenous. It is therefore important for me to separate variation stemming from differences in tax bases from differences in tax policies, which are plausible sources of exogenous variation. I therefore use the TAXSIM programs to calculate simulated tax rates for
three fixed populations: homeowners paying the top marginal tax rate, a stylized first-time
homebuyer, and the national average. They then serve as useful instruments for the true
average local tax rate.
For clarity, I can walk through the process of calculating the simulated tax rate for the
national population. I start by collecting the full sample of taxpayer characteristics for
a given year. Then, in the first step, I compute state and federal tax rates as if the full
population lived in Alabama in 2008. After computing and storing the average rate for
this population, I proceed to loop over the other 49 states and seven years in my sample,
calculating average tax rates for the same population as if they lived in every state tax
regime. I then repeat this entire process for a high-income taxpayer and a stylized first-time
homebuyer, providing me with three instruments that provide variation along different
sections of the income tax schedule.
Crucially, all taxpayer characteristics are held constant when I calculate each simulated
rate. Any variation in the instruments is therefore driven by differences in state policies,
not differences in state tax bases.
Summary statistics for tax variables can be found in Panel B of Table 1.2. Because the finest
geographic information in the SOI microdata sample is the state of residence, I use publicly
available aggregates to compute these averages. Specifically, tract averages are computed
from the 2015 zip-code-level averages, using 2010 population weights to construct a crosswalk between zip codes and census tracts. The results reinforce the conclusion from Panel
A that border tracts are somewhat poorer than average. Average Adjusted Gross Income
was $65,288 in the border tracts (relative to $69,517 in the interior), and filers in border areas are roughly three percentage points less likely to itemize and claim the MID. Because I
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am measuring average mortgage subsidy rates at the state level, I am likely overestimating
the tax rate at the border. This will only bias my estimates if the extent to which borders
are not representative is correlated with tax policies. Classical measurement error in the
treatment variable will be removed by the instruments.
1.4.3. Other Data Sources
While my main estimates rely only on the data sources described in the previous subsections, I draw on several commonly used data sources to construct control variables for
robustness tests. Annual State GDP and county income data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Economic Accounts, and county unemployment data is
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Local Area Unemployment database. The National Center for Education Statistics’ F-33 survey provides spending and enrollment data
for school districts, which I assign to census tracts using a block-weighted crosswalk. Finally, I obtain state government spending and inter-governmental spending within states
from the Census Bureau’s annual State Government Finances survey, which are then converted to per-capita measures using the Census’ state population estimates.

1.5. Results
1.5.1. Border Design Estimates of Capitalization
This section presents my main estimates of the capitalization effect of the MID, specified
as the relationship between log prices and the average marginal net-of-tax rate in the local
area (denoted by (1 − τM ID )). As a first step, therefore, I first regress log house prices on
the local average marginal income tax rate without any instrumentation. Panel A of Table
1.3 shows the results of estimating Equation 1.3 directly via OLS. The resulting estimate is
small, imprecise, and not statistically differentiable from zero: 0.299 (0.321).
As previously discussed, regressing prices on average marginal tax rates invites a host
of endogeneity concerns. Average tax rates in a state depend on both policy rules and
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characteristics of the local population, including income, household type, etc. These population characteristics may respond directly to policy, either through the direct effects of
local taxes and spending, through sorting, or through the simultaneous determination of
demographics and policy via the local amenity and productivity factors.
Purging these estimates of endogeneity requires measures of the tax burden that do not depend on the local population. I therefore construct three statistics that that rely exclusively
on variation induced by state policies. This approach, often referred to as “simulated instruments,” is common in empirical public finance (Currie and Gruber 1996). I use state
tax rules to calculate average marginal tax rates for one of three fixed populations: the
national average, an individual paying the the top marginal income tax rate with a large
mortgage, and a representative first-time homebuyer.
Panel B shows the results of estimating Equation 1.3 using these measures of the local tax
rate. The cost of using these simulated rates is that they may accurately measure the local
tax rate, since they remove the influence of local demographics by design. Thus, these
regressions are best thought of as reduced-form approximations to the true relationship.
Consistent with the hypothesis that a more generous tax deduction increases house prices,
the coefficients are all negative and statistically significant.
The magnitudes in Panel B are difficult to interpret, however. The ideal specification would
combine the local measure used in the naive OLS specification in Panel A with the stronger
exogeneity claim of the simulated instruments.
Therefore, Panel C shows specifications that use the policy variables to instrument for
the true average marginal tax rate. Columns (5)-(7) show results using each of the three
policy measures individually. The estimates range from -0.948 (0.243) to -1.315 (0.309),
implying that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate applied to mortgage interest
raises house prices by 0.9%-1.3%. To exploit the full variation from all three instruments,
my preferred specification pools all three instruments together into a single first-stage.
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Estimating this over-identified model via two-step GMM produces a semi-elasticity of 0.830 (0.229), as seen in Column (7).
To put this magnitude in perspective, recall from Table 1.1 that the incidence for itemizing
d ln(P )
buyers is proportional citemize d(1−τ
M ID ) + rm LT V . Under commonly accepted parame-

ter values,21 the user cost for an itemizing homebuyer facing a 25% marginal tax rate and
making a 20% down payment is 4.78%. For this purchaser, then, the price response implied by the overidentified model negates 84% of the tax benefit provided by the MID. If
this household’s LTV falls below 60%, the incidence turns negative. Indeed, as I discuss
further in Section 1.6, adding non-itemizers to this calculation implies that the average
new homebuyer would prefer a reduction in deductibility.
There are several reasons that we might expect such strong capitalization of the MID. The
first stems from the non-linearity of debt subsidies. As originally noted by Rappoport
(2016) and echoed by Sommer and Sullivan (2018), the combination of inelastic housing
supply and less-than-complete financing of home purchases can result in homebuyers being harmed by borrowing subsidies.22 Second, the marginal buyer in certain areas may
have different characteristics than the average buyer. To the extent that wealthier itemizers “set the market” for land and houses, local prices may be determined by purchasers
with costs of capital than the average resident’s. Finally, as previously discussed, capitalization effects may be stronger in the empirical setting analyzed here, where moving across
state lines is a relatively cheap option. Accordingly, we should not be overly surprised to
see large price differentials across state borders.
1.5.2. Robustness of Border Design
The estimates discussed thus far use a flexible parameterization to control for house quality
and local shocks. Specifically, border-by-quarter fixed effects soak up any shocks to local
housing markets, while house-type-by-border effects account for local valuations of differ21
22

See Section 1.6.
See Appendix A1.1 for further discussion
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ent house characteristics. Identification stems from comparisons between nearby homes
that transact in the same period, with additive quality adjustments specific to each location.
Table 1.4 shows that these results are robust to a wide variety of other strategies to control
for house quality and a local shocks. Column (1) replicates the GMM results from Table
1.3 for ease of comparison, and the next five columns report similar specifications using
various combinations of fixed effects for house types, border pairs, and time periods. All
estimates are within (or nearly within) a standard error of the main specification. In a fullysaturated model with border pair by house type by quarter fixed effects, the estimated
coefficient is -0.734 (0.262).
The rightmost three columns report results from hedonic regression specifications. To ensure covariate overlap, columns (8) and (9) restrict the sample to transactions for which
an observationally identical house sells across the state border in the same quarter or year,
respectively. Rather than using fully-interacted house type fixed effects, these specifications control for separate effects of bedrooms, bathrooms, house age, condominium status,
subdivision status, and a quadratic in square footage. The resulting point estimates are
slightly smaller, ranging from -0.572 (0.231) to -0.626 (0.243), but still quite large and statistically significant.
Having shown that the capitalization estimates in Table 1.3 do not depend on the specific
functional form used to control for local shocks, I turn to the possibility that other characteristics might also change sharply at state borders and confound my estimates. Recall
that my key identifying assumption is that observationally identical houses on either side
of a border are close substitutes. If local economic outcomes, amenities, or policies co-vary
in the same way, my results could be biased.
I can test for such bias by adding controls for local characteristics and observing how the
coefficients change. This intuition – formalized by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) and
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Oster (forthcoming) – follows from the observation that, even if the perfect set of control
variables is not available to the researcher, controlling for imperfect proxies nevertheless
conveys information about the possible bias. For instance, if a coefficient suffers from
omitted variable bias, then adding controls that are correlated with the confounders will
cause the targeted coefficient to shift towards the true, unbiased value. Conversely, if
the estimates remain stable as new controls are added, the identifying variation is not
threatened by the hypothesized confounder.
For this exercise to be informative, it is important to select a broad set of market-level
control variables that are capitalized into house prices. The canonical models of spatial
equilibrium and local public finance offer some guidance here. Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982) suggest focusing on measures of economic productivity and local amenities. I use
local unemployment rates and average incomes to measure productivity. While amenities
are difficult to measure – and most are unlikely to change sharply at state borders – public
school spending is both measurable and likely to change at state borders. Hamilton (1975,
1976) also highlights the importance of local taxes and public goods. School quality is a
particularly salient and measurable local public good. Local tax rates are much more difficult to measure, but I can use state government revenues as a measure of state-provided
government services and inter-governmental transfers to proxy for the extent to which
state governments provide resources to local entities. Furthermore, because schools receive a large share of their funding through local property taxes, education spending will
be closely related to property tax burdens.
Table 1.5 shows specifications that control for a variety of potential confounders, along
with uncontrolled estimate in the leftmost column (1) for ease of comparison. Reassuringly,
the capitalization estimates are strikingly stable. Panel A uses the locally measured control
variables – unemployment, mean income, and school expenditures. The largest deviation
comes from the specification controlling only for unemployment.23 The point estimate
23
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on school expenditure deserves a brief comment. Because I do not observe property tax rates, the “effect” of school spending likely bundles the effects of edu-
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increases in magnitude by 0.140 log points to -0.970 (0.255). Controlling for all three local
measures produces an estimate of -0.904 (0.263).
Results in the bottom panel control for state-level economic and government expenditure
variables. Adding all three controls results in an estimate nearly identical to the uncontrolled model: -0.832 (0.298). All of the estimates in Table 1.5 are less than one standard
error from the original specification, leaving one to conclude that unobserved confounders
are unlikely to drive the estimates.
Finally, it is possible that household sorting could bias my estimates. Variation in the
MID subsidy is driven by both itemization rules and local tax rates, and evidence suggests
that households – particularly high earning ones – react to state tax rates when choosing
residences (Moretti and Wilson 2017). If the characteristics of these households affect local
housing prices, then my estimates could be biased.
To assess this concern, I estimate models that do not rely on variation in tax rates. Instead,
I construct a dummy variable reflecting whether each state allows its residents to claim the
MID,24 and I use this variable to instrument for the local average marginal rate. These estimates are shown in Table 1.6. While the standard errors are considerably higher (reflecting
the fact that I have drastically restricted the available identifying variation), none of the
estimates are statistically distinguishable from my preferred specification. Models that
control for all three local characteristics used in the previous table – useful for increasing
statistical power – result in an estimated coefficient of -1.258 (0.544).
1.5.3. Panel Estimates
Finally, I estimate difference-in-difference style regressions that identify capitalization via
changes in state tax policies. Because these models include both state fixed effects and
cational investment and increased local taxes. As emphasized by Hilber (2017), regressions of house prices
on either tax rates or public goods can be positive, negative, or zero under various plausible models of local
public finance.
24
Note that this requires me to drop states with no state income tax from my sample, as they do not have
itemization policies to begin with.
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border-pair fixed effects, they estimate the extent to which cross-border price differentials
change after one of the states changes its tax policy. They are therefore robust to concerns
that the cross-sectional variation in state tax rates is endogenous to economic shocks at the
border. However, they will still be biased if changes in state tax rates are endogenous to
border conditions, a possibility I address by including state-level economic controls.
Because these specifications are substantially more demanding of the data, I expand the
sample to include all counties on state borders, rather than just census tracts. This increases my regression sample from 632,238 observations to over 21 million, which is necessary to provide sufficient statistical power for meaningful statistical inference in these
models. While houses in neighboring counties are less comparable than houses in neighboring tracts, the addition of state fixed effects adds a layer of robustness to the estimates
that likely makes this tradeoff worthwhile.
As expected, the estimates in Table 1.7 are less precise than the cross-sectional estimates.
Panel A uses the three tax rate instruments used in Tables 1.3-1.5. Without controls, the
estimated capitalization semi-elasticity is -1.416 (0.554). Adding controls results in similar
results, suggesting that endogenous tax rate changes are not a major threat.
The bottom panel uses panel variation in itemization policies exclusively. Panel B of Figure
1.4 shows that four states have either eliminated or capped deductions since 2008, providing sudden variation in mortgage deduction value that is not related to local tax rates.
These estimates are comfortably in the range of the cross-sectional results, ranging from
-1.098 (0.447) in the uncontrolled specification to -1.001 (0.457) in the model with all three
state controls.
The specifications in Panel B are, in a certain sense, the most robust estimates shown in
this paper. Most (if not all) of the threats to robustness described in the previous section
are assuaged by the combination of state fixed effects and the suppression of variation in
tax rates. The cost, in this case, is the loss of power and the need to rely on only three
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policy changes in a short panel. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that these specifications are
statistically quite close to the main results.
1.5.4. Heterogeneity
It is reasonable to suspect that the average capitalization effects estimated thus far mask
heterogeneity across geographic areas or sectors of the housing market. One might expect
capitalization effects to vary within different segments of the housing market, perhaps because higher-income households are more attuned to the tax implications of their mortgage
and housing choices.
To estimate submarket-specific capitalization rates, I separate my analysis sample based on
a measure of house quality. I first estimate a hedonic regression of log prices on observable
house characteristics. The fitted values from this regression form a measure of quality that
depends on fixed housing characteristics, not observed prices. I then sort houses based
on these predictions and group them into four evenly-sized quartiles. By sorting on the
fitted values, I use the hedonic price function to infer house quality without explicitly
conditioning on the dependent variable. Splitting the sample based on observed prices
could bias the process, since the capitalization effect would influence both the observed
dependent variable as well as the assignment to subsamples.
Table 1.8 shows estimates of the main specification for different segments of the house
quality spectrum. The effect is monotonically increasing in house quality. Among the
lowest quality houses (those in quartile one), a one percentage point rise in the after-tax
rate (1 − τ M ID ) decreasing prices by 0.699 (0.365) percent. The price response increases in
magnitude to -0.714 (0.278), -1.184 (0.326), and -1.306 (0.416) in quartiles two through four,
respectively.
The quartiles in Table 1.8 are calculated within bordering tract-pairs. As a result, all of the
variation is within markets, rather than across markets with different housing valuations.
The same pattern holds if I calculate quartiles using the full-sample quality distribution,
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however. Those results can be found in Table A1.2; estimates range from -0.552 in the first
quartile to -1.306 (0.416) in the fourth.
Taken together, these results imply that houses at the highest market segment are more
responsive to credit subsidies than those at the bottom of the market. In the following section, I incorporate the heterogeneity of the capitalization rate across housing sub-markets
when calculating the distribution of MID incidence for new home-buyers.

1.6. Interpretation and Distributional Impact
The final step of the analysis moves beyond average effects to consider the distribution of
MID incidence. Here, I make use of the merged CoreLogic-HMDA sample described in
Section 1.4.1. HMDA surveys include information on household income, which allows me
to impute marginal tax rates and the likelihood of itemizing for individual households.
I focus on the distribution of incidence for new homebuyers. These effects reflect the most
interesting heterogeneity, as incidence depends on the joint distribution of tax rates, itemization status, and mortgage balances. Renters receive no benefits from the MID, and I do
not observe them in the data. Existing homeowners are effectively hedged against capitalization effects, because any capital loss they experience is offset by savings on their next
purchase.25 While I cannot explicitly separate first-time buyers from repeat purchasers in
the data, I impose sample restrictions meant to approximate the income and LTV distributions of first-time buyers.26
The parameters I use to compute user costs are detailed in Table 1.9. My housing transactions data and the available summary data extracts from the IRS both terminate in 2015, so
I use the average 2015 interest rates in this analysis. Some variables, such as house prices
and initial mortgage balances, are observed in the housing data. Elsewhere, I adopt the
25
Capital gains/losses are more directly relevant for households who are close to retirement or who are considering substantial changes to their housing consumption. My dataset does not allow me to follow households over time, however.
26
Because first-time buyers earn less and borrow more than the average buyer, I drop purchasers with
incomes in the top 25% of their MSA’s distribution or LTVs in the bottom 25%.
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conventions of the literature when assigning values to other parameters of the user cost
equation (Poterba and Sinai 2011, Martin 2018). Marginal tax rates and itemization rates
are imputed based on the average values for households of the same income and county
of residence using public IRS SOI tables.
I use the framework developed in Section 1.2.2 to compute the impacts of a one percentage point reduction in the deductible portion of mortgage interest. There are several reasons to consider a reduction in deductibility as opposed to an increase. The first is policy
relevance. As previously discussed, few if any mainstream political actors advocate for
additional tax preferences for mortgages. The second reason relates to the generalizability of my empirical findings. To the extent that residents are mobile across state lines,
the capitalization effects that I measure may overstate the price response in other parts of
the country. Supply responses dampen capitalization, but a market with readily available
(unsubsidized) substitutes behaves much like an inelastically supplied market. This motivates the focus on a reduction in the subsidy, as the durability of the housing stock implies
housing markets respond to negative demand shocks as if supply were inelastic (Glaeser
and Gyourko, 2005).
Figure 1.5 plots the average change in deduction value, the average change in housing
costs (i.e. price times user cost), and average incidence within twenty evenly sized income
categories. The sample includes all residential housing transactions in 2015, subject to
the income and LTV restrictions discussed above. Price effects are computed using the
quartile-specific parameters shown in Table 1.8.
Among the lowest income households, the subsidy provides very little benefit, largely
because few of these households itemize. Accordingly, the policy change benefits these
households by lowering house prices. Moving up the distribution, the deduction value
increases as itemization rates and tax rates increase. This value is roughly offset by the
price effect, however, which is larger for more expensive homes (as discussed in Section
1.5.4). While the point estimates indicate that even wealthier households benefit from a
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weakened deduction, the total incidence is not statistically different from zero.
To supplement the national averages, Figure 1.6 shows similar results for four metro areas:
New York, San Francisco, Cleveland, and Detroit. In addition to showcasing a diverse set
of housing markets, analyzing this set of cities benefits from the additional robustness of effectively inelastic housing supply – New York and San Francisco because of strict housing
regulations, Cleveland and Detroit due to long and on-going population declines. Certain
households in the middle of the income distribution in New York and San Francisco, as
well as the wealthiest San Francisco home purchasers, would be harmed by a reduced deduction (though the magnitudes are well within statistical range of zero). Otherwise, the
patterns are similar to the national picture, subject to compositional differences due to the
local income distribution. House price impacts are bigger in the more expensive metros,
but these effects are offset by higher itemization rates.
Finally, Appendix Figures A1.1 and A1.2 show similar results over the LTV distribution, as
opposed to income. Incidence is, surprisingly, relatively constant at different debt levels,
even though the theory indicates that high-LTV buyers should benefit more than low-LTV
buyers. That result applies when holding other factors constant. In this case, the greater
tax benefit afforded to larger borrowers is offset by the facts that these borrowers are less
likely to itemize, are in lower tax brackets (and hence have higher user costs), and live in
less valuable homes.

1.7. Conclusion
This paper takes a modern approach to a central question in housing and public finance.
I measure the economic incidence of the mortgage interest tax deduction using plausibly
exogenous policy variation and a flexible, sufficient statistics economic framework, rather
than deriving incidence effects from a calibrated model. The key empirical target – the
capitalization of mortgage subsidies into house prices – is estimated by using a national
housing transactions dataset and a research design that exploits sharp policy variation at
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state borders. Combining the estimates with the derived incidence formulas allows me to
to map out the distribution of policy effects.
My preferred specifications indicate that a one percentage point increase in the tax rate
applied to mortgage interest increases house prices by 0.8%. These estimates are robust
to a variety of specification checks; controls for local economic and political factors; specifications that rely on itemization rules instead of tax rates; and difference-in-difference
specifications that estimate capitalization exclusively via changes to state tax policies.
These magnitudes imply that all buyers purchasing with loan-to-value ratios below 60%
would prefer a reduction in the subsidy rate. At 80% LTV, an itemizing buyer sees 84% of
the tax benefit cannibalized by capitalization. These effects help explain why, per the most
credible available evidence, mortgage interest deductions do not meaningfully increase
homeownership (Gruber et al. 2017, Hilber and Turner 2014). To the extent that the subsidies are captured by homebuilders or existing homeowners, they provide little incentive
to own instead of rent.
This paper focuses closely on the MID’s incidence on homebuyers. Extending the analysis
to other parts of the market using new data sources and research designs is a promising avenue for future research. In particular, understanding the policy impacts on market interest rates and incentives for supplying different types of homes would paint a fuller picture
of the deduction’s costs and benefits. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, elevated house
prices and mortgage debt levels increase risk for both households and the macroeconomy.
Quantifying the extent to which housing subsidies magnify such risks could improve the
design of macroprudential policy.
While many policy discussions focus on the statutory regressivity depicted in Figure 1.1,
accounting for house price effects points to a different driver of economic incidence. The
estimated capitalization implies that homebuyers’ economic benefits are at best small, even
if they receive a tax reduction. The subsidy is largely captured by the supply side, ulti-
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mately accruing to either shareholders in the homebuilding industry or divesting homeowners. Thus, the benefits are indeed concentrated among a particularly well-off population, but one determined by asset holdings rather than income.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Income and Federal Mortgage Interest Deduction Value (2015)

Note: Author’s calculation using IRS Statistics of Income Data. Deduction value is calculated as the total
amount deducted times the group’s marginal tax rate, accounting for itemization rates and filing status. See
Appendix for details.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Federal Deduction Value Over Time

Note: Author’s calculation using IRS Statistics of Income Data. Deduction value is calculated as the total
amount deducted times the group’s marginal tax rate, accounting for itemization rates and filing status. See
Appendix for details.
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Figure 1.3: Border Variation in Mortgage Tax Rates for Housing Sample
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Note: The map plots all counties in the housing dataset that border a state with a different MID tax rate in
2015. The color denotes the top total (federal and state) marginal tax rate applied to mortgage income in 2015,
accounting for all relevant clawbacks and deductions.
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Figure 1.4: Time-Varying Sources of Mortgage Tax Rate Variation

(a) Changes to Top State Mortgage Interest Tax Rates

(b) Sample Counties Exposed to Rate Change, 2008-2015
Notes: Panel A plots all changes to the top state MID tax rate since 1996. Changes of at least 2.5 percentage
points are labeled. Panel B plots all counties in the housing sample in states that change rates between 2008
and 2015, as well as counties neighboring those states. The color denotes the magnitude of the change in the
rate.

45

Figure 1.5: Income-Specific Incidence of a Small Reduction in Mortgage Deductibility

Notes: This figure reports the effect of a one-percentage point decrease in the tax rate applied to mortgage
interest for new home-buyers. The sample includes all 2015 transactions in the merged HMDA-CoreLogic
sample, dropping sales in the top 25% of their MSA’s income distribution or the bottom 25% of their MSA’
loan-to-value distribution. The plotted points show means computed within 20 evenly-sized income bins.
Total incidence is the sum of the change in deduction value and the change in the flow cost of housing (Price *
User Cost), and the associated confidence interval reflects statistical uncertainty in the value of the capitalization parameter.
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Figure 1.6: Income-Specific Incidence of a Small Reduction in Mortgage Deductibility in Four Metro Areas
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Notes: The four panels reproduce Figure 1.5 for specific metro areas.

Table 1.2: Summary Statistics

Panel A. Housing Transactions
Price (Thousands)
LTV at Origination
Square Footage
Three or More Bedrooms
Three or More Bathrooms
New Construction
Built in Last Decade
Condo
Subdivision
Missing Housing Characteristics
Number of Transactions
Panel B. Tax Filer Characteristics
Adjusted Gross Income
Percent Itemizing
Percent Claiming MID
Avg. MID Per Claimer
Number of Tracts

Non-Border
Tracts

Border
Tracts

Analysis
Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

246.358
0.628
1,697
0.782
0.388
0.049
0.214
0.129
0.098
0.381
26,635,605

224.599
0.576
1,562
0.789
0.344
0.038
0.197
0.082
0.072
0.504
856,434

227.667
0.615
1,920
0.791
0.348
0.044
0.229
0.069
0.068
0.000
425,017

69,517
0.306
0.221
8,624
69,705

65,288
0.270
0.193
7,724
3,744

-

Notes: Panel A shows average characteristics of housing transactions for various subsets of the CoreLogic
sample. Column (1) contains all single-family residential transactions between 2008 and 2015. Column (2)
restricts this sample to transactions in tracts that fall on state borders, and Column (3) includes only observations with non-missing housing characteristics (bathrooms, bedrooms, square footage, and age) and dropping
extreme outliers (square footage over 10,000 or a price outside of [10,000 , 2,500,000]. Panel B shows average
characteristics of tax units in these districts, drawn from the IRS Statistics of Income tables. These variables
are measured at the zip code level and mapped to tracts via population-weighted averages.
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Table 1.3: MID Capitalization Across State Borders
Panel A. Naive OLS
(1 − τM ID )

Panel B. Reduced Form
(1 −

N ationalAvg.
τM
)
ID

(1)
0.299
(0.321)
(2)

(3)

-0.689***
(0.180)

Homebuyer
(1 − τM
)
ID

-0.820***
(0.186)

HighIncome
(1 − τM
)
ID

Panel C. Instrumented Models
(1 − τM ID )

IVs
Observations
Brdr-By-Type FE
Brdr-By-Qtr FE

(4)

-1.037***
(0.281)
(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

-0.948***
(0.243)

-1.315***
(0.309)

-1.165***
(0.320)

-0.830***
(0.229)

N ationalAvg.
τM
ID

Homebuyer
τM
ID

HighIncome
τM
ID

All

632,238
X
X

632,238
X
X

632,238
X
X

632,238
X
X

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1.3 using several independent variables and simulated instruments. The dependent variable in each column is log house price. The independent variable in
Panels A and C is the average marginal net-of-tax rate applied to mortgage interest in each state and year
(1 − τM ID ). The independent variables in Panel B are constructed by applying each state’s tax rules in each
N ationalAvg.
year to one of three fixed populations: a nationally representative sample of taxpayers ((1 − τM
)),
ID
Homebuyer
a stylized first-time homebuyer ((1 − τM ID
)), and a high-income household paying the top marginal
HighIncome
tax rate ((1 − τM
)). Panels A and B are estimated by OLS; Panel C uses the independent regressors
ID
from Panel B as instruments for the true average marginal tax rate. The over-identified model in Column (7)
is estimated via two-stop efficient GMM. The sample includes all housing transactions between 2008 and 2015
that occur in a census tract on a state border. Standard errors allow for clustering at the state-year level.
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Table 1.4: Robustness of Border Design Specification
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Fixed Effect Specifications
(1 −

τ M ID )
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Observations
R-squared
Match Sample
House Type FE
Border Pair FE
Brdr-By-Type FE
Brdr-By-Qtr FE
Brdr-By-Year FE
Brdr-By-Type-by-Qtr FE
Brdr-By-Type-by-Year FE
StateBorder-By-Qtr FE
Hedonic Controls

(7)

(8)

(9)

Matched Hedonic Specifications

-0.830***
(0.229)

-0.632***
(0.241)

-0.590**
(0.230)

-0.646***
(0.222)

-0.734***
(0.262)

-0.880***
(0.249)

-0.626**
(0.243)

-0.572**
(0.231)

-0.581**
(0.240)

632,238
0.722
All

650,819
0.664
All
X

101,046
0.663
Qtr

657,289
0.620
All
X
X

385,552
0.801
All

550,462
0.743
All

650,819
0.663
All

101,046
0.663
Qtr

181,133
0.643
Yr

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1.3 using the over-identified model described the
Table 1.3 with various subsets of controls and fixed effects. Sample and variable definitions follow the notes
of Table 1.3 except where noted. Columns (3) and (8) restricts the sample to houses that transact in the same
quarter as an identical house across a state border. Column (9) restricts the sample to matched transactions
occurring in the same year. Hedonic controls include the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, condominium status, presence in a subdivision, house age, and a quadratic in square footage. Standard errors
allow for clustering at the state-year level.

Table 1.5: Robustness of Border Design to Local Economic and Policy Controls
Panel A: Local Controls
(1 − τM ID )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.830***
(0.229)

-0.970***
(0.255)
-0.0377***
(0.00443)

-0.924***
(0.224)

-0.829***
(0.226)

-0.0142***
(0.00229)

-0.904***
(0.263)
-0.0402***
(0.00601)
-0.00117
(0.00150)
-0.0151***
(0.00219)

County Unemployment
County Mean Income

0.000830
(0.00140)

Per-Pupil School Expenditure

Observations
Panel B: State Controls
(1 − τM ID )

632,238

632,238

621,656

608,589

598,007

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

-0.830***
(0.229)

-0.833***
(0.233)
-0.000298
(0.00113)

-0.846***
(0.291)

-1.023***
(0.235)

-0.0504**
(0.0205)

-0.832***
(0.298)
0.000323
(0.00131)
0.0141
(0.0111)
-0.0756**
(0.0328)

632,238

632,238

State GDP
State Gov. Expenditure

-0.000727
(0.00753)

Inter-Gov. Expenditure

Observations

632,238

632,238

632,238

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1.3 using the over-identified model described the
Table 1.3 with various control variables. All regressions include border-x-quarter and border-by-house-type
fixed effects. Sample and variable definitions follow the notes of Table 1.3. The units for all monetary variables
are thousands of real 2016 dollars per person. Unemployment and mean income are measured at the county
level. School spending is measured at the Census’ Local Educational Area (school district) level; when tracts
lie in multiple districts, they are assigned a weighted average of the overlapping districts’ values. Standard
errors allow for clustering at the state-year level.
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Table 1.6: Border Design Using Only State Deductibility Instrument

(1 − τM ID )

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-1.614**
(0.651)

-1.403**
(0.648)
-0.0473***
(0.00516)

-1.515**
(0.620)

-2.201***
(0.622)

-0.0186***
(0.00339)

-1.258**
(0.544)
-0.0574***
(0.00757)
-0.00414**
(0.00181)
-0.0160***
(0.00280)

527,699

517,117

County Unemployment
County Mean Income

-0.000727
(0.00167)

Per-Pupil School Expenditure

Observations

540,359

540,359

529,777

Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation 1.3 using a binary indicator for whether a state
restricts the deductibility of mortgage interest as the only instrument. See Table 1.5 notes for variable definitions. All regressions include border-x-quarter and border-by-house-type fixed effects. The sample includes
all housing transactions between 2008 and 2015 that occur in a census tract bordering a state with a different
tax policy, after dropping states with no state income tax. Standard errors allow for clustering at the state-year
level.
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Table 1.7: Border Difference-in-Difference Estimates of MID Capitalization
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-1.569***
(0.400)
0.00652***
(0.00213)

-1.432**
(0.564)

-1.451**
(0.557)

0.0229
(0.0329)

-1.675***
(0.432)
0.00676***
(0.00223)
-0.0165*
(0.00929)
0.0237
(0.0324)

Panel A: Tax Rate Instruments
(1 − τM ID )

-1.416**
(0.554)

State GDP
State Gov. Exp.

-0.00312
(0.00945)

Inter-Gov. Exp.

Observations

21,059,108

21,059,108

21,059,108

21,059,108

21,059,108

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

-0.851*
(0.453)
0.00651**
(0.00247)

-1.088**
(0.464)

-1.108**
(0.455)

0.0171
(0.0338)

-1.001**
(0.457)
0.00690***
(0.00242)
-0.0156
(0.00962)
0.0271
(0.0358)

21,059,108

21,059,108

Panel B: State Deductibility Instrument
(1 − τM ID )

-1.098**
(0.447)

State GDP
State Gov. Exp.

0.00102
(0.00978)

Inter-Gov. Exp.

Observations

21,059,108

21,059,108

21,059,108

Notes: This table presents instrumental variable esimates of equation 1.3, adding a state fixed effect. All
regressions also include border-x-quarter and border-by-house-type fixed effects. Panel A uses the three instruments described in Table 1.3. Panel B instruments for (1 − τM ID ) with an indicator variable for states that
remove or significantly restrict the deductibility of mortgage interest. The sample contains all counties that
border a state with a different tax policy. Standard errors allow for clustering at the state level.
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Table 1.8: Capitalization Effects Across the Local House Quality Distribution
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(1 − τM ID )

-0.699*
(0.365)

-0.714**
(0.278)

-1.184***
(0.326)

-1.306***
(0.416)

Observations

139,263

134,133

132,838

127,780

Notes: This table shows estimates of the over-identified model discussed in Table 1.3 for subsamples of the
data based on predicted house values. House quality is the predicted value from a hedonic regression. Specifically, it is the fitted value from a regression of log prices on the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms,
condominium status, presence in a subdivision, house age, and a quadratic in square footage. Quartiles are
defined within border-pairs; therefore they reflect the house’s rank in the local quality distribution. See Table
A1.2 for estimates that define quartiles over the national quality distribution. See Table 1.3 notes for other
details of the sample and specification.
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Table 1.9: Parameter Values for User Cost Calculations
λ
rm
rf
m+d
σ
π
τp
τ M ID
τy
ρ

Loan-to-Value Ratio
Mortgage interest rate
Risk-free return (10-yr Treasury)
Maintenance + depreciation
Risk premium for housing
Expected capital gains
Property tax rate
Tax rate applied to deductions
Tax rate on income
Probability of itemizing

Observed in data
3.9%
2.1%
2.5%
2%
2%
1.5%
Inferred from income and county
Inferred from income and county
Inferred from income and county

Notes: Parameter values that are not observed or imputed are drawn from Poterba and Sinai (2011) and Martin
(2018). rm is the average mortgage rate for 30-year, fixed rate agency mortgages originated in 2015, the last
year for which IRS SOI data is available. rf is the average 10-year Treasury rate from 2015. τ M ID , τy , and ρ
are imputed using average values for the appropriate county-income subgroup in IRS SOI county-level data
files.

55

CHAPTER 2 : Housing Disease and Local Public Finance
2.1. Introduction
Median expenditure per student in U.S. public schools grew from $9,131 in 1990 to $12,907
in fiscal year 2008/9, a real change of 41%. Such spectacular growth was not concentrated
in a limited set of school districts: the 10th and 90th percentiles of expenditure per pupil
increased 47% and 44%, respectively. Around the same time period, house prices in U.S.
school districts skyrocketed. Figure 2.1(b) shows that average house prices increased 70%
for the median school district, from $159K in 1993 to $274K by the end of 2007. The 90th
percentile had price growth of 91%, and the 10th percentile had a price increase of 32%.
Could the housing boom have caused those major changes in school expenditures per
pupil?
The answer is “no” according to the leading local public finance models (Oates 1969)
because house prices are just a function of local taxes and amenities,1 and therefore are
thought to have a muted effect on local finances. This intuition comes from Tiebout (1956),
who posited that local expenditures solely reflect household sorting and preferences for
public goods.2 Local government finances are thought to be determined by other factors,
such as fiscal federalism,3 local governmental decisions and transfer schemes,4 local autonomy and competition,5 and more recent “mandates” such as pension benefits and special
education.6
1
This property allows researchers to recover willingness to pay for local public goods and to test whether
those goods are provided at efficient levels. See Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) on how to estimate
willingness to pay for school quality using housing prices, and Brueckner (1979), Barrow and Rouse (2004),
and Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) on how to test for efficiency in the provision of local public goods.
2
A long literature shows the importance of household preferences and sorting for determining the quality
of public education, such as Epple and Sieg (1999), Fernández and Rogerson (2001), Hilber and Mayer (2009),
and Epple, Romano and Sieg (2012).
3
Reviews of the fiscal federalism literature can be found in Oates (1999, 2005).
4
For the impact of local politics see Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and more recently Macartney and Singleton (2017). For the effects of equalization and transfer schemes in education see Murray, Evans and Schwab
(1998), Hoxby (2001), Bradbury, Mayer and Case (2001), Card and Payne (2002), and more recently Jackson,
Johnson, and Persico (2016) and Lafortune, Rothstein and Schanzenbach (2018).
5
See Hoxby (2000), Rothstein (2007), Hoxby (2007), and Clark (2009).
6
See Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2011, and 2012) and Brinkman, Coen-Pirani, and Sieg (forthcoming).
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In this paper we re-examine this standard answer. We propose a new mechanism – housing disease – to explain the changes in local school expenditures during the 1990s and
2000s. Housing disease is a spillover from housing markets. First, housing booms generate unusually high growth rates of housing prices. That triggers a growth in school district
revenues given that local governments raise a share of their funds via property or land. In
turn, school district administrators may have incentives to spend the extra revenues without consulting voters due to complicated budget rules, frictions in re-optimizing tax rates,
or pure rent-seeking. The end result is an increase in education expenditures without a
corresponding shift in local preferences.
This type of mechanism is not unprecedented in the economics literature. In fact we use the
word “disease” to emphasize its similarity to Baumol and Bowen (1966)’s cost disease, a
canonical example of a spillover to the cost of public education stemming from conditions
in a separate market. The primary difference is that, whereas Baumol and Bowen’s cost
disease originates in the labor market, the housing disease’s genesis is the housing market.
The first challenge in estimating the importance of housing disease is that house prices
are endogenous to school quality and household composition. We deal with this issue
by using the timeline of housing booms in each school district in our sample. The variation from local housing booms has two features that are key to our research design: a)
different school districts began to boom across a decade-long period from mid-1990s to
the mid-2000s, some of them multiple times, allowing us to remove the impact of national
macroeconomic factors; b) housing booms in the last cycle were associated neither with
changes in school quality nor with widespread changes in household composition. In Section 2.4 we show how to estimate the timeline of local booms using time series methods
developed by Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and empirically validate the research design by
directly testing the two key features above.7
7

Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2015) and DeFusco et al (2017) use a similar methodology to estimate
the impact of housing booms on investments in human capital and on price increases in nearby metro areas,
respectively.
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The second challenge is that housing data is generally not available for a large sample of
school districts. We solve this problem by amassing the most recent version of the CoreLogic universe of housing transactions from 1993 to 2013 and mapping each home to school
district boundaries. Our sample covers more than 2,000 school districts with almost 60%
of all total enrollment in public schools. The micro data allow us to use a split-sample
approach, such as in Card, Mas and Rothstein (2008), to deal with specification search bias
that arises when the same time series is used to estimate both the timeline and magnitude
of a housing boom (Leamer 1983). One random sample is used to create a price index for
each district and estimate the timing of local booms. The hold out sample is then used to
estimate the magnitude of price changes along the cycle.
We find that school district house prices are nearly 20 percent larger by the end of the fifth
year of a housing boom, when compared to the pre-boom year (net of other housing booms
in the same district, and net of time and district effects). Expenditures per pupil creep up
with a one to two-year lag, turning statistically significant at year 3 and becoming 3 percent
larger by the fifth year of a boom. With those magnitudes in hand we can back out the
house price elasticity of public school finances. We find an elasticity between 0.16 and 0.20,
with our favorite specification resulting in 0.18. This relatively small elasticity is justified
by the fact that a large fraction of school district revenues now come from state and federal
transfers, especially for low income districts.8 We also find slightly larger elasticities for
local housing busts, but our research design is only internally valid for housing booms
– housing busts are usually accompanied by drops in income and employment that are
difficult to disentangle.
The estimates are robust to a number of tests based on samples that include subsets of
school districts, by type (unified, elementary, and secondary) or by the level of independence. The estimates are also robust to using different definitions of housing breakpoints,
8

Those transfers now correspond to more than 50% of total revenues, but this number is difficult to properly measure given that the data may not distinguish between the jurisdiction that collects taxes versus the
jurisdictions that actually has control over taxes – see Hoxby (1996).
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and to the inclusion of a number of demographic characteristics as controls. We further
estimate econometric models in levels (as opposed to using logs) in order to recover the
portion of an additional dollar in the housing tax base that flows to general school expenditures. We find that a $100 increase in the local housing tax base leads to a $1 increase in
school expenditures, which is a reasonable approximation of effective property tax rates
in the United States. This also implies that local school districts are not engaging in major
changes in statutory tax rates after the begin of a housing boom. In the final robustness test
we estimate the same econometric models for U.S. municipalities. Those local jurisdictions
also raise part of their revenues via property taxes, and we find a similar housing disease
effect.
While the estimated elasticities are not especially large, the increase in prices during the
last housing boom was so extraordinary – a cycle never before seen in the United States
(Shiller, 2005) – that housing disease can account for almost 50% of the real increase in public education spending during the 1990s and 2000s. Our back-of-the-envelope calculations
also show housing disease can only account for 20% of the expansion of expenditures in
below median expenditure districts, but can explain 70% of that increase in above median
districts. This heterogeneity is due to small differences in the estimated elasticity for districts below and above the median, and to large differences in the price changes over the
cycle (as shown in Figure 2.1(b)).
These results imply a breakdown of the theoretically efficient choices made by Tiebouttype households. Since the optimal level of expenditures equates marginal costs (local
taxation) with marginal benefits (school services), additional spending induces costs that
exceed its benefits. This inefficiency is the cost of housing disease.9 Empirically though, it
is natural to ask whether these additional resources are really being completely wasted.
We address this question by using detailed school district finance data to measure how the
additional expenditures generated via housing disease are spent. Total expenditure per
9

Details of school finances and the Tiebout model are discussed in Section 2.2.
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pupil increases by $350 five years after a housing boom begins, with $163 assigned to current expenses and $178 allocated to capital expenditures, an almost equal split. Instruction
corresponds to almost the totality of the increased current expenses; and we do not find
new resources being used to increase administrative expenses, ruling out the worst type
of rent seeking.
Among the instructional expenses we also find that pupil-teacher ratios, a proxy for educational quality, improve but at a fairly small rate (less than 1% reduction in pupil-teacher
ratio). We also find a large increase in average salaries and benefits: 4.6% and 5.1% respectively by the end of the fifth year of a housing boom. Those changes in school wages
occur in contrast to average MSA level changes in personal income that remain flat during
the housing booms we study. These wage results could reflect either increases in school
personnel quality/productivity or rent-seeking, a possibility raised by Brueckner and Neumark (2014) and Diamond (2017).
Despite this potential ambiguity in the interpretation of the wage effects, the fact that
pupil-teacher ratios increased, capital budgets grew, and administrative expenses remained
flat suggests that housing disease is accompanied by improvements in the quality of school
inputs, and that bureaucrats are not capturing the increased resources. To check for effects
on educational output, we also provide test score estimates based on National Assessment
of Educational Progress (NAEP), though this analysis suffers from additional shortcomings, noisy measurements, and limited statistical power. Not surprisingly, almost none of
the test score estimates are statistically different from zero.
Overall, this research contributes to the understanding of the increase in public education
spending of 1990s and 2000s. While the large amount of resources devoted to public education still sparks a debate over whether money matters for improving school quality,10
we focus on understanding why the recent growth happened in the first place. We propose
10
Some key studies on this topic include Coleman et al. (1966), Hanushek (1986), Card and Krueger (1992),
Krueger (1999), and Hanushek and Rivkin (2006).
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and test a new mechanism that is generally not taken into account by standard theory and
is difficult to study given data and design limitations. Housing disease may in fact become
more relevant in the near future because extreme price fluctuations are becoming a feature
of the system as opposed to a one-time bug. Housing markets are now characterized by
many local housing booms and busts (Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Sinai (2013)), fueled
by both behavioral and financial factors (Shiller (2005), Mian and Sufi (2009), Favara and
Imbs (2015)), and exacerbated by regulations that limit the supply of new housing (Glaeser
and Gyourko (2018)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews how school district
finances work and the potential for housing disease; Section 2.3 then describes the data
sources and sample construction; Section 2.4 then describes our empirical framework and
tests the validity of our research design; Section 2.5 presents our estimates; and Section 2.6
concludes.

2.2. Public School Finances and Housing Markets
School districts in the United States are funded by a mix of local, state, and federal revenue. In 2014, States and localities provide 46% and 45% of total public school revenues,
respectively, with federal spending contributing the final 9%.11 State and federal transfers
are generally redistributive in nature. At the state level, movements to reduce inequality
in district resources gained traction in the 1970s and accelerated after a series of court cases
in the 1990s. Hoxby (2001), Jackson, Johnson, and Persico (2016) and Lafortune, Rothstein,
and Schanzenbach (2018) provide analyses and more detailed overviews of these reforms.
Property taxes are the dominant source of local revenue. Our empirical analysis focuses
on districts with independent taxing authority, i.e. those with the power to levy taxes in
11

It is important to note that the distinction between state and local revenues is not always clear, due to
the complexities of state revenue-sharing policies. Hoxby (1996) highlights the importance of distinguishing
between the entity that collects revenue – an accounting concept – and the entity that decides how to spend it.
For example, California has a system in which school districts collect taxes locally even though revenue rules
are determined almost entirely by the state.
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order to fund local schools. Mechanisms for selecting property tax rates vary by jurisdiction. Annual budgets, with associated tax rates, are proposed and administered by district
officials, and, in some cases, must be approved by voters. District officials have varying
levels of accountability to their residents; superintendents and schoolboard members may
be directly elected, appointed by other political officers, or a mix of both. In certain cases,
citizens may directly vote on school spending measures (Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein
2010).
Regardless of the variation in accountability measures and tax rules, households are free to
“vote with their feet” by moving to another district if local tax and spending policies stray
too far from the household’s preferences. This intuition underlies the Tiebout (1956) model
and the extensive literature which follows.12 Note that in Tiebout’s original model, districts
use head taxes rather than property taxes to screen residents, but in practice, districts cannot use head taxes and instead raise most of their revenue from property taxes. Hamilton
(1975) notes that local jurisdictions can still achieve efficient sorting and expenditure policies by combining property taxes with zoning. Lot size restrictions establish a minimum
house price in each jurisdiction, mimicking the screening mechanism of Tiebout’s head
tax.
This class of models has generated significant debate over the proper interpretation of
the relationship between local house prices, taxes, and public goods. One point of view
– often referred to as the “benefit view” – emphasizes the across-district relationship between taxes and public goods characteristic of the Tiebout/Hamilton tradition. Taxes reflect the price of local public goods, and in the process the screen out households with
low willingness-to-pay for these amenities. Thus, the costs of higher taxes are efficiently
balanced against residents’ valuations of local public goods.13 While these models vary in
12
Examples include Epple and Sieg (1999), Fernández and Rogerson (2001), Hilber and Mayer (2001), Epple
Romano and Sieg (2012), and Calabrese, Epple, and Romano (2012).
13
Many other papers qualify this interpretation. Barseghyan and Coate (2016) highlight issues that arise
when zoning restrictions – which affect only new construction – are selected by incumbent residents. Banzhaf
and Mangum (2017) emphasize that capitalization can take the form of both fixed access costs, a la Hamilton
(1975), and an increase in the per-unit cost of housing. When taxes affect the marginal cost of housing services,
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their description of the policy levers available to local governments, they almost uniformly
treat house prices based on market-clearing conditions in the housing market.
Using the simplest possible notation, suppose school district leaders choose both the level
of total education expenditure E and the local property tax rate τ to maximize a value
function that increases in expenditure E and decreases in the tax burdens imposed on the
local citizenry. Let T denote the vector of household tax burdens, defined by Ti = τ P hi ,
where P is the price of housing and hi is household i’s housing consumption. Hence,
letting H denote the stock of housing, the district solves the following program:

max V (E, T) subject to E ≤ τ P H
E,τ

In standard models, the tax rate τ can be frictionlessly adjusted each period.14 Optimal
taxes and expenditures are then determined by an equimarginality condition: taxes are increased until the marginal cost of raising revenue equals the marginal benefit of additional
expenditure.15
Suppose now that the district experiences an unexpected housing boom – an increase in
P in our framework. If tax rates can be costlessly adjusted, the district can restore the
initial allocation by a proportional reduction in the property tax rate. Expenditure and
each resident’s tax burden is unchanged.16
they also create a consumption inefficiency. Hilber (2007) and Banzhaf and Mangum (2017) provide useful
overviews of theoretical and empirical work on this question.
14
To guarantee a unique solution, we also assume that V () is twice continuously differentiable, strictly
concave, and obeys standard Inada conditions (Ve (0, .) = ∞, Ve (∞, .) = 0, VTi (., 0, .) = 0, andVTi (., ∞, .) =
−∞).
15
This is obviously an indirect formulation of the district’s decision, rather than a full micro-foundation of
the political-economic equilibrium. Instead of taking a stand on the district preferences, resident preferences,
and the political process that leads to an equilibrium, we use a general value function that captures the key
intuitions.
16
Note that we are implicitly assuming away several effects that may be important in practice. First, we
assume that the population of the town is fixed. While this is perhaps a justifiable assumption in the short
and medium term – especially if we think local decision makers place more weight on current residents than
potential new residents – it ignores the sorting mechanisms underlying Tiebout models. Second, we assume
that expenditures and taxes do not influence prices or quantities, a mechanism emphasized by Hoxby (2001).
The setup here can readily accompany such pass-through effects, but they distract from our main point. Finally, by placing tax burdens directly into the value function (rather than, say, citizens’ after-tax income) we
can ignore the direct effect of the price increase on citizen purchasing power.
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Given the education finance system discussed above, however, changing tax rates can be a
costly process. School district administrators may also hesitate to change tax rules because
they may not be able to distinguish housing disease from other mechanisms that produce
increases in prices and revenues, such as gentrification or local productivity shocks. Suppose that the district has set E and τ in expectation of a certain price level P . If, after
choices are codified, the district learns that prices are actually higher, then revenues will
exceed expectations and must be spent (in part because many states and districts have
rules that prevent schools from keeping large amounts of rainy day funds). Since the policy variables were chosen to equate marginal costs with marginal benefits, the additional
spending induces costs that exceed its benefits. This inefficiency is the cost of housing
disease.
If unexpected increases in P are small and idiosyncratic, there would be no reason to worry
about this mechanism. One of the most salient features of housing markets, however, are
strong boom-and-bust cycles. Moreover, these large swings in prices are difficult to generate in models in which prices depend solely on fundamentals. Glaeser and Nathanson
(2015) review models that allow prices to depart from fundamentals, for reasons such as
uncertainty about long-run supply, limited rationality, search-and-matching frictions, and
lapses in credit standards. Housing disease starts with these departures from competitive
equilibrium prices. More precisely, we use the term to refer to the influence of unexpected
price increases – i.e. those unrelated to local fundamentals like amenities and productivity
– on school district revenues and expenditures.
This idealistic setting assumes, of course, that districts were spending the optimal level of
revenues prior to a housing boom. But if district spending was inefficiently low prior to
the housing shock (because of frictions such as state level regulations described in Cellini,
Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010)), then housing disease could actually improve efficiency.
Another issue involves the possible uses for the revenue windfall, independent of the level
of efficiency in a given district. The simple theory above assumes an objective function that
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depends only on total expenditures, but in practice there are different ways of spending
resources. District officials, for example, could allocate the windfall to sources that benefit
them personally, such as their own salaries. Diamond (2017) and Brueckner and Neumark
(2014) provide evidence that local officials sometimes use their positions to extract rents in
this manner. This effect is more likely if voters pay less attention to tax revenue increases
that result from unexpected windfalls as opposed to politically salient increases in rates.
We explicitly test for the presence of this type of rent-seeking in our empirical work. We
also test if districts spend the additional revenues on instruction and/or capital projects.
Alternatively, district leaders could save the increased revenues and return them to voters
in subsequent years via lower taxes. In some cases, however, districts may have explicit
incentives to avoid this behavior, as unspent funds may crowd out future transfers. To
account for a full range of possible dynamic effects, our empirical specifications allow
prices and expenditures to evolve flexibly over a period of five years following a housing
boom. Before turning to our empirical specification though, the next section reviews the
school and housing data.

2.3. Data
2.3.1. School District Data
Our primary data source for school district finances is the School District Finance Survey
(often referred to as the F-33 survey), which the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) has administered annually since 1995. The datasets report detailed revenue and
expenditure categories for all school districts in the United States. 17 School district boundaries are not constant over time, as districts merge and split with some regularity. We
contacted all state education agencies to request details of the history of district boundary changes. Ultimately we received this information from 36 states, allowing us to create
constant-boundary district definitions for most of our sample. We restrict our final analysis
17

The survey also includes charter school operators, which we do not include in any part of our analysis.
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sample to districts that have independent taxing authority, “unified” districts that include
both elementary and high school students, and districts that never merged or split during that time period. However, we also show that our results are robust to relaxing these
restrictions 18
We supplement the revenue and expenditure data with demographic and staffing information from the District and School Universe Surveys, part of the NCES’ Common Core
of Data. These datasets provide a several useful descriptors for our analysis. First, they
report the racial background of enrolled students and the number of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches. These measures allow us to check whether changes in local housing prices might reflect changes in the composition of local students or residents.
The files also provide detailed staffing information, which we use to construct measures of
average salaries and employment levels for various categories of workers.
Finally, we obtained microdata from the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) to assess whether changes in spending translated into short-term changes in student achievement. We make use of the State NAEP sample, which contains scores from
a national, consistently-normed test administered biannually to a randomly selected subset of students in participating states.19 We average student scores to the district-year-test
level to construct a summary measure of student performance. More precisely, we use
NAEP’s reported “plausible values” in lieu of raw test scores, which are not included in
the microdata. See Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach (2018) and Jacob and Rothstein (2016) for useful discussions of the possible biases that may arise when using modelderived measures of student ability in external analyses.20 Another limitation of the NAEP
18
We use per-pupil expenditure and revenue measures throughout our analysis. One shortcoming of the
NCES data is that it records “snapshot” enrollment as of October 1st of each schoolyear, which may not reflect
district size as accurately as other measures, such as average daily attendance. We are unaware of an annual,
national dataset that records districts’ average daily attendance or a similar measure, however.
19
We are grateful to Julien Lafortune for providing code to link the NAEP microdata to NCES district identifiers.
20
Fortunately, our results are virtually identical when using NAEP plausible values, ability measures estimated from item-response models, or residualized versions of these measures that control for individual
student demographics, suggesting that such biases are not likely to be an important factor in our results.
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is limited coverage in early parts of the sample. Between 1996 and 2002, each biennial
testing cycle offered only math or reading – never both. Furthermore, participation was
optional, and between 41 and 45 states participated in each year during this period. Participation has been mandatory since 2002, however, and the change in sample composition
likely explains the sudden change in math scores apparent in Appendix Figure A2.1.
2.3.2. Housing Transactions Data
Our house price data come from CoreLogic, a private data vendor that aggregates public
deeds records from county recorder’s offices in markets across the country. Houses are preassigned to their Census block group, which we then match to school district boundaries
using Census block relationship files.
We focus attention on districts with sufficient data to at least calculate a continuous quarterly price series between 2000:Q1 and 2007:Q1 (we use data from outside of this time
period when it is available).21 The resulting dataset includes 2,785 school districts and
over 28 million transactions. To eliminate bias from specification search (Leamer 1983),
we randomly split the sample in half and compute constant-quality hedonic price indices
for each sample independently.22 One sample is used to identify and test for the existence
of structural breaks, and the other is used to estimate how prices change in the periods
surrounding the break.
Figure 2.2 (a) plots the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the resulting district-level price indices. The boom period of the recent cycle is apparent at each part in the distribution, with
the median price increasing by 98% during that period. Figure 2.2 (b) plots annual growth
rates of the same series. To remove the effects of seasonality in the housing market, we cal21
Specifically, we only include districts that report at least 16 observations in all quarters during this period,
though we also include periods outside of this window.
22
We estimate hedonic models because their data requirements are much less stringent than repeat-sales
methods, particularly when working with small geographies. In practice, hedonic and repeat-sales estimates
are very similar when both are computationally feasible. We construct our hedonic indices by regressing log
prices on the square footage of the home (and its square), the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms,
the age of the home, and an indicator for condominiums. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and DeFusco et al
(2017) show that this model closely approximates the Case-Shiller index when estimated at the MSA level.
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culate growth rates as year-over-year changes in the quarterly series, i.e. (Pt − Pt−4 )/Pt−4 .
While the national housing bust starting in early 2005 is immediately apparent, there is no
visual evidence of a sudden break during the previous boom period. This fact is essential
to our identification strategy. While most markets experienced a sudden onset of rapid
growth, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in the timing of the booms.
2.3.3. Sample Restrictions and Representativeness
Table 2.1 reports some basic summary statistics and demonstrates how the sample composition changes as we add restrictions. The first column reports summary statistics for
the entire sample of school districts in the F-33 dataset. Moving to the right, we add restrictions one by one until arriving at our main regression sample in column (5). The final
column summarizes data for districts in the regression sample that we are able to match to
test score data.
The most stringent sample restriction is the availability of historical housing transactions
data. While the CoreLogic sample covers more than 90% of U.S. counties in 2016, we require sufficient transaction volume to estimate quarterly price indices starting no later than
the year 2000. Hence, the merge to the housing sample immediately reduces our sample
by 80%. Unsurprisingly, the districts that survive the merge to the housing data tend to be
larger than the national average; enrollment in the breakpoint sample (10,221 students per
district) is nearly three times that of the average district (3,459), corresponding to almost
60% of the total enrollment in public schools. These districts also have larger minority populations, higher student teacher ratios, and greater portions of the population eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch, an indicator of family income. Somewhat reassuringly, revenue per pupil is similar in the housing sample ($11,047/student) as in the overall sample
($11,158/student).
Columns (3) through (5) show the effects of restricting the sample to unified districts only
(as opposed to districts specific to elementary schools or high schools); districts with in-
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dependent taxing authority; and districts with constant borders and no missing financial
data over our sample period. Enrollment, average revenue, student teacher ratios, and
average demographics are largely unaffected by these restrictions. Our favorite sample is
based on Column 5, and it represents 42% of all public school students.

2.4. Empirical Framework and Validity of Research Design
2.4.1. Identifying Structural Breaks and Estimating Magnitudes
Glaeser et al. (2014) provide the motivation and micro-foundations for the existence of
structural breaks in housing prices. In their model, house prices grow at a constant rate
in the steady-state. However, the introduction of a shock to the local economy – e.g. a
demand shifter or a change in expectations – leads to a discrete jump in the growth rate as
the local housing market converges to a new equilibrium. This insight has led to a recent
empirical literature exploiting these sharp changes to understand how changes in house
values affect other economic variables (Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), DeFusco et al. (2017),
Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2015)). Because we closely follow the breakpoint identification and inference methods described in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) and DeFusco et
al. (2017), we sketch an outline of these procedures here and relegate many of the details
to Appendices A2.1 and A2.2.
First, consider the problem of testing for the existence of a single structural break. Denoting
the house price growth rate in district i at time t as di,t , the null hypothesis of no structural
break is:
H0 : di,t = di,0 , t = 1, . . . T

(2.1)

The alternative hypothesis is that the growth rate changes in the middle of the sample, at
a time period t∗ , i.e.:
H1 : di,t =




d1,i (t∗ ), t = 1, ..., t∗


d2,1 (t∗ ), t = t∗ + 1, ..., T
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(2.2)

The first step of our analysis is to identify the value of t∗ that minimizes the residual variation in growth rates. We implement this by searching over all values of t0 in each districts’
price growth series,23 estimating a regression model with separate intercepts for the preand post-t0 periods, and selecting the candidate time period that produces the smallest
sum of squared residuals.
Of course, this procedure will select a candidate breakpoint regardless of whether a break
exists, and some care needs to be taken when constructing tests for the existence of a structural break. If t∗ were known a priori, we could test H1 against H0 using standard methods.
Because we select the break that maximizes the likelihood ratio, however, critical values
for testing must be derived from the distribution of the supremum of the likelihood ratio
statistic (under the null hypothesis of no break). Andrews (1993) and Bai (1997) derive
exact formulas for this distribution, and Estrella (2003) describes numerical methods to
calculate p-values efficiently.
Ultimately, we allow for up to three structural breaks in the price growth series for each
district. Bai (1999) and Bai and Perron (1998) derive tests for the existence of b+1 structural breaks against the null hypothesis of b breaks. Therefore, we test for a second break
whenever we detect a first break at the 5% significance level, and a third break whenever
we identify a significant second break. This recursive testing procedure is valid because, as
shown by Bai (1999) and Bai and Perron (1998), the one-break test remains valid when multiple breaks exist. We identify candidate breakpoints in multiple-break models by looping
over all possible pairs (or triples) of breaks in a districts’ price growth series.
It is also important to note that the regressions used to identify breakpoint locations do
not provide unbiased estimates of the significance and magnitude of the change in price
growth rates at the breakpoint. This is due to the specification search issue identified by
23

The endpoints of our series are data-dependent. For each district, the first period is the earliest quarter
featuring at least 16 transactions, with a hard minimum of 1993:Q1 to focus attention on the most recent cycle.
The final period is the pre-2009 peak of the price level, though our results are robust to capping the series in
2007 for all districts. We do not allow breakpoints to lie in the first two or final two periods of the series.
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Leamer (1983), in which the data-dependent manner by which we identify breakpoints
contributes to a bias in estimating the magnitude of the break. We address this issue via
the split-sample approach suggested by Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008). That is, we randomly split the dataset in half, and use one sample to estimate the breakpoints and the
other to estimate the price response.
We run variants of the panel Equation 2.3 below in order to estimate the magnitude of
changes in price (and also for a number of other school district outcomes) along the housing boom. Denote by Yi,t the log of the house price index in district i and year-quarter t, t∗i,b
the quarter of the bth breakpoint in a district, and Bi the number of breakpoints estimated
for district i:
Yi,t = αi + κt +

Bi
X

6
X




θρ 1[t − t∗i,b = ρ + εi,t

(2.3)

b=1 ρ=−6ρ6=0

where αi and κt are district and time fixed effects, respectively.
This parameterization allows for flexible dynamics in the break’s effects. Each θρ measures
the change in the outcome variable ρ years after the break, relative to the year immediately
prior to the break (note that we omit the dummy variable for relative year zero.) Negative
values of ρ target the “effects” of future breaks, allowing us to test for the existence of pretrends that might confound our research design. The controls included in panel equation
2.3 guarantee that the housing boom effects will be estimated net of calendar effects, school
district fixed effects, and also net of other booms and busts that happened in the same
district.
In the same specification we estimate separate effects for positive breaks, non-significant
breaks, and negative breaks, as we are primarily interested in understanding the effects of
sudden booms – i.e. positive structural breaks. Even though all empirical specifications
will estimate the effect of housing busts, the validity of such estimates are less credible
since many markets begin to decline at essentially the same time, complicating efforts
to separate the effects of bust-induced price variation from the national macroeconomic
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downturn.
2.4.2. Breakpoint Results and Validity of Research Design
For illustrative purposes, each panel of Figure 2.3 plots price growth rates for a separate
district, with estimated breakpoints marked in red. The top left panel shows an example
of a school district with only one positive and statistically significant breakpoint, which
we call a boom. The top right panel has a district with two statistically significant breaks.
The bottom left panel has a district with two booms and one bust in the same district, and
finally, the bottom right panel shows the example of a district with one break that is not
statistically different from zero. Those examples make the obvious point that the number
of breaks we detect depends both on severity of the change in trend as well as the level of
idiosyncratic variance in the series.
The three panels of Figure 2.4 show the full distributions of breakpoint timing for positive breaks, negative breaks, and non-significant breaks. Crucially for our identification
strategy, the positive breaks are well distributed between 1998 and 2005. Cross-sectional
variation in the timing of housing booms allows us to separate shocks to the local housing
market from national trends and changes to the macroeconomy. Negative breaks, on the
other hand, are concentrated largely during the onsets of economic downturns in 2001 and
2006. Overall, the 1,725 district time series in our favorite regression sample produce 1,107
booms, 541 busts, and 405 non-significant breaks.
Figure 2.5 then shows that school district housing booms are not preceded by changes
in total expenditures per pupil, pupil-teacher ratios, and mathematics and reading test
scores. That is not a surprise given that quality of school amenities is not part of the list
of causes of the housing boom. Figure 2.6 then turns to the demographic composition
of school districts. First, there is no evidence of changes in racial composition around
booms. Second, while it appears that use of free lunch is lower in the post-boom period,
the magnitude of the change is quite small compared to the size of the price effect. To

72

confirm that shifts in demographics are not driving our results, in the next section we
report results from models that control for %white, %black, %Hispanic, and % free lunch
as a robustness check. Their inclusion does not impact the estimation of the house price
elasticity of expenditures per pupil.
Finally, while annual income data are not available at the school district level, Ferreira
and Gyourko (2011) estimate how average personal incomes vary during MSA level housing booms using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These estimates are
available in Appendix Table A2.1, and show that personal incomes did not change before
or after the housing boom, which is a known feature of that housing cycle. While all tests
above corroborate our main assumptions about demographics, at the end of Section 2.5 we
will also discuss other possible mechanisms through which booms could alter unobserved
demographic composition.

2.5. Results
2.5.1. House Prices and School Expenditures
The first three columns of Table 2.2 report how house prices evolved after the start of a
school district housing boom, bust, or non-significant breakpoint. Prices jump 4.8% in the
first year of a boom, and keep growing in the following years, reaching 20.1% above the
baseline in relative year 5. Busts have a symmetric result with cumulative price reductions of 12.0% by relative year 5. Districts that did not boom or bust had negligible price
increases.
Estimates for expenditures per pupil are shown in Columns 4, 5 and 6. Expenditures start
to creep up in the second year of a housing boom, become statistically significant in year
3, and reach a peak of 3.3% in relative year 4. Busts again have a mirrored pattern of
reductions in expenditures. None of the estimates are significant for school districts with
non-significant breaks.

73

Figure 2.7 plots the impact of local housing booms on prices and expenditures together.
Both show no trends prior to the beginning of the boom. But while prices immediately
respond to the beginning of a boom, expenditures respond with a lag – matching the institutional features of school district finances discussed in Section 2.2. Finally, the size of the
price effect is an order of magnitude higher than the expenditure effect.
Table 2.3 explores a number of robustness tests. Column 1 shows our preferred estimates
again to facilitate comparisons. Column 2 includes the full sample of school districts in
our data, prior to restricting the sample to independent unified school districts that never
experienced a split or a merge and that possess a complete panel of finance data.24 The
path of the coefficients is similar, but the point estimates are about 20% smaller - which is
not surprising given the non-consistent sample. Column 3 then excludes non-independent
school districts from the full sample, and the resulting point estimates for expenditures per
pupil become slightly larger. Column 4 trims outliers in our preferred sample by excluding
districts with expenditure growth rates in the top or bottom 1% of the sample. These
estimates are only slightly smaller for house prices and similar for expenditures per pupil.
Column 5 only uses the one-breakpoint model. Price and expenditure estimates increase
by the same proportion. The intuition for this result is that such model does not control
for a second or third break, and therefore the effects of multiple booms are loaded into
the one break. Finally, Column 6 uses our original specification with the addition of school
demographics. Estimates are practically unchanged, which corroborates the validity of the
research design.
2.5.2. House Price Elasticity of Expenditures Per Pupil
In this section we back out the house price elasticity of expenditures per pupil. One complication is that it is difficult to pin down the precise lag structure for these elasticities given
the heterogeneity in school finance structures in the United States. We therefore present
24
We have estimated all results in this paper using the full sample of districts that we match to our housing
dataset, and our findings are unaffected. The expenditure and revenue coefficients decrease slightly, as one
would expect when many districts without independent taxing authority are added to the sample.

74

results from two types of Wald estimator. One divides the point estimates of expenditures
per pupil in time t by the price effect in time t − 1 (the lagged price elasticity) and one
that divides the expenditure coefficient by the price coefficient from the same period (the
concurrent price elasticity). Standard errors are calculated via the delta method.
Columns 1, 2, and 3 of the first row of Table 2.4 show the estimated lagged price elasticities for relative years 3, 4 and 5. The estimates are remarkably stable, ranging from 0.16
to 0.20. The last column shows the estimate for a specification that bunches relative years
three through five, producing a weighted average elasticity of 0.18. The next row uses
concurrent estimates as opposed to the lagged structure. These concurrent elasticities are
slightly smaller, with a weighted average of 0.16.25 Next, the table reports the elasticities
for the busts, showing a number that is larger than the ones for the boom but imprecisely
estimated (the pooled elasticity estimate is 0.34). One possible reason for the larger elasticity is that, as we mentioned before, the busts in our sample are bunched in the onset of
recessions, and therefore those results might be confounded by other factors, such as drops
in employment and wages.
Next we investigate if there is heterogeneity in these elasticities. We first create indicators
for districts that were below and above the median expenditure per pupil in 1996, and
then fully interact them with the relative year dummies. We run these models for prices
and expenditures and calculate elasticities that are reported in the last two rows of Table 4.
Although we have a relatively large sample of districts, it is not sufficient to produce heterogeneity estimates that are statistically different from each other. However, the pattern of
the point estimates is suggestive: school districts with above median initial expenditures
per pupil have a larger elasticity than the below median districts.
These results match a couple of important features of the American school finance system:
25

Our estimated elasticities are somewhat smaller than existing estimates of the property-tax elasticity for
cities and states. Lutz (2008) estimates a value of 0.4 using national and state level time series analysis, while
Vlaicu and Whalley (2011) find a 0.74 elasticity for California cities using an instrumental variable constructed
from housing supply constraints.
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school districts receive a large fraction of their revenues from state and federal transfers,
and those transfers are disproportionally more relevant to low expenditure districts. In
this setting, average elasticities should be relatively small, and high expenditure districts
should have higher elasticities.
With the boom elasticities in hand we can back out by how much housing disease impacted
the rise in public education spending in the United States during the 1990s and 2000s. The
main assumption needed for this exercise is that the estimated elasticities can be applied
to all price changes, not just the price changes from the variation used in our research design. While this might seem like a strong assumption, the sample period is characterized
by little changes in real wages and incomes. While there is still an ongoing debate about
the causes of the last housing boom (i.e,, changes in credit supply, changes in house price
expectations, or a combination of both) the current consensus is that a small part of the
cycle was due to real changes in fundamentals. Finally, we also assume no general equilibrium consequences arising from the initial changes in prices, which is consistent with the
lack of changes in demographics observed in Figure 2.6.
The underlying data from Figure 2.1 shows that school districts had an average house
price increase of 95.17% from 1995 to 2007 (right before the Great Recession). Multiplying
that number by the 0.18 elasticity gives a change in expenditure per pupil of 17.13%. That
corresponds to about half of the observed change in average expenditures per pupil from
1996 to 2008, implying that housing disease was the most important determinant of school
finances during that period. The main driver of this effect is the unprecedented increase in
house prices.
We also calculate heterogeneity by using the price changes from the bottom and top of the
distribution (P90 and P10), and applying the below and above median expenditure heterogeneity in elasticities reported in Table 2.4.26 Housing disease can only account for 20% of
the expansion of expenditures in below median expenditure districts, but can explain 70%
26

Separate estimates for prices and expenditures per pupil are shown in Appendix Table A2.2.

76

of that increase in above median districts. Again, this reflects the fact that low expenditure
districts are much more dependent on state and federal transfers and the fact that housing
booms were much larger at the top of the distribution.
2.5.3. U.S. Municipalities
School districts may not be the only jurisdictions that suffer the effects of housing disease.
States, counties, cities, and other special districts also rely on housing markets to raise
funds. In this subsection we estimate the house price elasticity of expenditures per citizen
for municipalities. We focus on these jurisdictions because the large number of U.S. cities
allows us to carry out a similar empirical exercise. There are more than 35,000 cities in the
United States, but we focus on cities with more than 20,000 residents because of the better
data coverage.27 Of this subset of cities, 1,528 have enough housing data to conduct the
breakpoint analysis.
With the timeline of municipal housing booms in hand, we proceed with estimating Equation 2.3 for both house prices and expenditures per citizen. Figure 2.8 plots those point
estimates. The pattern for price and expenditure changes is remarkably close to the price
dynamics reported for school districts in Figure 2.7. Table 2.5 then reports elasticities for
municipalities. Our preferred specification that pools years 3 to 5 shows a lagged price
elasticity of 0.18, which is again similar to the number estimated for school districts. Elasticities for the negative breaks are noisier, presumably because of the smaller number of
cities.
2.5.4. Housing Tax Base and School Expenditures
Thus far we have measured the effects of structural breaks in housing markets in logarithms, which facilitate the interpretation of relative magnitudes and the calculation of
elasticities. Estimating the relationship in levels allows for a slightly different interpretation. Specifically, if we can obtain the causal relationship between the dollar value of all
27

Annual fiscal data for municipalities come from two sources: Census of Governments and Annual Survey
of State & Local Government Finances.
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homes in the district (i.e. the residential property tax base) and total district expenditures,
we can interpret the estimated magnitude as the portion of an additional dollar in housing
tax base that is spent on schools.
To measure the local tax base,28 we need to measure both housing quantities and prices.
We first obtain the total number of housing units in each school district in the Census years
2000 and 2010 by aggregating block level data from the Census SF1 files. For the earlier and
intervening years, we interpolate linearly. We then multiply these measures with average
house prices recorded in the CoreLogic data to obtain a rough estimate of the value of each
district’s housing stock.29
After constructing the tax base measure, we turn to estimating its effect on expenditures
and revenues, using Equation 2.3. Estimates of the separate effects on the tax base and total
expenditures are reported in Appendix Table A2.4. With these in hand, we apply the same
Wald estimators used for the elasticities and report the results in Table 2.6. The last column provides the concurrent and lagged estimates after pooling years three to five. Both
estimates are similar, indicating that $100 dollars of additional housing tax base induced
by a boom generates an additional dollar of school spending. Single-year estimates range
from 0.75% to 1.20%.
We interpret these coefficients as reflecting of the marginal effective property tax rate used
to raise funds for the school districts. Note that the effective rate is different than the
statutory property tax rate, as the former will incorporate the influence of state transfer
schemes, collections from other jurisdictions, and frictions in the re-assessment process.
Systematic data on property tax rates is generally not available, but our estimated magni28

The property tax literature commonly refers to the total value of housing in a locality as “housing wealth.”
In our context, we prefer the term “residential tax base” for two reasons. First, an increase in the price of
housing need not increase wealth; for permanent residents, the increase in asset values is precisely offset by
the increase in prices. Second, “wealth effects” have a different meaning in economics, and referring to the tax
base preempts confusion.
29
Note that we are making at least two assumptions that are unlikely to hold in practice. First, home construction is cyclic, not linear. Second, we only observe average prices for houses that transact, which may not
be a representative sample of the local housing stock. Both of these assumptions are born of necessity, and any
associated biases are at least ameliorated by district and time fixed effects.
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tude is close to the national median inferred from self-reports in the American Community
Survey (Harris and Moore 2013). The overall consistency likely indicates that districts do
not significantly change their tax rates in the short term in response to the change in the
tax base.
2.5.5. School District Revenues
Even though the tax base estimates above indicate that districts are not dramatically changing tax rates after a boom begins, one caveat with our study is that adjustments in tax rates
and other local rules and regulations are not observed in the data. If districts reduce tax
rates after the start of a housing boom, then we underestimate the elasticity - but can still
interpret the results as a combination of the direct price effect plus the indirect political
effect of potential adjustments in tax rates. The school district revenue data do not help
solving this problem because of three issues: a) it only reports total revenues as opposed
to a breakdown of tax base and tax rates; b) even the breakdown by local versus state
or federal transfer is muddled because it is difficult to disentangle the role of the school
district as tax collector versus who in fact has control of the tax resources (Hoxby 1996);
c) the revenue data is noisier than the expenditure data because of reporting standards.
For example, revenues for capital projects that invest (spend) resources for five or seven
years are fully recorded in the first year of the project. A similar phenomenon occurs with
private donations.
Further complications arise from state policies that either restrict districts’ taxing ability
or redistribute revenues. Such policies are quite common; see Hoxby (2001) and Jackson,
Johnson, and Persico (2016), who carefully track court cases and state legislation to evaluate the impacts of state policy changes. We are primarily interested in how such policies
might mediate housing disease, not the overall impact of these policies. Accordingly, we
need only focus on aspects of state formulas that respond to changes in the local property tax base. Note that many common formula features, such as foundation formulas or
equalization policies, are not directly affected by house price growth, so their impacts are
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therefore absorbed by district fixed effects.
Therefore, we focus attention on state policies that restrict the growth of local property
taxes by placing explicit limits on property tax growth, either by capping growth in assessments or capping revenue growth directly. We draw our classifications from Hightower, Mitani, and Swanson (2010), who surveyed all 50 states and categorized funding
formulas along various dimensions.30 In light of these issues, Table 2.7 reports a robustness test with magnitude estimates for total revenues and for revenue subcategories (local,
state, and federal) in states with and without property tax growth caps. Total revenue
per pupil follows a path that is not statistically different from the path observed for total
expenditures per pupil. As one would expect, local revenues respond to housing booms
in uncapped states only. When property tax increases are restricted, housing booms produce small and statistically insignificant effects. State revenues show the opposite pattern:
zero effect in uncapped states and positive effects in capped states. But again, we caution
against drawing strong conclusions from the revenue data given the many measurement
issues explained above.
2.5.6. Type of School Expenditures and Quality
How are the additional resources arising from housing disease spent by school districts?
Reported school expenditures are split into three main categories: current (corresponding
to 84.7% of the total expenditures during the sample period), capital (10.5%) and others
(4.8%).31 Columns 1 and 2, of Table 2.8 report estimates for capital and current expenditures. Current expenditures increase by 1.7% in year 5, while capital expenditures have
a much larger effect, increasing 12.6% above the baseline. Converting those number into
dollars by multiplying the point estimate in year 5 by the baseline average in year 0, we
find an almost perfect split in the allocation of extra dollars between current and capi30

We are omitting one formula characteristic that is likely relevant: district spending caps. While not directly
tied to growth, when the constraint binds – as they frequently do, in practice – they eliminate the relationship
between house prices and revenue.
31
Other types of expenditure include interest on debt and payments to other governments or school systems.
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tal projects: current expenditures increase by $163 while capital expenditures increase by
$179.
Next we split current expenditure into its two key categories, instruction and services,
and present the estimates in Columns 3 and 4.32 About 2/3 of the additional current expenditures (by year 5) goes directly towards instruction, while the other 1/3 is allocated
to services. Finally, in Columns 5, 6, and 7 we break down the service component into
instruction, pupil, and administration.33 Instruction and pupil services concentrate the
majority of the extra resources, while administrative cost point estimates are very small
and not statistically different from zero.
Further, we test if the additional instruction expenditures are allocated to the quantity of
teachers – which reduces pupil-teacher ratios – or to raises in wages and benefits paid to
the teachers. Estimates are shown in Table 2.9. We find a mix of both: large increases
in average salaries and benefits in years four and five (4.6% and 5.1% respectively), and
moderate decline in pupil-teacher ratios moderately after a boom (slightly less than 1%).
We also report separate effects for instructional salaries, administrative salaries, and other
salaries in Appendix Table A2.5 though our construction of these variables requires significant caveats.34 These estimates corroborate the result that administrative costs are
not increasing with housing disease. Ultimately housing disease increases the quality of
school inputs by the combination of additional resources devoted to instruction and capital
projects, while not expanding bureaucratic expenses.
32
Instruction accounts for 60.9% of current expenditures, most of which is teacher salaries and benefits
(though instructional aides are also included in this category). Services are 33.8%. Examples of service employees include support, administrative, operations, transportation, and business staff.
33
Instructional services are expenses related to instruction that do not involve interaction between students
and teachers in the classroom; examples include staff training, curriculum development, and technological
services. Pupil support includes administrative, guidance, health, and logistical expenditures, such as counseling, speech therapy, and record maintenance. Administrative services include operations associated with
the district office or the office of the school principal.
34
We calculate average salaries by dividing total spending on salaries (obtained from the F-33 Finance file)
by the number of employees (obtained from the Common Core of Data survey file). Unfortunately, these
two datasets do not group employees into consistent categories, so we aggregate up to the broad groupings
described here. Mapping the categories to a common definition nonetheless requires some guesswork. To
reduce the influence of misclassification errors, we drop districts with fewer than ten employees in a given
category, since errors in employee counts are most harmful in small samples.

81

Table 2.10 then presents point estimates for math and reading tests scores, for both 4th and
8th graders, in columns 1 through 4. Because the NAEP test is only administered every
two years, we pool relative-year coefficients into groups of two. The estimates are noisy,
in part because test scores are never available for 15% of our main regression sample and
inconsistently available for other districts. We see no significant effects on math scores in
any specification. There is some evidence that reading scores increased for fourth graders,
but not for 8th graders.
We are hesitant to over-interpret the 4th grade reading test score estimates for several reasons. First, the effects enter with a substantial lag. The estimates are driven by observations
long after the boom, placing significant strain on our identification strategy. The extended
lag also creates an unbalanced panel; we only observe five post-boom years for districts
with positive breaks relatively early in the sample, which are observably different from the
late-breaking areas. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that we do not observe a similar increase
in math scores. We are unaware of any reason to expect reading scores to respond more
strongly to increased expenditures than math scores. In fact, generally speaking, math
scores are more responsive to educational intervention than reading scores for school-age
children (Fryer 2017). Finally, as explained in the data section, NAEP performance data is
based on plausible value predictions of individual test scores, as opposed to the raw tests
scores per se.
2.5.7. General Equilibrium Consequences
Our results assumed that sorting based on unobservables were not driving the estimates,
and we corroborated this assumption by looking at how observed school demographics changed around the timeline of local housing booms. However, one could posit that
housing booms may induce a higher share of high income families or families with more
school-age children to move to better school districts (or districts with higher expenditures per pupil) just because of budget constraints. The mechanism is simple: households
with higher unobserved willingness to pay for those school districts will win the bidding
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war for the limited supply of homes in those districts. Such effects, though, could only
have a trivial impact on the overall composition of households in a school district because
only a small fraction of homeowners move every year. Moreover, new households likely
have very little influence in the local political decisions of school boards given that they
are mostly newcomers. To the extent that new households do affect tax and spending decisions, one could consider these changes part of the housing disease effect. Notably, if
housing disease consists of both direct price effects and any secondary effects on policy,
our point estimates are still consistent, though they have a more reduced-form interpretation.
Our discussion also implicitly assumes that housing wealth effects do not operate – that
is, the increase in house prices does not cause households to demand higher education
expenditures. In theory wealth effects should not occur in this setting because housing
consumption remains constant: homeowners would have to sell their current house to
tap the new wealth, but the cost of buying a new similar home would completely offset
the gains from the previous sale. Behavioral factors could generate some type of illusory
wealth effect, but results in the finance literature (e.g. DeFusco (forthcoming)) suggests
that such wealth effects are small in practice, and therefore unlikely to drive our results.
Finally, another general equilibrium consequence of housing disease depends on the degree of inefficiency of the new expenditure levels. High levels of inefficient spending
should lead to lower future house prices and a reduction in expenditures. Those second
order effects may happen with even longer lags though, making its estimation not suitable
in our setting.

2.6. Conclusion
Both housing prices and educational spending rose dramatically in the 1990s and 2000s.
Traditional public finance theory views public school districts as a set of local jurisdictions
that provide different degrees of school quality, and access to those benefits is capitalized
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into house prices. This paper shows that the reverse causal channel should not be ignored:
house price increases lead to additional spending per pupil by increasing the local tax
base, and local administrators have incentives to spend those extra funds. We refer to this
phenomenon as housing disease, as the increase in expenditures comes from a housing
market spillover rather than a political decision weighing the benefits of school spending
against the costs of increased tax burdens.
The magnitude of the estimated effect is substantial: we estimate house price elasticities of
per-pupil expenditures of 0.16-0.20, implying that rising house prices can explain roughly
half of the increase in per-pupil expenditures leading up to the Great Recession. Although
housing disease is a source of inefficiency in local finances, we find that the spending
increases are concentrated on student instruction and capital projects, and not administrator salaries, suggesting that improvements in school quality may have accompanied the
increase in school expenditures. Our results also have important implications for hedonic
valuation methods. As noted previously, the Tiebout (1956) assumptions are often invoked
to justify regressing house prices on measures of local amenities to recover homeowners’
valuations of these amenities (see Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) and Hilber (2007) for
discussions). Our results point to a potential reverse causality issue when these methods
are used to value local public goods. Future work should take care to assess and address
this potential bias.
Even after the widespread growth of state and federal revenue sharing rules in the past
decades, our results show that district finances are still influenced by local housing conditions. Since there is little reason to believe that housing cycles are disappearing, housing
disease will remain a relevant feature of the American landscape. It may even grow in importance, as long as local communities have the power to constrain new housing development through zoning rules. Those regulations not only magnify the housing affordability
problem in the United States, but also increase the cost of local services via housing disease. In fact, an interesting area of future work relates to how individuals within a district
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are bearing the incidence of housing disease, and how jurisdictions interested in reducing
localities’ exposure to price shocks should alter their taxing framework.
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Table 2.1: Sample Restrictions and Representativeness

Number of Districts
Enrollment
Revenue Per Pupil
Student/Teacher ratio
Percent Black (K-4)
Percent Hispanic (K-4)
Percent Free-Lunch

All

Merged
with
Housing

Unified
Districts
Only

Indep.
Districts
Only

District
Finance
Sample

Test
Score
Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

13850
3459
11158
14.37
0.07
0.1
0.27

2785
10221
11047
16.84
0.1
0.17
0.2

2070
12334
10929
16.61
0.1
0.15
0.2

1748
11750
10696
17.11
0.1
0.16
0.21

1716
11706
10725
17.06
0.1
0.16
0.21

1465
13200
10562
17.07
0.11
0.16
0.21

Notes: All variables are reported for the year 2005. Restrictions are added cumulatively; hence each column
is a subset of the column directly to its left. The district finance regression sample includes only districts with
constant boundaries and no missing finance data during our sample period.
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Table 2.2: Price and Expenditure Impacts of Housing Booms and Busts
Log Price

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

Log Expenditure

Positive

Non-Sig.

Negative

Positive

Non-Sig.

Negative

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.048***
(0.004)
0.116***
(0.006)
0.168***
(0.007)
0.196***
(0.008)
0.201***
(0.009)

0.003
(0.003)
0.008*
(0.004)
0.010
(0.006)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.003
(0.010)

-0.014***
(0.004)
-0.032***
(0.005)
-0.048***
(0.008)
-0.079***
(0.011)
-0.120***
(0.013)

0.004
(0.005)
0.012*
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.007)
0.033***
(0.008)
0.030***
(0.008)

-0.003
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.007)
0.004
(0.008)
0.003
(0.008)
0.008
(0.010)

0.002
(0.007)
-0.004
(0.010)
-0.017
(0.010)
-0.012
(0.010)
-0.025**
(0.012)

0.859
88,534

0.859
88,534

0.859
88,534

0.797
25,740

0.797
25,740

0.797
25,740

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: Prices are estimated using quarterly data, while expenditures are only available annually. All models
also include a dummy for all pre-break years, a dummy for all relative years 6 and above, district fixed effects,
and year fixed effects. The sample includes all independent, unified districts with no missing finance data,
constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints (see text for the precise criterion). Standard errors allow for clustering at the district level. ***, **, and * reflect statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% confidence, respectively.
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Table 2.3: Robustness of Price and Expenditure Effects of Housing Booms
Main
Sample

All
Districts

All Indep.
Districts

Trimmed
Sample

Single
Break

Demog.
Ctrls

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.048***
(0.004)
0.116***
(0.006)
0.168***
(0.007)
0.196***
(0.008)
0.201***
(0.009)

0.041***
(0.003)
0.106***
(0.004)
0.154***
(0.005)
0.174***
(0.006)
0.172***
(0.007)

0.046***
(0.004)
0.115***
(0.005)
0.163***
(0.005)
0.182***
(0.006)
0.179***
(0.007)

0.046***
(0.005)
0.114***
(0.006)
0.165***
(0.007)
0.192***
(0.008)
0.196***
(0.009)

0.061***
(0.003)
0.142***
(0.005)
0.210***
(0.007)
0.254***
(0.009)
0.281***
(0.012)

0.050***
(0.004)
0.117***
(0.006)
0.166***
(0.007)
0.193***
(0.008)
0.198***
(0.009)

0.859
88,534

0.874
144,605

0.871
126,495

0.864
74,316

0.857
88,534

0.859
86,682

Panel B. Effects on ln(Expenditures Per Student)
Relative Year = 1
0.004
0.004
-0.005
-0.004
Relative Year = 2
0.012*
0.009*
-0.006
-0.005
Relative Year = 3
0.023***
0.013**
-0.007
-0.005
Relative Year = 4
0.033***
0.022***
-0.008
-0.006
Relative Year = 5
0.030***
0.017***
-0.008
-0.006

0.006
-0.004
0.012**
-0.005
0.015***
-0.006
0.024***
-0.006
0.018***
-0.007

0.002
-0.004
0.015**
-0.006
0.024***
-0.006
0.032***
-0.007
0.029***
-0.007

0.007
-0.005
0.014**
-0.007
0.030***
-0.008
0.042***
-0.01
0.046***
-0.01

0.004
-0.005
0.012*
-0.006
0.023***
-0.007
0.033***
-0.008
0.030***
-0.008

0.795
36,578

0.849
21,405

0.797
25,740

0.798
25,274

Panel A. Effects on ln(Price)
Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations

R-squared
Number of observations

0.797
25,740

0.801
41,678

Notes: Column (1) reproduces the results in Table 2.2; see Table 2.2 notes for details of the sample and specification. Column (2) includes all districts with sufficient housing data to estimate breakpoints (see text for the
precise criterion). Column (3) restricts this sample to districts with independent taxing authority. Column (4)
imposes the other restrictions in our main regression sample and also removes districts whose annual revenue
growth falls in the top or bottom one percent of observed values in our sample. Column (5) follows the main
regression sample but uses breakpoint results calculated from a model that allows at most one break per district. Column (6) follows the main regression sample and specification but adds controls for the percentage of
minority students and the percentage of students eligible for free lunch.
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Table 2.4: Education Expenditure Elasticities of School District House Prices
Relative
Year 3

Relative
Year 4

Relative
Year 5

Pooled
Yrs. 3-5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.18***
(0.05)
0.14***
(0.04)

0.20***
(0.04)
0.19***
(0.04)

0.16***
(0.04)
0.17***
(0.04)

0.18***
(0.04)
0.16***
(0.04)

0.54*
(0.33)
Heterogeneity in Lagged Price Elasticities
High-Expenditure Districts
0.20*
(0.11)
Low-Expenditure Districts
0.16***
(0.06)

0.21
(0.19)

0.33**
(0.15)

0.34*
(0.19)

0.21**
(0.09)
0.20***
(0.05)

0.17**
(0.08)
0.16***
(0.05)

0.20**
(0.08)
0.17***
(0.05)

All Positive Breaks
Lagged Price Elasticity
Concurrent Price Elasticity
All Negative Breaks
Lagged Price Elasticity

Notes: Elasticities are the ratio of coefficients on log expenditures and log price. Lagged price elasticities
divide expenditure coefficients by price coefficients from the previous year. Concurrent price elasticities divide
expenditure and price coefficients from the same year. We collapse price data to the annual level to create a
common estimation dataset and estimate models via seemingly unrelated regression to compute standard
errors. Otherwise, the sample and specification follow the description in Table 2.2. High (low) expenditure
districts are districts with per-student expenditures above (below) the sample median in 1996. The underlying
regression results for these subsamples are reported in Table A2.2. Standard errors allow for clustering at the
district level. ***, **, and * reflect statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Municipal Expenditure Elasticities of Local House Prices

All Positive Breaks
Lagged Price Elasticity
Concurrent Price Elasticity
All Negative Breaks
Lagged Price Elasticity

Relative
Year 3

Relative
Year 4

Relative
Year 5

Pooled
Yrs. 3-5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.15
(0.13)
0.10
(0.08)

0.19**
(0.08)
0.17**
(0.07)

0.25***
(0.08)
0.25***
(0.08)

0.18**
(0.08)
0.15**
(0.06)

1.34**
(0.67)

0.53*
(0.28)

0.52***
(0.20)

0.64**
(0.31)

Notes: These estimates show the ratio of coefficients on total expenditures and coefficients the total value of the
districts’ housing stocks. Hence, the reported effects can be interpreted as the increase in education spending
resulting from a one-dollar increase in the value of the residential property tax base. See Table A2.4 for the
underlying regression results. We measure the value of housing stocks by multiplying average transaction
prices in the CoreLogic data by the number of housing units in each district. The latter are obtained from the
2000 and 2010 Censuses, and we interpolate linearly in other years. As in Table 2.4, lagged (concurrent) effects
divide expenditure coefficients by tax base coefficients from the previous (same) year. Standard errors allow
for clustering at the district level. ***, **, and * reflect statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence,
respectively.
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Table 2.6: Effects of Changes in the Residential Property Tax Base on Education Expenditures

All Positive Breaks
Lagged Effect
Concurrent Effect

Relative
Year 3

Relative
Year 4

Relative
Year 5

Pooled
Yrs. 3-5

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0079***
(0.0012)
0.0075***
(0.0015)

0.0090***
(0.0016)
0.0120***
(0.0030)

0.0114***
(0.0024)
0.0118***
(0.0029)

0.0097***
(0.0016)
0.0100***
(0.0022)

Notes: These estimates show the ratio of coefficients on total expenditures and coefficients the total value of the
districts’ housing stocks. Hence, the reported effects can be interpreted as the increase in education spending
resulting from a one-dollar increase in the value of the residential property tax base. See Table A2.4 for the
underlying regression results. We measure value of housing stocks by multiplying average transaction prices
in the CoreLogic data by the number of housing units in each district. The latter are obtained from the 2000
and 2010 Censuses, and we interpolate linearly in other years Lagged price elasticities divide expenditure
coefficients by price coefficients from the previous year. As in Table 4, lagged (concurrent) effects divide
expenditure coefficients by tax base coefficients from the previous (same) year. We measure district the value
of housing stocks by multiplying average transaction prices in the CoreLogic data by the number of housing
units in each district. The latter are obtained from the 2000 and 2010 Censuses, and we interpolate linearly in
other years. Standard errors allow for clustering at the district level. ***, **, and * reflect statistical significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Effects on Total District Revenues and Revenue Sources
Full Sample

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
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Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

No Property Tax Growth Cap

Property Tax Growth Cap

Log Total
Revenues

Log Local
Revenues

Log State
Revenues

Log Federal
Revenues

Log Local
Revenues

Log State
Revenues

Log Federal
Revenues

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.007
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
0.014***
(0.005)
0.025***
(0.005)
0.012**
(0.005)

-0.005
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.007)
0.020**
(0.009)
0.023**
(0.010)
0.029***
(0.010)

0.001
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.008)
0.011
(0.010)
0.010
(0.012)
-0.012
(0.013)

-0.008
(0.010)
-0.026***
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.017)

0.014
(0.009)
0.011
(0.009)
0.007
(0.010)
0.003
(0.012)
-0.019
(0.012)

0.018
(0.013)
0.030**
(0.014)
0.041***
(0.014)
0.056***
(0.015)
0.023
(0.015)

0.024**
(0.010)
0.025**
(0.011)
0.002
(0.016)
0.014
(0.012)
0.025
(0.016)

0.909
25,740

0.95
25,739

0.867
25,739

0.907
25,721

0.95
25,739

0.867
25,739

0.907
25,721

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for details of the sample and specification.

Table 2.8: Effects on Expenditure Subcategories
Log Expenditure

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
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Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Mean Expenditure
Time FEs
Area FEs

Current

Capital

Current
Instruction

Current
Services

Service
Pupil

Service
Instructional

Service
Administrative

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

0.003
(0.002)
0.010***
(0.003)
0.014***
(0.003)
0.018***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.003)

0.004
(0.036)
0.062
(0.049)
0.116**
(0.055)
0.175***
(0.060)
0.126**
(0.060)

0.006**
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.003)
0.021***
(0.003)
0.019***
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.003)
0.008**
(0.004)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.016***
(0.005)
0.016***
(0.005)

-0.008
(0.006)
0.008
(0.007)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.032***
(0.009)
0.042***
(0.010)

0.003
(0.008)
0.027**
(0.011)
0.029**
(0.013)
0.045***
(0.013)
0.035**
(0.013)

-0.005
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
0.004
(0.007)
0.008
(0.007)

0.958
25,739
9,614

0.293
25,729
1,420

0.956
25,739
5,950

0.929
25,739
3,306

0.893
25,272
538

0.795
25,279
389

0.857
25,279
725

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for details of the sample and specification.

Table 2.9: Effects on Wages, Benefits, and Teacher Employment

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

Log Avg.
Salary

Log Avg.
Benefits

Log Pupil
Tchr. Ratio

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.009
(0.005)
0.029***
(0.006)
0.046***
(0.007)

-0.014**
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.012
(0.008)
0.037***
(0.009)
0.051***
(0.011)

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.011
(0.008)
-0.009***
(0.003)
-0.007
(0.005)
-0.008**
(0.004)

0.793
24,178

0.866
24,178

0.831
24,864

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: See notes to Table 2.2 for details of the sample and specification. All dependent variables are in logs.
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Table 2.10: Effects on NAEP Test Scores

Relative Year in [1, 2]
Relative Year in [3, 4]
Relative Year in [5, 6]
Observations
R-squared
Time FEs
Area FEs

Grade 4 Math

Grade 4 Reading

Grade 8 Math

Grade 8 Reading

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0412
(0.0383)
0.00658
(0.0390)
0.0239
(0.0465)

0.0322
(0.0418)
0.0484
(0.0453)
0.111**
(0.0537)

-0.00268
(0.0338)
-0.00641
(0.0345)
0.0229
(0.0402)

0.0102
(0.0280)
0.0247
(0.0305)
0.0558
(0.0346)

3,711
0.816

3,751
0.762

3,719
0.829

3,796
0.783

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) pool 4th and 8th grade test results together and include grade-level dummies. See
the notes to Table 2.2 for other details of the specification and sample restrictions.
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Figure 2.1: School District Expenditures and House Prices
(a) Expenditures Per Student

(b) Average House Prices

Note: Plots show percentiles among school districts in our final regression sample (i.e. all independent, unified
districts with no missing finance data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints).

96

Figure 2.2: School District House Price Indices
(a) Index Levels

(b) Index Growth

Note: Plots show percentiles among school districts in our final regression sample (i.e. all independent, unified
districts with no missing finance data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints).
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Figure 2.3: Examples of Breakpoint Estimates
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Figure 2.4: Timing of Structural Breaks in School District House Prices
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Figure 2.5: Pre-Boom Trends in School Quality Proxies

Note: Plotted coefficients are from a model with five relative year dummies ranging between -5 and -1, a postbreak dummy, a dummy for relative years less than -6, district fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The sample
includes all independent, unified districts with no missing finance data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered
at the district level.
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Figure 2.6: Demographic Shifts During Housing Booms

Note: Plotted coefficients are from a model with five relative year dummies ranging between -5 and -5, a
dummy for relative years greater than 6, a dummy for relative years less than -6, district fixed effects, and year
fixed effects. The sample includes all independent, unified districts with no missing finance data, constant
borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals,
with standard errors clustered at the district level.

101

Figure 2.7: The Effects of a Housing Boom on Prices and School District Expenditures

Note: Plotted coefficients are from a model with 10 relative year dummies ranging between -5 and 5 (omitting
zero), a dummy for all relative years -6 and lower, a dummy for all relative years 6 and above, district fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. The sample includes all independent, unified districts with no missing finance
data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints. Prices are estimated using quarterly data, while expenditures are only available annually. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals, with
standard errors clustered at the district level.
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Figure 2.8: The Effects of a Housing Boom on Municipal House Prices and Expenditures

Note: Plotted coefficients are from a model with 10 relative year dummies ranging between -5 and 5 (omitting
zero), a dummy for all relative years -6 and lower, a dummy for all relative years 6 and above, district fixed
effects, and year fixed effects. The sample includes all independent, unified districts with no missing finance
data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints. Prices are estimated using quarterly data, while expenditures are only available annually. Dotted lines show 95% confidence intervals, with
standard errors clustered at the district level.
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CHAPTER 3 : “No Excuses” Charter Schools and College Enrollment
New Evidence From a High School Network in Chicago
3.1. Introduction
As a college education becomes increasingly necessary to succeed in the modern American labor market and achieve upward socioeconomic mobility (Goldin and Katz 2007;
Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Dynarski 2008), a college degree remains one of the best
investments available to young Americans (Barrow and Rouse 2005; Heckman, Loechner
and Todd 2008; Acemoglu and Autor 2010; Greenstone and Looney 2011; Oreopoulos and
Petronijevic 2013). It is therefore unsurprising that many high-performing urban schools
have focused on making college the default option for low-income students. In the contentious debate over school accountability and high-stakes testing, both sides can agree
that preparing students to reach their potential as productive citizens generally means
preparing them to enroll and succeed in post-secondary studies.
The consensus on how to achieve this goal is far less clear. Many in the education reform movement advocate an interventionist approach, arguing that schools must take an
intensive, hands-on role in the lives of poor children (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2004,
Whitman 2008). As evidence, these advocates point to the growing number of studies
showing that high-performing charters dramatically raise the test scores of low-income
students.1 On the other hand, some critics argue that the relentless focus on test scores
detracts from real learning and is harmful to students in the long run (Ravitch 2010). The
root of the controversy is essentially an empirical question about the education production
function. Even though there is a robust positive correlation between test performance and
college-going,2 , it is not obvious that short-run achievement effects necessarily translate
1

See, for example, Angrist et al. (2010), Tuttle et al. (2010), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), Dobbie and Fryer
(2011), and Curto and Fryer (2014)
2
In the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 sample (NSLY79), a one-standard deviation increase
in a student’s Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score is associated with a 23.2 percentage point increase
in the likelihood of attending college (authors’ calculations based on OLS regression of college attendance on
AFQT scores and a full set of race dummy variables for youths born before 1961.) Controlling for test scores in
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into college success.
To advance this debate, we exploit the outcomes of randomized admissions lotteries for
three cohorts of students who applied to enter the Noble Street Charter School, a highperforming charter high school in Chicago. We match these records to administrative
college enrollment data to estimate the effect of being selected to attend Noble on college matriculation and persistence. We find that lottery winners are 10.0 percentage points
more likely to enroll in college and 9.5 percentage points more likely to stay enrolled for at
least four semesters. Effects on college graduation are not statistically different from zero,
but this is at least partially reflects the fact the largest cohort in our sample would not have
been old enough to graduate from a four year college at the time of our data pull.
Importantly, the increase in quantity did not come at the expense of quality. We estimate
nearly identical effects if we restrict attention to attendance at four-year colleges or schools
with an average entering SAT score of at least 1,000 (out of 1,600). In addition, the effect on enrollment at two-year colleges is statistically zero. We interpret these findings as
strong evidence that Noble is measurably increasing students’ human capital as opposed
to pushing marginal students into low-quality institutions.
Our work contributes to a broader literature that uses large administrative datasets to understand the causal relationship between school characteristics and college enrollment.
Dobbie and Fryer (2015) find that sixth graders who are offered a spot in the Harlem
Children’s Zone Promise Academy are more likely to enroll in college immediately after graduating high school, though students in the control group eventually “catch up”
and close the gap. In a similar vein, Angrist et al. (2016) show that attending a Boston-area
charter school causes many students to enroll in four-year colleges instead of two-year
colleges. Other work focuses on the long-term impacts of educational quality rather that
school governance. Linking data from a large urban district to tax records, Chetty, Friedthe NLSY79 sample is sufficient to close – and even reverse – the black-white gap in college attendance (Lang
and Manove 2011).
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man, and Rockoff (2014) use a quasi-experimental design to show that a one-standarddeviation increase in teacher value-added for a single year increases a student’s probability of college attendance at age 20 by 0.82 percentage points. Deming et al. (2014) examine
school choice lottery results from Charlotte-Mecklenburg and conclude that attending a
first-choice high-school leads to small but noteworthy increases in enrollment and graduation rates from competitive colleges.
We make three key contributions to the literature. First, we provide robust evidence that
a school-based intervention can simultaneously improve overall enrollment, persistence,
and college quality. In particular, we provide the first experimental evidence that a highquality charter high school can increase overall college enrollment for more than one year.3
In part, this is a consequence of improved statistical power. Noble’s admissions lottery
generates a very powerful first-stage effect on enrollment that allows us to estimate a variety of treatment effects more precisely than similar papers in the literature (Dobbie and
Fryer 2015, Angrist et al. 2016).
Second, we demonstrate the medium-term effectiveness of a relatively late intervention.
Noble conducts lotteries for incoming high-school freshman, many of whom have spent
their formative years in low-performing traditional Chicago public schools. As other
economists have emphasized the importance of early interventions for improving the economic outcomes of poor children (see Heckman 2012), this aspect of our results is noteworthy.
Finally, the Noble Network’s rapid expansion since 2006 allows us to examine whether
the intervention we study is scalable. Over the ensuing eight years, Noble added 15 high
schools, and the network currently enrolls over 10,000 students each year. The expansion
3
Booker et al. (2011, 2014) find that charter attendance is positively correlated with college enrollment after
controlling for observable characteristics of students, and Sass et al. show that these effects extend to college
persistence. Using similar methods, Dobbie and Fryer (2016) find that charter attendance has a small effect
on two-year college enrollment only, though schools adhering to the “No Excuses” philosophy also improve
enrollment at four-year colleges. Because these estimates do not benefit from random or quasi-experimental
variation in charter enrollment, however, they require stronger identifying assumptions than studies exploiting admissions lotteries.
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not only shows that the network merits study in its own right, due to the sheer number of
students enrolled; it also provides an interesting test case for whether the intervention we
study is scalable. An important question is whether the administrative and instructional
practices that drove the flagship campus’s impact on college outcomes will have similar
impacts in new environments across the diverse communities of Chicago. More generally,
Noble’s rapid expansion offers a unique opportunity to assess how “No Excuses” practices
scale and replicate in new settings and populations, albeit within the same city.
Therefore, the final portion of our analysis focuses on results at Noble’s broader network.
While we cannot exploit lottery-based randomization for this portion of our analysis, we
make use of a college enrollment study conducted by Chicago Public Schools (CPS) to nonexperimentally estimate treatment effects for two later cohorts attending seven separate
Noble campuses. These results re-affirm our lottery-based findings for Noble’s flagship
campus. Conditional on observables, the college enrollment rate of students in Noble’s expanded network exceeds that of both traditional public school and charter school students
in Chicago.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the history and
academic practices of the Noble Network of Charter Schools. Section 3.3 summarizes
our data and empirical strategies. Section 3.4 presents our main results and our nonexperimental analysis, and Section 3.5 concludes by interpreting our results in light of
other recent research.

3.2. The Noble Network of Charter Schools
The Noble Charter Network began in 1999 as a single high school, Noble Street Charter School (now Noble Street College Prep). In the fall of 2006, the operator opened two
new campuses to serve the growing demand for admissions, and the network has since
grown to include 16 high schools serving roughly 10,000 students. College-readiness is an
explicit part of Noble’s stated mission “to prepare low-income students with the scholar-
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ship, dedication, and honor necessary to succeed in college and lead exemplary lives, and
be a catalyst for education reform in Chicago.”
Noble’s campuses are spread across the west and south sides of Chicago. As Figure 3.1
shows, the expansion has been concentrated in high-poverty neighborhoods. Accordingly,
Noble attracts a predominantly poor, minority student body. 95% of Noble students are
Black or Hispanic, and nearly 90% are eligible for federal lunch subsidies based on their
family’s income.
Noble’s educational philosophy is quite similar to that of other “No Excuses” charter
schools, such as the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) and the Harlem Children’s Zone
Promise Academy.4 While no two Charter Management Organizations (CMOs) follow
precisely the same principles and practices, the philosophy largely aligns with those highlighted by Dobbie and Fryer (2013), who identify five within-school factors that explain
roughly 50% of the variance in charter school performance in their sample. Noble Network
schools academic programs can be understand within the context of these five practices.
While exact school calendars vary slightly by campus, Noble campuses offer longer class
periods, a longer school day, and a longer school year than traditional Chicago Public
Schools (CPS) high schools. On average, Noble students spend 7.5 hours per day and 185
days per year in school. For comparison, during the period covered by our analysis typical
CPS high school students spent only 6.9 hours per day and 170 days per year in school on
average.5 This implies that Noble students spent 18.3% more time in school, amounting to
858 hours over 4 years or nearly three-quarters of a year of additional instruction.
Noble campuses structure their day to ensure that all students receive differentiated instruction in a smaller-group setting. Students attend daily 35-minute differentiated aca4

Other well-known “No Excuses” CMOs include Yes Prep (Houston), MATCH (Boston), Mastery (Philadelphia), Excel (Boston), Green Dot (Los Angeles), Success Academies (New York City), and Uncommon Schools
(New Jersey, New York, and Massachusetts.)
5
Beginning with the 2012-13 school year, CPS and the Chicago Teacher’s Union agreed to extend the school
day by 34 minutes to 7.5 hours per day and extend the school week by two weeks to 180 days per year.
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demic labs, where they get smaller-group instruction specific to their needs. Typical academic labs include reading groups organized by lexile level, math groups assigned by
performance on interim assessments, AP course labs, and social emotional support seminars. Teachers are required to hold daily office hours that students can attend for academic
support from 4:00-4:30pm. Office hour attendance becomes mandatory for students whose
academic performance falls below certain thresholds. Most campuses also offer some form
of after-school tutoring provided by outside organizations.
To help teachers use data to drive instruction, Noble schools administer quarterly interim
assessments in all core content areas (in addition to traditional classroom summative and
formative assessments). After students take interim assessments, teachers from all campuses meet in content area teams to analyze the data and collaboratively plan how to use
the assessment data to drive their instruction. Morning and afternoon advisories track students’ academic progress, mark behavioral infractions, and hold students accountable as a
group for maintaining academic and behavioral standards.
To develop human capital, teachers receive regular feedback on their performance. Teachers attend campus wide professional development sessions every Friday, in addition to
network-wide collaborative planning outlined above. Noble aggressively recruits teachers
with a demonstrated track record of success and rewards teachers whose students demonstrate above-average academic growth with performance bonuses.
While school culture is notoriously hard to measure, Noble takes several explicit approaches
to incubating a culture of high expectations for all. All students are expected to take college
entrance exams and gain acceptance to college, regardless of their post-graduation plans.
College acceptances are celebrated publicly, and counselors assist students in applying for
grants and scholarships. Top students are invited to participate in the “Right Angle” program, which sends students to academic enrichment programs at highly-selective college
campuses nationwide.6
6

Through the 2013-14 school year, one unique aspect of Noble’s culture of high expectations was their use
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3.3. Data and Research Design
3.3.1. Raw Data
We combine lottery data and student demographic information from Noble Network administrative records with college matriculation and degree attainment data from the National Student Clearinghouse to generate our empirical estimates. The lottery records span
high school lotteries from 1999 to 2012 for all campuses in the Noble Network of Charter
Schools, though we can only make use of lottery data for three early cohorts at the original Noble campus. We describe our data sources and the relevant institutional details in
the following subsections, and the Online Appendix provides more detail about the raw
lottery files and variable construction.
Lottery Data and Sample Construction
Our analysis sample includes all students who entered a Noble admissions lottery between
2003 and 2005. Noble Street Charter School was not oversubscribed in 1999, 2000, or 2001;
hence there was no lottery. While Noble did have a binding lottery in 2002, the records
are less complete than in subsequent years. We made several attempts to construct the
2002 lottery sample from the files we were provided, but after consulting with Noble staff
we were not fully confident in their accuracy. We therefore drop the entire cohort in the
interest of caution, though adding them to our sample does does not change any of our
findings (these results are available from the authors upon request.)
To meet increased demand, the Noble Network opened two new schools every year between 2006 to 2009 and a single school in 2010. As a result, almost every applicant was
offered a spot at at least one of the network’s schools. Students entering subsequent lotteries would not complete high school in time to enter our analysis. Therefore, our analysis
of financial penalties to disincentivize undesirable behavior. For example, students who earned three demerits
for rules infractions not only earned a three-hour detention, but were also required to pay a five-dollar fine.
Students with twelve or more detentions were required to cover fees totaling $140 for a behavior-improvement
class. Starting with the 2014-15 school year, this practice is no longer used by any school in the Noble network.
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focuses on the three cohorts of students who entered a lottery between 2003 and 2005.
The raw lottery files include a student’s name, gender, date of birth, address, eighth grade
school, sibling indicators, lottery result (accepted or waitlist), and waiting list position.
Noble also provided us with enrollment records that include all students who enroll in
a network school. We merge these files with the lottery data to identify which students
eventually enrolled at Noble.
The precise lottery mechanisms used by Noble is essentially identical to those studied
by other prominent papers in the literature (Dobbie and Fryer 2015, Angrist et al. 2016).
Indeed, it is common to most charter schools that are do not participate in their school
district’s centralized school choice process, as in, e.g., the Denver charter schools studied
by Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2015). Admission is entirely randomized subject to two accommodations for families with multiple children. First, students with an older sibling already
enrolled at a Noble campus are automatically granted admission to that campus. Second,
when two siblings enter the same lottery, both siblings are admitted if either student receives an admissions offer.7 (We discuss how we incorporate these features of the lottery
into our empirical specification in the following subsection.) Conditional on sibling status, admission is entirely random. An initial pool of predetermined size is selected and
immediately offered admission. All other students are randomly sorted and placed on
the waitlist. When an admitted students declines an admissions offer, the available slot is
offered to the student at the highest waitlist position.
We provide a detailed accounting of our sample and lottery results in Appendix Table A3.1.
Pooling the 2003-2005 cohorts together results in an initial pool of 1,089 lottery entrants.
We exclude students from our analysis sample for one of two reasons. First, 118 applicants
(10.8% of the initial sample) are the younger siblings of a student enrolled at Noble. We
drop these students because they are not subject to the random variation required for our
research design. Second, we do not observe dates of birth for a small group of students (13
7

If both students are put on the waitlist, they are both assigned to the more favorable waitlist position.
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in total, representing 1.2% of the original pool). These appear to be due to recording errors.
Because students’ precise dates of birth are required to match them to entries in the NSC
database, we are forced to drop these students from our analysis. Though lottery winners
are slightly more likely to suffer from missing data than losers (the raw means are 1.4 and
0.9 percentage points), the difference is not statistically significant and the frequency of
missing data is so small that even the most severe bounding methods do not threaten our
findings.8
The remaining 958 students compose our experimental sample. We define lottery winners
as students who were immediately offered a position at Noble or who received one of the
first ten waitlist positions.9 This categorization results in a final tally of 412 lottery winners
and 546 lottery losers. The admissions offer is a very powerful predictor of enrollment.
81.5% of students who are immediately offered admission attend Noble for at least one
year, as well as half of the students who receive one of the top ten waitlist positions. Only
14 applicants (2.6%) farther down the waitlist ever receive and accept an admissions offer.
As we discuss in our Results section, this powerful first-stage effect grants us a degree of
statistical precision unavailable to prior studies in this literature.
Aggregated CPS Administrative Data
Finally, for additional summary statistics and our non-experimental analysis, we combine
a variety of publicly available datasets provided by Chicago Public Schools.10 From these,
we observe a variety of demographic and performance indicators averaged to the school8

More precisely, we can assess the maximal extent to which attrition might bias our results if we impute
missing outcomes according to the “worst case” scenario for our results – i.e. imputing zeros for treated
students and ones for control students. In this scenario, our main treatment effect estimates decline by between
one and two percentage points. Their statistical significance is unchanged. These results are available from
the authors upon request.
9
Since the waitlist order is assigned randomly, using any cutoff to assign treatment and control is a valid
instrument for attending Noble. We chose to include the top ten students in treatment based on an informal
review of the lottery files; as Table A3.1 shows, many students near the top of the waitlist end up attending
Noble, while the likelihood of attending drops off considerably after ten. Using a lower threshold or assigning
all waitlisted students to the control group does not change our results.
10
These data can be acessed at the following url: http://cps.edu/SchoolData/Pages/SchoolData.
aspx
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grade level. These data sources vary in their coverage. Test scores, free lunch eligibility,
bilingual status, and special education counts are only available after 2009. However, we
observe racial composition, graduation rates, and dropout rates as early as 2000.
We supplement our microdata by linking these records to data on middle schools attended
by students in our sample. We use three middle-school characteristics from this data: the
percentage of eight graders who score proficient or better on the math section of the Illinois Standard Achievement Test, the percentage proficient on the reading section, and the
percentage of the student body that is black or Hispanic. In total, we are able to match
71.7 percent of our sample to their 8th grade school’s CPS summary records. The remaining students either had missing data, ambiguous data, or attended a private or parochial
school for which CPS does not track demographics or test performance.
These aggregated data also provide our outcome measures and control variables for our
non-experimental analysis. For clarity, we describe this portion of the data alongside our
analysis strategy in Section 3.4.4.
College Enrollment Data
To track college-going, we submitted the name, date of birth, and expected high school
graduation date of every student in the 2002 through 2005 lotteries to the National Student
Clearinghouse (NSC), a non-profit organization that maintains a database of college enrollment and degree attainment. NSC returned this information with data on enrollment
spells and graduation for every school attended by matched students. By necessity, we
assume that students who were not matched to any records in the NSC database never
enroll in college. In principle, both students and schools have the option of preventing
researchers from accessing their records. This is not a significant concern for our analysis, however, as only 1.3 percent of the records we submitted were blocked by either the
student or the school.
At the time of our submission, the NSC database included enrollment records at over 90
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percent of colleges and universities in the United States. It is natural to ask whether coverage is similarly thorough for the colleges targeted by students in our sample, however.
Fortunately, Noble provided us with a list of college enrollment histories of their graduating seniors, based on their own NSC submission combined with input from college
counselors. While we do not use this information in any other part of our analysis, it allows us to observe the prevalence of false negatives in our treatment group. Out of 232
students graduating from Noble between 2007 and 2009, our NSC request flagged 211 are
flagged in our NSC data – a match rate of 90.9 percent. This suggests that NSC coverage is
not likely to be a major issue for our analysis.11
NSC also provides information on the timing of enrollment that we use to construct measures of persistence. Each row in the NSC match corresponds to an enrollment period,
with a fixed beginning and end date. The majority of schools in our matched sample report
semester-long enrollments, spanning August/September to December or January/February
to May/June. However, some schools use a quarter system or report continuous enrollment durations of over a year. To combine all of these different formats into a consistent
structure, we generate a series of indicators for enrollment in the fall and spring semesters
between 2006 and 2012. We consider students to have been enrolled in a given fall semester
if they are enrolled for at least thirty days between August 1 and December 31 of that year.
For spring semesters, we use endpoints of January 1 and June 1. All of our results are
robust to other plausible definitions of persistence, including the total number of days
enrolled or the total time between the first and last enrollment.
3.3.2. Empirical Approach
To measure the effect of Noble attendance on college outcomes, we estimate both Intent
to Treat (ITT) and Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) specifications. Let Zi be an in11

In our analysis, we code these 21 students as never enrolling in college. If we had a similar external source
on the college enrollments of control students, we could plausibly update our dataset. Given that we do not
have such information, correcting only the treated false negatives (or dropping them from our sample) would
positively bias our estimated treatment effects.
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dicator for receiving an offer to attend Noble. We estimate the following model via leastsquares regression to recover ITT estimates:

Yic = βXi + τ Zi + γc + φc ∗ 1(siblingi ) + εic

(3.1)

The ITT effect τ measures the difference between lottery winners and losers, adjusted for
chance imbalances in the vector of student-level controls Xi . This can be interpreted as the
causal impact of receiving an offer to attend Noble. To ensure that lottery status is not correlated with unobservable student characteristics, we drop students who are automatically
accepted because they have an older sibling enrolled in a Noble school. All regressions also
include lottery-cohort fixed effect (γc ) and interactions with an indicator for having a sibling entering the same lottery (1(siblingic )), since siblings in the same cohort are admitted
if either draws a winning number.12 When students enter multiple lotteries over a series
of years, we only include the first entry.
Identification of τ requires only that lottery status Zi be uncorrelated with the error term εi .
If we also assume monotonicity in the first stage (i.e. the lottery offer does not discourage
anyone from enrolling) and that the exclusion restriction holds (i.e. the offer only affects
college outcomes by changing Noble enrollment status), the causal effect of attending Noble is also identified for a certain sub-population. In regression terms, we use lottery status
Zi to instrument for enrollment at Noble to identify the LATE parameter. Letting N oblei
denote an indicator for whether a student has ever enrolled at a Noble charter school, the
second-stage equation can be written as follows:

Yic = αXi + ρN oblei + δc + θc ∗ 1(siblingi ) + ηic

(3.2)

Estimating Equation 3.2 by two-stage least squares produces an estimate of the LATE parameter, defined as the average effect of attending Noble for “compliers” – students who
12

None of our results are sensitive to dropping students with siblings in the same lottery.
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are induced to attend Noble by winning the lottery (Angrist and Imbens 1994). We report ITT estimates throughout the text except where noted. The results of Equation 3.2 are
reported in Table 3.3 alongside the corresponding ITT estimates.
3.3.3. Summary Statistics and Balance
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for Noble students, other charter school students, and
CPS public school students. The source for all of the statistics in this table is the publicly
available, school-level data provided by CPS described in the previous section. We show
statistics for two separate time periods to provide a picture of Noble’s early years (when
the students in our experimental sample were in high school) as well as the later period
after Noble’s expansion had begun.
Like most Chicago schools, Noble serves students who are roughly 90% minority, though
Noble enrolls a much larger share of Hispanic students than the average charter or traditional public school in Chicago. Other demographic data are not available prior to 2009.
In more recent years, the network’s collective student body is quite similar to the rest of
the district on non-racial dimensions. Noble students are marginally less likely than traditional public school students to qualify for special education considerations (11.6 percent
vs. 13.5 percent) but slightly more likely to be eligible for free or subsidized lunch (88.5
percent vs. 84.9 percent).
While Noble students are demographically similar to students at other schools, the differences in test performance are striking. Throughout our sample period, CPS students took
the Explore test during the fall of their freshman year.13 Hence, ninth grade test scores are a
good measure of the incoming ability of each schools’ students. Based on these measures,
Noble students in later cohorts enter high school with slightly lower test performance than
the average traditional public school student (though significantly higher than the average
13
Both the Explore exam and the tenth grade Plan exam are produced by ACT, Inc. and test the same four
subjects as the ACT test: math, reading, English, and science. Both exams consist of a separate, multiplechoice section for each of the four subjects. We use the single “composite” score calculated by test providers
throughout our analysis except where noted.
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charter student). However, by eleventh grade, Noble students overtake their peers and
score markedly higher than the CPS average and the charter average on all sections of the
ACT. In the 2013-14 school year, all ten Noble campuses with enrolled eleventh graders
ranked in the top 33 CPS high schools in overall ACT performance (out of 156 schools
with reported scores). Looking beyond test scores, students entering ninth grade at a Noble campus are 20.0 percentage points more more likely to graduate within five years of
enrollment than their peers in traditional public schools, and 18.8 percentage points less
likely to drop out within five years of enrollment.
These summary statistics naturally give rise to questions about what sort of high schools
our control group attends. Put differently, we would like to better understand the counterfactual outcome for our treatment group. Unfortunately we do not observe what high
school untreated students attend; our microdata only tells us whether students ever attended Noble. However, it is worth noting that the Chicago charter sector was extremely
small at this time. The 2005 ninth grade cohort had only eight charter high school options, and those eight schools educated a population 5% of the size of the traditional public
school population.14 We also directly observe the middle schools attended by most applicants. Of those, less than one percent attended a charter middle school for eighth grade,
largely reflecting the low supply of charter middle schools at the time (only 14 were active, relative to 484 traditional public middle schools). Of course, the lottery population
has revealed their preference for a charter school education, indicating that they are likely
not representative of the district at large. Nevertheless, given the dearth of other charter
options, we believe it is likely that most lottery losers attended traditional public schools.
While detailed school-level data is useful for comparing Noble’s student body to the broader
CPS population, we require student micro-data to assess the balance of the admissions lottery. This is an important check; if lottery status is not determined randomly, neither of
our empirical specifications is valid.
14
Table 1 includes data from 23 charter schools because the “experimental sample period” extends forward
until 2008.
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Our demographic data is somewhat limited because we do not have access to detailed,
district-provided administrative data used in other studies exploiting charter school lotteries (e.g. Dobbie and Fryer 2011, Abdulkadiroglu et al 2011, and Curto and Fryer 2011,
among many others). We address this issue by constructing several indirect proxies for key
socioeconomic variables. First, though we lack direct information on race and ethnicity,
we can glean some useful information from students’ last names given the prevalence of
Hispanic students in our sample. The Census Bureau provides a table containing surnameby-race frequencies for the 150,000 most common surnames, to which we matched 95% of
the students in our sample.15 We code a student as Hispanic if 80% of the individuals with
his/her last name are Hispanic (though our results are not sensitive to using other reasonable thresholds).16 Second, while we do not observe students’ lagged test scores, we can
use average test scores at their middle school as a proxy.
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics and balance test results for the short list of studentlevel covariates that we construct from the lottery files. Columns (1) and (2) present means
and standard deviations for lottery winners and losers, respectively. Column (3) reports
the p-value from a regression of each characteristic on lottery status, controlling only for
cohort fixed effects and a cohort-by-sibling-status effect.
The lotteries are well balanced. Noble attracts roughly three female applicants for every
two male applicants, and this ratio is balanced across treatment and control. 70.5 percent
of lottery winners have distinctly Hispanic last names, compared to a statistically indistinguishable 67.2 percent of lottery losers. Lottery losers attend middle schools with slightly
higher levels of math and reading proficiency, though once again differences are small and
statistically insignificant. Both lottery winners and losers went to middle schools where 90
percent of students were black or Hispanic. None of differences in baseline variables are
15
The data are available at https://www2.census.gov/topics/genealogy/2000surnames/. We
use the 2000 Census data because it is the decennial Census closest in time to the lotteries.
16
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2014) and Elliot et al. (2009) show that surname-based proxies
are very strong predictors of Hispanic ethnicity in samples of mortgage applicants and health plan enrollees,
respectively. In particular, adding home zip codes to the predictive model only marginally improves one’s
ability to accurately classify Hispanic ethnicity in either population.
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statistically significant, and a joint test of all six coefficients in Table 3.2 yields a p-value
of 0.751. Taken together, these results provide a strong case for the internal validity of our
evaluation, suggesting that lottery imbalance is unlikely to be an issue for our analysis.

3.4. Results
3.4.1. Experimental Estimates
While aggregated statistics show that students at Noble significantly out-perform their
CPS peers on standardized tests, it is not clear ex ante that these results would translate into
improvements on medium-term outcomes. For instance, the differences may be driven by
selection into Noble rather than any actual treatment effect. What’s more, even if the difference is causal, the short-term treatment effect on test scores may not translate into longterm benefits if the effects are driven by test-specific preparation rather than true learning.
While our lottery design does not allow us to directly measure underlying mechanisms,
we can provide clear evidence on whether attending Noble leads to increased college enrollment, quality, and persistence.
Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the effect of Noble attendance on college enrollment outcomes.
We report estimates of equations (1) and (2), controlling for student’s gender, average test
scores at the student’s middle school, and student age to increase precision (our results are
almost identical when we drop all demographic controls.) Lottery winners are 10.0 (3.1)
percentage points more likely to enroll in college than lottery losers. For compliers, we
estimate a LATE parameter of 13.5 (4.0) percentage points. Relative to the control mean of
58.8 percent, this is a 23 percent increase. If we restrict attention to “on-time” enrollments
that begin the fall after a students’ expected high school graduation dates, the ITT effect
falls to 6.7 (3.3) percentage points but remains statistically significant.
To put these estimates in perspective, it is worth comparing our results those of several
recent papers studying the impact of improved high school quality on college outcomes.
Deming et al. (2014) use school choice lotteries in Charlotte-Mecklenburg to instrument
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for attending a first-choice high school. Their estimates are not statistically significant
when aggregated across all students and colleges, but their LATE estimate for attending a
competitive college is 4.2 percentage points. Students who win the the Harlem Children’s
Zone admissions lottery Promise Academy are 17 percentage points more likely to enroll
in college the fall after graduation, though lottery losers close the enrollment gap fairly
quickly (Dobbie and Fryer, 2015). Furthermore, this “treatment” includes middle school
education, high-school education, and a wide range of community investments. Results
for Boston-area charters do not show a significant effect on overall college enrollment rates
despite large increases in test scores (Angrist et al. 2016).17 In other words, the best evidence to date has shown improvements that are either transitory or much less robust than
our estimates for Noble.
A natural concern is that the increase in college enrollment might come at the expense
of quality. If Noble merely pushes marginal students into lower quality schools, then
we would expect to see smaller effects on attending more rigorous and more competitive
schools. The results in Panel B of Table 3.3 show that this is not the case. The treatment
effect on attending a two-year college is statistically zero – an increase of 3.7 (3.3) percentage points – while the effect on four-year college attendance is 11.4 (3.2) percentage points,
slightly larger than the ITT estimate for all colleges. We obtain similar results using the
test scores of incoming college students to proxy for quality. Winning the lottery increases
the probability that a student enrolls in a school where the median two-subject SAT score
is above 1,000 by 10.5 (2.9) percentage points.18 The LATE estimate (13.7 [3.8] percentage
points) represents an increase of 65 percent over the control mean of 20.9 percent. Taken
together, the results in Panel B suggest that attending Noble increases both the likelihood
17
It should be noted that our point estimates are fairly close to those of Angrist et al (2016), who estimate
an 11.5 (8.4) percentage point increase in enrollment. Our estimates are substantially more precise, however,
owing to an extremely powerful first stage. Across the three cohorts we consider, 79.5% of students offered
admission enroll at Nobel, compared to only 2.5% of control students.
18
We obtained average SAT scores for entering freshmen from the U.S. News and World Report. Certain
schools provide average ACT scores instead of SAT scores. We use the ACT’s concordance table (available
at http://www.act.org/solutions/college-career-readiness/compare-act-sat/) to translate these scores into the equivalent SAT score.
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and quality of college enrollment.
Finally, we turn to measures of college persistence in Panel C. Lottery winners are 12.6
(3.2) percentage points more likely to enroll in at least two semesters and 9.5 (3.3) percentage points more likely to enroll in at least four semesters. Relative to the average
control student, these effects represent increases of 26.0% and 25.9%, respectively. To calculate graduation effects, we drop students from the 2005 cohort because we would not
observe graduation if they were making normal progress through high school and a fouryear college.19 Using students from the 2003 and 2004 cohort only, we calculate a small
and statistically insignificant effect on degree completion: 0.7 (3.0) percentage points, with
a control mean of 14.9%.
For completeness, we also calculate and present persistence and graduation effects separately for two-year and four-year colleges. The results in Appendix Table A3.2 confirm
that the patterns we observe are driven by enrollment at four-year institutions. Treatment
effects for two-year college outcomes are negligible; the only marginally significant estimate is a 5.5 (3.0) percentage point increase in the likelihood of enrolling for at least two
semesters. The estimates for four-year college outcomes are quite similar to the main estimates in Table 3.3.
To provide a fuller picture of enrollment behavior, Figure 3.2 depicts how enrollment rates
evolve over time. In each panel we normalize the time scale on the horizontal axis such that
the date of the lottery corresponds to year 0. In other words, 4.5 on our axis corresponds
to the first semester of college for a student making normal progress through school, 5
corresponds to the second semester, etc.
Panel A of Figure 3.2 displays the the percentage of students currently enrolled or graduated, separately for lottery winners and losers. Consistent with the on-time enrollment
results, lottery winners are more likely to enroll in college immediately after graduating.
19
We obtained our NSC data in November 2012. If a member of the 2005 lottery cohort made regular
progress through high school and immediately entered a four-year college after graduating, she would have
been a college senior at the time.

121

They are also substantially more likely to be enrolled at every subsequent time period.20
Aside from a small increase in treatment-group enrollment in the second fall after expected
graduation, the lines also slope down at a similar rate, indicating that persistence conditional on starting college is similar in the two groups. Panel B of Figure 3.2 plots the percentage of students who have ever been enrolled in college. Both the treatment and control
lines rise steeply in the first two years after expected high school graduation, indicating
that substantial quantities of new students are enrolling after their predicted freshman
fall. Importantly, however, the treatment line rises at roughly the same rate as the line for
the control group. This indicates that Noble is truly increasing rates of college attendance
rather than inducing students to enroll sooner than they otherwise would. Appendix Figures A3.1 and A3.2 show these graphical results separately for two- and four-year college
enrollment outcomes.
3.4.2. Heterogeneity
To test for potential heterogeneity in our treatment effects, Table 3.4 reports ITT results
estimated separately by gender, neighborhood poverty rate, and middle school quality.
We also report p-values on the null hypothesis that treatment effects are equal for each
pair of groups.
There are few consistent patterns in the results, though we are under-powered to detect moderate differences. None of the estimated parameters are statistically different
across subgroups. At most, we find suggestive evidence that effects on total enrollment
and enrollment in four-year colleges are larger for students from high-quality middle
schools – the opposite effect found by Deming et al. (2014). The differences are within
the range of normal statistical variation, however, so we caution against interpreting them
too strongly. Similarly, students from lower-poverty neighborhoods have higher estimated
effects, though there are no statistically significant differences.
20
As we only observe seven semesters of expected college enrollment for the 2005 cohort, we truncate the
graph at this point to maintain a consistent sample.
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It is perhaps noteworthy that we do not observe any differential effects by gender, since,
as Angrist et al. (2016) note, relatively few late-stage interventions show promising results
for boys. In this respect, the lack of gender differences is consistent with other work examining the effect of No Excuses charters on college enrollment (Dobbie and Fryer 2015,
Angrist et al. 2016). Similarly, using our surname-based classifications, we cannot detect
any differences in treatment effectiveness between Hispanic and non-Hispanic students.
(Recall that we do not directly observe race or ethnicity in our dataset, and our sample
does not contain enough students with distinctly black or white last names to examine
other racial subgroups).
Finally, we investigated whether our treatment effect estimates differ across cohorts. If
learning-by-doing helps teachers and school administrators prepare low-income students
for college, one might expect Noble’s treatment effect to increase over time. On the other
hand, the network was preparing to open two new campuses in the Fall of 2006, and it
is possible that this effort diverted resources from the main campus. In Figure 3.3, we
plot ITT estimates of the effect on college enrollment separately for each lottery. The point
estimates increase monotonically over time, reaching 16.6 (5.0) percentage point effect for
the 2005 cohort. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal treatment effects
across all three cohorts. At most, we can say that Noble’s effectiveness did not appreciably
decline over this period.
3.4.3. External Validity
As with any randomized experiment, it is worth stepping back to consider the external validity of our estimates – that is, the extent to which these results might generalize to other
settings. Any such discussion is necessarily somewhat speculative, as our experimental
data cannot directly speak to generalizability. However, evidence from several recent papers can help us make some informed conjectures about the scope of our results.
First, there is strong evidence that replicating the practices of “No Excuses” charter schools
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is sufficient to produce significant gains in student achievement. Fryer (2014) evaluates
school turnaround efforts in which low-performing public schools in Houston, Denver,
and Chicago adopted educational practices common to successful charters. He finds large
treatment effects in math. In a context closer to our own, Cohodes, Setren, and Walters
(2016) show that successful Boston charter schools generate similar achievement gains
when they open new campuses. Similarly, Tuttle et al. (2015) show that Knowledge is
Power Program (KIPP) charter schools have sustained their achievement effects through
a period of rapid growth (though the magnitude of the effects declined somewhat in the
middle of their sample period).
While these papers analyze effects on test scores, not college enrollment, it is noteworthy
that similar charter school models have maintained their effectiveness as they scale. We
interpret the findings as evidence that school policies and practices are the most important determinants of student outcomes; effectiveness is generally not determined by an
unreplicable, unobserved ingredient found only at one campus.
Some researchers also note that lottery estimates of charter school treatment effects necessarily draw from oversubscribed schools (Tuttle, Gleason, and Clark 2012). Since these
schools are more popular than undersubscribed charters (almost by definition), their effectiveness is unlikely to be representative of the entire charter sector. We therefore are
careful to interpret our results as representative of No Excuses charters specifically, whose
general popularity and success in raising test scores has been documented by a host of
lottery-based studies (Angrist et al. 2010, Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, Dobbie and Fryer
2013, Dobbie and Fryer 2015, Tuttle et al. 2015).
At the same time, Chabrier, Cohodes, and Oreopoulos (2016) note that a significant portion of “No Excuses” charters’ effectiveness in increasing test scores is explained by their
tendency to locate in poor, urban areas. As Figure 3.1 shows, Noble campuses draw from
these very neighborhoods. Therefore, we should not conclude that Noble schools would
generate similar treatment effects for wealthy, suburban, or rural students. Given the im124

mense remaining socioeconomic and racial disparities in college-going, however, we believe that increasing college enrollment among underserved communities is still a desirable and policy-relevant goal.
Given the balance of the evidence, we believe it is reasonable to conclude our lottery findings are likely to extend to similar charter schools in urban areas. In Section 3.4.4, we test
this assumption directly using publicly available data on other Noble campuses. These
non-experimental results are consistent with our lottery estimates, though their validity
relies on much stronger identifying assumptions.
3.4.4. Non-Experimental Estimates
The experimental results clearly demonstrate that early cohorts attending Noble Street
Charter School are more likely to enroll in college, enroll in selective four-year institutions,
and remain enrolled for at least four semesters. We have interpreted these results to mean
that the academic practices and policies practiced throughout the Noble network lead to
improved college outcomes. One possible objection to this interpretation, of course, is that
we have thus far only analyzed students attending one campus. Even though other Noble
schools follow the same general practices and policies, it is possible that there is something
unique about the original campus that accounts for the effects we estimate.
As we discussed in Section 3.2, however, our lottery design is not feasible for later cohorts
of Noble students. The network’s rapid expansion absorbed the excess demand that is
essential for our identification strategy. We must therefore turn to non-experimental methods and aggregated data sources to provide evidence on the external validity of our estimates.21 As discussed earlier, CPS publishes a variety of demographic and performance
measures at the school-grade level. Most important for our purposes are the college enrollment data. Using their own NSC data pull, CPS has calculated and released the average
college enrollment rate for every high school between 2010 and 2013. We use these as a
21

We made several attempts over the course of three years to enter into a data sharing agreement with CPS
that would allow us to analyze confidential microdata, but none of our attempts were successful.
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performance measure for later cohorts.22
Estimating a plausible specification also requires, at the very least, a measure of the baseline ability of each graduating class. Ideally, we would observe middle school performance
outcomes for each senior class, allowing us to construct ability measures that do not reflect
any treatment impacts. Since we only observe school-level averages, however, this design
is not feasible. Fortunately, as mentioned earlier, during our sample period all CPS students took standardized tests in the Fall of their freshman year. We can therefore use each
cohort’s average score on their ninth grade Explore exam. These measurements are taken
so early in students’ high school careers that we can plausibly assume that they reflect
incoming ability, not the influence of the school they attend.
The basis of our empirical strategy is to use incoming ability to predict college-going rates
for that cohort, as can be seen in Figure 3.4. Each dot represents the graduating class at
a single high school. In Panel (a), we plot the school’s average Comprehensive score on
the Explore exam taken in the Fall of 2009 on the horizontal axis. The vertical axis records
2013 college enrollment rates. As is immediately apparent, this measure of baseline ability
explains most of the between-school variation in college enrollment – the R2 statistic of the
quadratic fit plotted in the figure is over 70%.
The shaded markers denote the seven Noble campuses with graduating seniors in 2013.
Despite their location in the middle of the incoming-score distribution, their college enrollment rates are among the highest in the district. In particular, all seven campuses are
located well above the regression line. Many more Noble graduates enter college than one
would predict based on their incoming ability.
22

CPS calculates college enrollment rates by dividing the number of enrollments by the number of graduating seniors. Of course, not every student who enrolls as a ninth grader eventually graduates, introducing
the potential for selection bias. While we cannot directly rule out this explanation without student-level panel
data, two facts suggest that this is not a major concern in our setting. First, we obtain similar results when we
calculate the enrollment rates as a fraction of all students who start ninth grade at a given school. This suggests
that Noble does not achieve its results by “weeding out” weaker students before graduation. Second, recall
from Table 3.1, that Noble’s dropout rates are significantly lower than other CPS schools, and their graduation
rates are much higher. We interpret these facts as evidence that our non-experimental effects are not driven
by de-selecting students after they start high school.
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Test results are not available prior to 2009. Thus, we can only observe both ninth grade
test scores and college enrollment rates for a single cohort (the class of 2013). To provide
further evidence, however, we can repeat the exercise using tenth grade test scores for the
class of 2012. Because this measurement is taken after students have already spent a year
in high school, this is not an ideal control. In particular, we might expect some of the early
achievement gains induced by Noble to be reflected in tenth grade scores. If this is the
case, we would under-estimate the true effect of attending Noble on college-going. With
these caveats in mind, Panel (b) displays the same graphical results for the class of 2012.
Reassuringly, the general pattern is similar to the Panel (a). Noble’s enrollment rates are
among the best in the district, and rates at all five schools surpass the best-fit line by a wide
margin.
For more detail, and to investigate the robustness of this approach, Table 3.5 presents regression results analogous to the plots in Figure 3.4. Each column shows the results of
regressing each school’s college enrollment rate on the baseline ability measure, its square,
and a varying set of controls. In all specifications we weight each observation by the number of students in the ninth grade class.
Columns (1) and (4) reiterate the graphical argument above. Controlling only for a quadratic
in baseline ability, we estimate the effect of attending Noble on college attendance to be 19.2
(2.1) percentage points for the class of 2013 and 12.0 (2.0) percentage points for the class of
2012. Columns (2) and (5) add an indicator variable for charter schools to this specification.
Because Noble is itself a charter school, one should add this coefficient to the Noble effect
when comparing Noble to traditional CPS public schools. The sum of the Noble and charter coefficient is quite similar to the earlier estimates, as one would expect. For the class
of 2012, however we cannot reject the hypothesis that Noble is as effective as the average
charter school. When we add a series of demographic control variables, however, Noble’s
performance exceeds even other charter schools in both years; we estimate effects of 12.8
(9.9) and 9.6 (7.6) percentage points.
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We should be careful when interpreting the non-experimental results, however. The research design does not benefit from the random variation used in our earlier analysis, so a
causal interpretation requires an admittedly strong selection-on-observables assumption.
Nevertheless, we find it reassuring that the best evidence we can muster indicates that
Noble students continue to out-perform expectations even during the network’s rapid expansion.

3.5. Discussion
Critics have long contended that the academic success demonstrated in many high-performing
charter schools can be explained by test preparation and a paternalistic environment that
does not improve true academic skills or promote non-cognitive development. This paper presents evidence from the Noble Network of Charter Schools in Chicago indicating
that “No Excuses” schools also have a positive impact on college attendance, quality, and
persistence. We believe that this is a cause for cautious optimism, as Noble’s educational
model is broadly consistent with the practices of other high-performing charter schools.
Our analysis of Noble’s impact on college outcomes builds upon studies of other highperforming charter schools in New York and Massachusetts that employ similar practices,
including extending the length of the school day and year, facilitating regular small group
instruction, using data to plan lessons and target remediation, and providing regular feedback to teachers on their instruction (Dobbie and Fryer 2015; Angrist et al. 2016). We
provide the most robust evidence to date that the impacts of these practices are both broad
and long-lasting: our point estimates are large and precisely estimated, we see no evidence
of fade-out, and the effects are driven by enrollment at selective, four-year institutions.
Furthermore, our results connect to a growing body of literature that indicates that the
achievement gains of the “No Excuses” approach is broadly replicable (Cohodes, Setren,
and Walters 2016, Fryer 2014, Tuttle et al. 2016). While our data only allows us to estimate lottery-based models for a single campus, we use non-experimental methods to test
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whether the gains were preserved as the network expanded. Encouragingly, these results
are in line with our experimental findings.
It is important to emphasize that our new findings are not in conflict with prior work on
the medium-run effects of high-performing charter schools. Rather, our contributions are
primarily a function of improved statistical power, stemming from a particularly strong
first-stage attendance effect. Viewed in concert with work by Dobbie and Fryer (2015)
and Angrist et al. (2016), we see an increasingly clear picture of a rapidly growing style of
school management23 that boosts the college enrollment of poor urban high schoolers. Unfortunately, the similarity of the educational approaches considered in each study means
that we can say very little about what mechanisms might be driving our results (at most,
one might infer that the neighborhood-level interventions of the Harlem Children’s Zone
are not essential for increasing college enrollment, a conclusion shared by Dobbie and
Fryer (2015)). Accordingly, understanding which “No Excuses” strategies are most important for generating long-term gains is an important topic for future research. Nevertheless,
we are confident that this educational model has proved to be – and will continue to be –
an effective part of the fight to increase low-income students’ human capital.
23

For instance, KIPP now manages 200 schools and enrolls 80,000 students. Noble operates 16 high schools
in Chicago.
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Figure 3.1: Noble Network Schools, Lottery Applicants, and Neighborhood Poverty Rates
NOTES: This figure plots the locations of the Noble Network of Charter Schools and the addresses of lottery
applicants over a grid of Chicago-area census tracts. The largest star marks the location of Noble Street Charter
school, the subject of our lottery results. The background color indicates the tract poverty rate averaged across
the 2007-2012 American Community Surveys. Five-year periods are the shortest moving averages available at
the tract level.
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(a) Contemporaneous Enrollment
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Figure 3.2: College Enrollment Over Time
NOTES: In both panels, the horizontal axis displays the number of school years after each cohort starts high
school. Hence, 4.5 corresponds to the first semester of college for a student making normal and uninterrupted
progress through school. Panel (a) records the percentage of lottery winners and losers who either (1) are
enrolled in college in that period or (2) have graduated prior to that period. Panel (b) plots the percentage
of students who have enrolled in college at any point up to the given time period. See Section 3.3 for more
details on how we construct these variables.
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Figure 3.3: Treatment Effects on College Enrollment by Lottery Cohort
NOTES: See Table 3.3 notes for details of the regression specification. The caption shows the results of an F-test
of the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is constant across cohorts.
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Figure 3.4: Non-Experimental Estimates of College Enrollment for Later Cohorts
NOTES: See Table 3.5 notes for variable definitions. Ninth and tenth grade tests were administered in the fall
semester for these cohorts. Ninth grade test scores are not available for the Class of 2012. All scores have been
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Because these variables are measured at the
school level, one standard deviation in this sample is smaller than the true student-level standard deviation.
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Table 3.1: Characteristics of Chicago Public High Schools
Experimental Sample Period
2003-2008
Original
Traditional
Noble
Other
Public
Campus Charter
School
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A. Student Body Characteristics
Black
0.115
0.712
0.493
Hispanic
0.825
0.214
0.361
Bilingual
.
.
.
Special Education
.
.
.
Free Lunch Eligible
.
.
.
Average Cohort Size
103.6
71.7
242.7
Panel B. Performance Measures
9th Grade Math
9th Grade Reading
9th Grade English
10th Grade Math
10th Grade Reading
10th Grade English
11th Grade Math (ACT)
11th Grade Reading (ACT)
11th Grade English (ACT)
Five-Year Graduation Rate
Five-Year Dropout Rate
Number of Schools

Non-Exp. Sample Period
2009-2013
Traditional
Noble
Other
Public
Network Charter
School
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.349
0.602
0.053
0.116
0.885
138.6

0.619
0.324
0.045
0.138
0.888
102.2

0.449
0.413
0.068
0.135
0.849
216.7

.
.
.
.
.
.
0.313
0.276
0.446
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
-0.277
-0.145
0.059
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
0.004
0.000
-0.006
.
.

0.008
0.037
0.005
0.599
0.324
0.751
1.028
0.452
0.911
0.816
0.161

-0.447
-0.473
-0.434
-0.469
-0.448
-0.420
-0.318
-0.288
-0.215
0.713
0.256

0.062
0.062
0.061
0.057
0.065
0.038
-0.003
0.023
-0.005
0.616
0.349

1

23

116

12

33
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NOTES: This table reports sample averages for a variety of variables and populations. The full sample includes
all CPS high schools open at any point between 2003 and 2013. All results are calculated from school-level
summary data published by CPS. We weight each observation by the number of enrolled students at each
time period. The full sample includes all CPS high schools open at any point between 2003 and 2013. Bilingual
status, special education stats, free lunch eligibility, and 9th and 10th grade test scores are not available before
2009. Five-year graduation (drop-out) rates are the percentage of original freshmen who graduate (drop out)
within five years. We adopt the convention that the graduation (drop-out) rate at year t reflects the outcomes
of students entering high school in year t-5. All test scores are normalized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one in each year. Because these variables are measured at the school level, one standard deviation
in our sample is smaller than the true student-level standard deviation.
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Table 3.2: Lottery Sample Summary Statistics and Randomization Check

Panel A. Student Characteristics
Hispanic (Inferred)
Female
Age at HS Entry
Panel B. Eighth Grade School Characteristics
Average Math Proficiency
Average Reading Proficiency
Percent Minority
Missing Baseline School Data
Observations
p-value from Joint F-Test

Lottery
Winners
(1)
0.705
(0.457)
0.621
(0.486)
14.520
(1.124)

Lottery
Losers
(2)
0.672
(0.470)
0.615
(0.487)
14.556
(1.177)

p-value
(1) = (2)
(3)
0.190

0.341
(0.152)
0.559
(0.138)
0.904
(0.118)
0.269
(0.444)
420

0.358
(0.163)
0.571
(0.148)
0.903
(0.118)
0.289
(0.454)
551

0.114

0.994
0.810

0.227
0.749
0.554
971
0.751

NOTES: This table presents summary statistics and balance tests for students who entered the ninth grade
admissions lottery at the Noble Network of Charter Schools between 2003 and 2005. Students with an older
sibling enrolled at Noble are dropped. All balance regressions include lottery fixed effects interacted with an
indicator for having a sibling enter the same lottery. Hispanic ethnicity is inferred if 80% of Census respondents with the student’s last name identify as Hispanic. Math and reading proficiency represent the percentage of eight graders at each student’s middle school who scored proficient or higher on the Illinois Standard
Achievement Test one year before the lottery. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: The Effect of Attending a High-Quality Charter School on College Enrollment,
Quality, and Persistence

Panel A. Enrollment
Enrolled in College

Control
Mean
(1)
0.588

Enrolled on Time

0.430

Panel B. Quality
Enrolled in 2-Year College

0.427

Enrolled in 4-Year College

0.322

Median SAT > 1000

0.209

Panel C. Persistence
Two Semesters or More

0.493

Four Semesters or More

0.374

Graduated from College

0.149

ITT
LATE
(2)
(3)
0.100∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.031)
(0.040)
∗
0.064
0.083∗∗
(0.033)
(0.042)
0.037
0.048
(0.033)
(0.042)
0.114∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.032)
(0.042)
0.105∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.029)
(0.038)
0.126∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
(0.032)
(0.042)
0.095∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.033)
(0.042)
0.007
0.010
(0.030)
(0.042)

NOTES: This table reports the effect of attending a school in the Noble Network of Charter Schools on college
enrollment, quality, and persistence. Column (1) reports the control mean for each outcome. Column (2)
reports Intent-to-Treat estimates following the specification described in the text. Column (3) estimates Local
Average Treatment Effects, using lottery status to instrument for a binary variable indicating whether a student
enrolled at Noble. All regressions control for gender; math and reading achievement at the student’s middle
school; the student’s age; cohort fixed effects; and cohort effects interacted with an indicator for having a
sibling entering the same lottery. Students who are automatically admitted because an older sibling is already
enrolled at Noble are dropped. Our sample comprises 412 lottery winners and 546 lottery losers. On-time
enrollment is defined as enrolling in the semester following each cohort’s expected high school graduation
date. Graduation effects exclude the 2005 lottery cohort, resulting in a sample size of 276 winners and 289
losers. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3.4: The Impact of Attending a High-Performing Charter High School for Various Subgroups

Enrolled in College

Enrolled in 2-Year College

Enrolled in 4-Year College

Graduated from College
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Four Semesters or More

Observations

Female
(1)
0.094∗∗
(0.039)
[0.620]

Gender
Male
(2)
0.112∗∗
(0.051)
[0.536]

0.019
(0.042)
[0.472]

0.069
(0.052)
[0.354]

0.127∗∗∗
(0.041)
[0.323]
−0.010
(0.043)
[0.203]
0.085∗∗
(0.042)
[0.398]
593

Neighborhood Poverty
High
Low
p-val.
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.090∗∗
0.113∗∗
(0.043)
(0.044)
0.715
[0.614]
[0.559]

Middle School Quality
High
Low
p-val.
(7)
(8)
(9)
0.160∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.051)
(0.053)
0.245
[0.580]
[0.537]

Inferred Ethnicity
Hispanic Non-Hisp. p-val.
(10)
(11)
(12)
0.080∗∗
0.110∗∗
(0.039)
(0.056)
0.656
[0.595]
[0.605]

0.457

0.050
(0.046)
[0.445]

0.031
(0.046)
[0.406]

0.776

0.009
(0.056)
[0.440]

0.047
(0.053)
[0.413]

0.617

0.031
(0.041)
[0.434]

0.056
(0.061)
[0.436]

0.737

0.090∗
(0.051)
[0.321]

0.569

0.108∗∗
(0.047)
[0.345]

0.118∗∗∗
(0.045)
[0.297]

0.870

0.193∗∗∗
(0.055)
[0.320]

0.085∗
(0.051)
[0.274]

0.151

0.083∗∗
(0.040)
[0.330]

0.133∗∗
(0.061)
[0.326]

0.489

0.031
(0.039)
[0.062]

0.477

0.049
(0.043)
[0.119]

0.164

0.011
(0.052)
[0.154]

0.013
(0.048)
[0.147]

0.981

0.005
(0.038)
[0.137]

−0.019
(0.061)
[0.172]

0.056
(0.056)
[0.405]
340

0.123∗∗
(0.052)
[0.303]
372

0.075∗
(0.041)
[0.385]
620

0.083
(0.062)
[0.366]
285

0.104∗∗
(0.052)
[0.335]
365

p-val.
(3)
0.785

0.784

−0.035
(0.043)
[0.174]
0.049
(0.046)
[0.407]
482

0.140∗∗∗
(0.046)
[0.336]
476

0.159

0.384

NOTES: This table reports the effect of attending a school in the Noble Network of Charter Schools for various
subgroups of the data. We report Intent-to-Treat estimates throughout, controlling for the variables summarized in Table 3.3, cohort fixed effects, and cohort effects interacted with an indicator for having a sibling
entering the same lottery. Hispanic ethnicity is inferred if 80% of Census respondents with the student’s last
name identify as Hispanic. Graduation effects exclude the 2005 lottery cohort. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The control mean of each outcome within each group is reported in
square brackets below the standard error.

0.736

0.913

Table 3.5: Non-Experimental Treatment Effect Estimates for Two Later Cohorts

Noble
Charter
Ninth Grade Test
Ninth Grade Test2

Class of 2013
(2)
(3)
0.098**
0.128***
(0.042)
(0.041)
0.104**
0.099***
(0.040)
(0.038)
0.186*** 0.187*** 0.137***
(0.012)
(0.012)
(0.025)
-0.030*** -0.029*** -0.026***
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(1)
0.193***
(0.020)

Tenth Grade Test
Tenth Grade Test2
Free Lunch Eligible

Class of 2012
(5)
(6)
0.022
0.096**
(0.037)
(0.043)
0.100*** 0.076***
(0.034)
(0.029)

0.167***
(0.014)
-0.025***
(0.005)

0.168***
(0.014)
-0.024***
(0.005)

0.147***
(0.030)
-0.022***
(0.006)
0.084
(0.179)
-0.432
(0.274)
-0.233*
(0.128)
-0.032
(0.074)
-0.147*
(0.082)

102
0.731

102
0.755

102
0.845

-0.080
(0.135)
-0.708***
(0.239)
0.064
(0.190)
-0.060
(0.064)
-0.159**
(0.073)

Special Education
Bilingual
Black
Hispanic

Observations
R-squared

(4)
0.117***
(0.020)

109
0.774

109
0.801

109
0.843

NOTES: This table reports non-experimental estimates of the effect of attending a school in the Noble Network of Charter Schools for two recent cohorts of students. The sample includes all CPS high schools with
graduating seniors in 2013 (columns (1)-(3)) or 2012 (columns (4)-(6)). All variables are school-level averages.
The dependent variable in each regression is the fraction of graduating seniors who enroll in college. Each
observations is weighted by the number of students in the original ninth grade class. Test score controls are
the average composite score on the Explore (ninth grade) and Plan (tenth grade) standardized test, normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Because these variables are measured at the school level,
one standard deviation in this sample is smaller than the true student-level standard deviation. Ninth-grade
test scores are not available for the Class of 2012. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
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A1.1. Complete or Over-capitalization
The incidence results derived in Section 1.2.2 allow for a surprising possibility: new home
purchasers can be made worse off by the interest deduction. This point deserves some
discussion. Over-capitalization of the subsidy – when the price increase is larger than the
subsidy payment – is possible even in a closed-economy model like the one above, and it
is exacerbated when people can choose to enter or leave the market in response to policy
changes.
First, consider the model outlined in Section 1.2.2, in which policy changes apply to a
closed housing market. With competitive supply, we can differentiate the market-clearing
condition D(P, r) = S(P ), apply the chain rule, and rearrange terms allows us to solve
for the theoretical level of capitalization,

d ln(P )
∂(1−τ M ID )

=

rm εD
c εS +εD .

This takes a somewhat

familiar form, with relative elasticities determining the division of the incidence between
demand and supply, plus an additional term to account for the fact that the deduction
applies only to mortgage interest rather than the entire cost of capital.1
Plugging the predicted capitalization into the buyers’ incidence formula yields a result
that is, at first, surprising: increasing the subsidy makes new home buyers better off if and
only if LT V <

εD
εS +εD .

In other words, buyers with low levels of debt or those in inelastic

markets would prefer to eliminate the MID.
This possibility, derived and emphasized by Rappoport (2016), is linked to the non-linearity
of the subsidy. The market price is still set by the marginal cost of capital. However, the
debt-equity mix of the marginal unit is not the same as earlier units. In particular, optimizing homebuyers finance later units of housing at higher loan-to-value ratios than initial
units. Thus, the user cost of the marginal unit of housing is higher than the average unit,
which determines the overall subsidy. Rappoport’s empirical work suggests that the number of households harmed by the federal MID is small in practice, however. In Sommer and
1

Note that I have made the simplifying assumption that all residents finance home purchases at the same
user cost c.
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Sullivan’s (2018) model, however, cutting the MID would benefit new home purchasers
due to the strength of the price response.

A1.2. A Model With Limited Mobility
Section 1.2.2 discusses how capitalization effects play out in models zero mobility or full
mobility. Here, I present a model for the in-between case of limited mobility.
The set-up follows the applied literature on local labor markets, particularly Kline and
Moretti (2014), Suarez-Serrato and Zidar (2016), and Diamond (2016). A unit mass of individuals choose to live in one of J cities, indexed by j. Utility is Cobb-Douglas in housing
h and numeraire consumption c, with city-specific amenity values Aj entering multiplicatively.
Individuals also have idiosyncratic tastes for city j, denoted by εij . The presence of locationspecific shocks generates imperfect mobility. If a worker has a strong preference for a given
city, she will not necessarily move even if the bundle of wages, house prices, and amenities
in a different city would be preferred by the average individual.

Uij = Aj hα c(1−α) exp[εij ]

For simplicity, assume further that production is Cobb-Douglas; capital is perfectly mobile
and inelastically supplied; and workers inelastically supply one unit of labor. Per Kline
and Moretti (2014), this implies that the labor demand curve in each market is flat. That
is, local wages wj do not depend on the local population, and are instead pinned down
by TFP and labor’s share of production costs. This feature is not necessary for any of the
qualitative results emphasized here, but it simplifies the exposition.
Consider the case in which all individuals purchase their home, and the cost of financing
varies exogenously across cities, possibly because of local tax policies. We denote the user
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cost of housing capital in city j by uj , and write:

ln(Vij ) = ln(Aj ) + wj −α ln(uj ) − α ln(Pj ) + εij
|
{z
}
vj

Then, if idiosyncratic tastes are distributed Type I Extreme Value with variance parameter
σ, we can solve for the population of city j:
h
i
v −α ln(uj Pj )
exp j
σ
h
i
Nj = P
vk −α ln(uk Pk )
exp
k
σ
Here, we can see that the variance of the taste shocks σ governs the degree of mobility. If
σ is small, local fundamentals vj dominate location decisions and idiosyncratic tastes are
inconsequential (i.e. perfect mobility). If σ is large, tastes dominate the location decision
(little-to-no mobility)
To close the model, allow the housing supply elasticity ψj to vary locally, according to
ψ

HjS = Bj Pj j . Local housing demand is the local population times the individuals’ housing
consumption. In logs:

!
X
α
+
σ
v
−
α
ln(u
P
)
α
+
σ
k
k
k
ln(uj ) −
ln(Pj ) − ln
exp
ln(HjD ) = Cj −
σ
σ
σ
k

Setting supply equal to demand implicitly defines prices, and we can take comparative
statics. If J is large (and hence individual cities are small), we can ignore the effect of
changes in uj to the log-sum-exponential term in the demand equation. Put differently,
we ignore the effects of changes to uj on prices in other markets. Implicitly differentiating
with respect to uj and re-arranging yields the following:
1 + ασ
∂ ln(Pj )
=−
∂ ln(uj )
1 + ασ + ψj
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Interestingly, in the limiting case of perfect mobility, the degree of capitalization no longer
depends on the elasticity of supply. Formally, we have the following result:
Proposition 2
lim

σ→0

∂ ln(Pj )
=1
∂ ln(uj )

In other words, when households are perfectly mobile, changes in borrowing costs are perfectly
capitalized into prices. regardless of the local supply elasticity.
The intuition follows from the logic outlined in Section 1.2.2. If households are indifferent between houses in two locations, then those houses must sell for the same price in
equilibrium.
Note also that, with zero mobility, (σ = ∞), we obtain the same expression as we did in
the closed economy model. This follows directly from the fact that, with Cobb-Douglass
preferences, the elasticity of demand is one when σ → ∞.
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Figure A1.1: LTV-Specific Incidence of a Small Reduction in Mortgage Deductibility

Notes:This figure reports the effect of a one-percentage point decrease in the tax rate applied to mortgage
interest for new home-buyers. The sample includes all 2015 transactions in the merged HMDA-CoreLogic
sample, dropping sales in the top 25% of their MSA’s income distribution or the bottom 25% of their MSA’
loan-to-value distribution. The plotted points show means computed within 20 evenly-sized loan-to-value
bins. Total incidence is the sum of the change in deduction value and the change in the flow cost of housing
(Price * User Cost), and the associated confidence interval reflects statistical uncertainty in the value of the
capitalization parameter.
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Figure A1.2: LTV-Specific Incidence of a Small Reduction in Mortgage Deductibility in Four Metro Areas
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Notes: This figure reproduces Figure A1.1 for specific metro areas.

Table A1.1: First-Stage Results
(1)
N ationalAvg.
(1 − τM
)
ID

(2)

0.727***
(0.0314)

HighIncome
(1 − τM
)
ID

0.897***
(0.0426)

Homebuyer
(1 − τM
)
ID

Observations
R-squared

(3)

0.623***
(0.0289)
626,241
0.975

626,241
0.966

626,241
0.967

Notes: This table reports the first-stage results underlying the estimates in Tables 1.3. See earlier table notes
for details of the sample and specification.
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Table A1.2: Capitalization Effects Across the National House Quality Distribution
Quartile 1

Quartile 2

Quartile 3

Quartile 4

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(1 − τM ID )

-0.552
(0.510)

-0.715**
(0.336)

-0.878**
(0.373)

-1.409***
(0.416)

Observations

139,935

134,188

130,925

135,656

Notes: This table shows estimates of the over-identified model discussed in Table 1.3 for subsamples of the
data based on predicted house values. House quality is the predicted value from a hedonic regression. Specifically, it is the fitted value from a regression of log prices on the number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms,
condominium status, presence in a subdivision, house age, and a quadratic in square footage. Unlike Table
1.8, quartiles are defined based on the full-sample distribution. See Table 1.3 notes for other details of the
sample and specification.
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A2.1. Breakpoint Identification and Testing
This section borrows heavily from DeFusco et al. (2017) and adopts the notation in Estrella
(2003).
Our goal is to estimate t∗ and assess its statistical significance. Let Πi = [πi,1 , π(i,2 ] be
a closed interval in (0, 1) and let Si be the set of all observations from t = int(πi,1 T ) to
t = int(πi,2 T ), where int(.) denotes rounding to the nearest integer. The estimated break
point is the value t∗ from the set Si that maximizes the likelihood ratio statistic from a
test of H1 against H0 .2 That is, for every t ∈ Si we construct the likelihood ratio statistic
corresponding to a test of H1 against H0 for that value of t, and we take the t that produces
the largest test-statistic as our estimated break point for district i.
Assessing the statistical significance of this breakpoint estimate requires knowing the distribution of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic as calculated from among the
values in Si . Let ξi = supSi LR denote this supremum. Andrews (1993) shows that this
distribution can be written as




||B1 (s)||
1/2
>c
P(ξi > c) = P sup Q1 (π1 ) > c = P sup
s1/2
πi ∈Πi
1<s<λi


(A.1)

where ||B1 (s)|| is the Bessel process of order 1, λi = πi,2 (1 − πi,1 )/πi,1 (1 − πi,2 ), and

Q1 (πi ) =

(B1 (πi ) − πi B1 (1))0 (B1 (πi ) − π1 (B1 (1))
πi (1 − πi )

Direct calculation of the probability in Equation A.1 is non-trivial, and prior research has
relied on approximations that typically are based on simulation or curve-fitting methods
(Andrews 1993, Hansen 1997). However, Estrella (2003) provides a numerical procedure
2

We use the terms supremum and maximum interchangeably in this exposition. Technically, all of the
results are in terms of the supremum of the likelihood ratio statistic.
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for calculating exact p-values that does not rely on these types of approximations. We use
this method to calculate p-values for the estimated break point, πi , for each district in the
sample.
We have not yet said where the interval endpoints πi,1 and πi,2 come from. We do not
allow breakpoints to fall in the first two or last two quarters in our sample. These values
vary by district because the length of the available series depends on both data availability
and the timing of the peak of the housing market in each district.

A2.2. Multiple Breaks
In estimating the break points, we allow for the possibility that a given market might
experience more than one housing boom during the course of our sample period. Our
method is recursive in that we first test for the existence of one break point against the null
hypothesis of zero. Given the existence of at least one break point, we can then test the
hypothesis of m+1 break points against the null of m using the results from Bai (1999). Bai
and Perron (1998) show that the test for one break is consistent in the presence of multiple
breaks, which is what allows for this sequential estimation procedure.
More specifically, let 0 < πi,1 < . . . < φi,m < 1 mark the proportions of the sample generated by the m break points estimated under the null hypothesis for district i. For technical reasons, we require that φi,j − φi,j−1 > πi,0 for some small πi,0 3 where we define
φi,0 = 0, φi,m+1 = 1. Further, let ηi,j = πi,0 /(φi,j − φi,j−1 ), j = 1, . . . , m + 1. The likelihood
ratio test compares the maximum of the likelihood ratio obtained when allowing for m + 1
breaks to that from only allowing for m. The distribution of this likelihood ratio statistic is
given by

P(LR > c) = 1 −

m+1
Y

!!
1−P

sup

Q1 (πi ) > c

(A.2)

πi ∈[ηi,j ,1−ηi,j ]

i=1
3

In practice, we require breakpoints to be separated by at least three quarters. Hence πi,0 = 1/Ti , where Ti
denotes the number of periods in the time series for district i.
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which we calculate by recursive application of the method provided in Estrella (2003).
We apply this procedure to test for the existence of two break points against the null of
one as well as three against the null of only two among those districts for which we find at
least two statistically significant break points.
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Figure A2.1: School District NAEP Math Scores (Fourth Grade)
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Figure A2.2: School District NAEP Reading Scores (Fourth Grade)

Note: Plots show percentiles among school districts in our final regression sample (i.e. all independent, unified
districts with no missing finance data, constant borders, and sufficient housing data to calculate breakpoints).
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Table A2.1: Effects of MSA Level Booms and Busts on BEA Income
BEA Income
Growth Rate
Relative Year = 1

-0.001
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
-0.006**
(0.003)

Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Dependent variable mean
Time FEs
MSA FEs

0.451
1,620
0.047
X
X

Notes: Reproduced from Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).
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Table A2.2: Effect Heterogeneity by Baseline District Expenditures
Log Price

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

Log Exp. Per Student

High-Exp.
Districts

Low-Exp.
Districts

High-Exp.
Districts

Low-Exp.
Districts

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.044***
(0.005)
0.097***
(0.007)
0.133***
(0.009)
0.154***
(0.012)
0.161***
(0.014)

0.077***
(0.007)
0.142***
(0.008)
0.181***
(0.010)
0.191***
(0.012)
0.175***
(0.013)

-0.007
(0.008)
0.005
(0.010)
0.019*
(0.011)
0.028**
(0.012)
0.027**
(0.013)

0.011*
(0.006)
0.015*
(0.008)
0.023***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.010)
0.031***
(0.010)

0.878
11,395

0.867
11,775

0.758
11,395

0.594
11,775

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: To create a common analysis dataset for prices and expenditures, we average the quarterly price series
to the district-year level. See the Table 2.2 notes for other details of the specification.
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Table A2.3: Municipal Price and Expenditure Effects of Booms and Busts
Log Price

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs
Cities

Log Expenditure

Positive

Non-Sig.

Negative

Positive

Non-Sig.

Negative

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.036***
(0.006)
0.107***
(0.007)
0.162***
(0.008)
0.193***
(0.008)
0.186***
(0.010)

0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.007)
0.000
(0.009)
-0.008
(0.012)
-0.027*
(0.015)

-0.015***
(0.006)
-0.036***
(0.007)
-0.064***
(0.009)
-0.102***
(0.012)
-0.138***
(0.013)

-0.013
(0.009)
-0.011
(0.010)
0.020
(0.013)
0.037***
(0.014)
0.049***
(0.014)

-0.008
(0.013)
-0.007
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.018)
-0.019
(0.018)
-0.004
(0.023)

-0.007
(0.013)
-0.026
(0.017)
-0.041**
(0.017)
-0.036*
(0.019)
-0.062**
(0.024)

0.879
48,390

0.879
48,390

0.879
48,390

0.900
10,991

0.900
10,991

0.900
10,991

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

913

913

913

913

913

913

See Table 2.2 notes for details of the specification.
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Table A2.4: Effects on the Residential Tax Base, Total District Revenues, and Total District
Expenditures

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
Relative Year = 6
R-squared
Observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

Tax Base

Total Revenue

Total Exp.

(1)

(2)

(3)

1.577e+09***
(3.314e+08)
2.408e+09***
(6.011e+08)
2.526e+09***
(7.891e+08)
1.872e+09***
(7.011e+08)
1.816e+09**
(7.917e+08)
1.876e+09**
(8.923e+08)

5.087e+06***
(1.478e+06)
1.051e+07***
(2.507e+06)
1.665e+07***
(3.600e+06)
1.694e+07***
(3.631e+06)
1.634e+07***
(4.510e+06)
1.777e+07***
(6.444e+06)

4.366e+06***
(1.585e+06)
1.214e+07***
(2.916e+06)
1.907e+07***
(3.898e+06)
2.280e+07***
(4.614e+06)
2.169e+07***
(5.507e+06)
2.055e+07***
(7.180e+06)

0.893
24,336

0.976
25,740

0.965
25,740

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: See Table 2.2 notes for details of the sample and specification. We measure the value of housing
stocks by multiplying average transaction prices in the CoreLogic data by the number of housing units in each
district. The latter are obtained from the 2000 and 2010 Censuses, and we interpolate linearly in other years.
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Table A2.5: Effects on Wages and Benefits by Subcategories

Relative Year = 1
Relative Year = 2
Relative Year = 3
Relative Year = 4
Relative Year = 5
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R-squared
Number of observations
Time FEs
Area FEs

Log Avg. Salary
Instruction
(1)
0.003
(0.003)
0.006*
(0.004)
0.011***
(0.004)
0.018***
(0.005)
0.020***
(0.005)
0.807
23082
X
X

Log Avg. Salary
Administrator
(2)
-0.058***
(0.012)
-0.067***
(0.014)
-0.066***
(0.016)
-0.056***
(0.017)
-0.034*
(0.020)
0.616
23082
X
X

Log Avg. Salary
Other
(3)
-0.051***
(0.010)
-0.033***
(0.013)
0.020
(0.014)
0.058***
(0.016)
0.084***
(0.018)
0.698
23082
X
X

Log Avg. Benefit
Instruction
(4)
0.005
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.006)
0.021***
(0.006)
0.033***
(0.008)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.877
23082
X
X

Log Avg. Benefit
Administrator
(5)
-0.058***
(0.013)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.059***
(0.016)
-0.043**
(0.018)
-0.020
(0.022)
0.718
23082
X
X

Notes: See Table 2.2 notes for details of the sample and specification. We calculate average salaries by dividing
total spending on salaries (obtained from the F-33 Finance file) by the number of employees (obtained from
the Common Core of Data survey file) after aggregating the different classification schemes in each file up to
the broad groupings described here. Districts with fewer than ten employees in a given category are dropped.

Log Avg. Benefit
Other
(6)
-0.055***
(0.011)
-0.037**
(0.014)
0.019
(0.016)
0.060***
(0.018)
0.082***
(0.021)
0.756
23082
X
X

A3.1. Data Sources and Variable Construction
A3.1.1. Lottery Records
Noble provided the results of all admissions lotteries taking place between 1999 and 2012.
The files are quite detailed. For each cohort, we observe applicants’ names, address, date
of birth, gender, eighth grade school, his/her randomly-drawn lottery number, and the initial admissions offer outcome (either Accepted, Waitlist, or Sibling, where Sibling denotes
students who received an admissions offer because of an older sibling already enrolled at
Noble). The files also indicate which Noble Network campus, if any, the student attended
in the fall the student attended the following fall. For the cohorts we consider, this field is
always “Noble” or missing, the latter case indicating that the student did not attend Noble.
NSC requires both a name and a precise date of birth (or a social security number, which
we never observe) to match students to their enrollment records. Unfortunately, birthday
information is not available for 13 students who would be otherwise eligible for our sample
(see Table A3.1 for a full accounting). Based on inspection of the raw files, the missing data
fields appear to be simple transcription errors. Some are explicitly entered as “missing”,
“?”, or “Mr. [redacted] forgot to write it down”; others are simply blank. These rows are
also likely to be missing other fields such as parents’ names or home addresses. Student’s
first and last names are never missing, however. We discuss the possible implications of
attrition for our analysis in Section 3.3.1.
A3.1.2. Lottery Variable Construction
As a first step, we drop all students whose admissions status is listed as “Sibling.” These
students are automatically admitted and are thus not included in our lottery analysis. Of
the remaining students, we designate students who are immediately accepted as well as
those offered one of the first ten waitlist slots as our treatment group. All other students
are assigned to the control group, even if they are eventually offered a slot. We use the

158

campus enrollment field to construct our endogenous treatment variable. The instrument
is a strong (but not perfect) predictor of eventual enrollment. Averaging across all cohorts,
81.5% of treated students enroll at Noble, compared to only 2.6% of control students.
Our empirical specification adjusts for the fact that two siblings entering the same lottery
have a higher probability of receiving an admissions offer than a student without a sibling.
This information was not directly recorded for the cohorts we consider, so we infer it from
the provided background information. Precisely, we assume that any students with the
same last name and same address are siblings. Records for later cohorts include indicators
for students with a sibling entered in the same lottery. Our method of identifying siblings
coincides perfectly with these flags in these later years.
A3.1.3. NSC Submission and Coverage
The National Student Clearinghouse is a national non-profit that provides enrollment and
degree-verification services. We submitted the names, dates of birth, and estimated high
school graduation dates for all students in our sample to the NSC’s Student Tracker service
in November 2012. In return, NSC provided detailed records of enrollment and graduation, which we use to construct our main outcome variables as described in Section 3.3.
The Student Tracker database currently contains over 3,600 institutions enrolling over 98%
of college students in the United States. Deming et al (2014) compare the list of covered
schools to the complete roster of schools eligible for Title IV funding and find that for-profit
schools and private religious colleges account for the majority of the missing schools.
While NSC does not provide the details of their matching algorithm, we were able to assess
its quality using a separate data source. Noble provided us with their own internal records
of college enrollment for seniors graduating between 2007 and 2009. Of the 239 students
on this list, we matched 232 to our analysis sample using provided student ID numbers
(wherever possible) and first and last names for students for whom ID numbers were not
provided in one or both datasets. The remaining seven students were not included in our
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sample either because they entered with a different cohort, or because they were missing
ID numbers and did not have a unique name that would allow for matching.
The schools attended by the 21 students who are not captured by our NSC pull do not
exhibit any clear common characteristics. Noble’s records indicate that 12 of these students attended either Northeastern Illinois University or a branch of the City Colleges of
Chicago. These are among the most commonly attended campuses in our sample. There
are six campuses that appear in the Noble list but not in our NSC dataset. Each is attended
by a single student. Three are out-of-state private universities, one is an out-of-state public
college, one is a community college, and one is a beauty school. Taken together, this evidence suggests that treatment students do not gravitate towards schools not covered by
NSC.
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Figure A3.1: Contemporaneous Enrollment Over Time, By College Type
NOTES: The horizontal axis displays the number of school years after each cohort starts high school. Hence,
4.5 corresponds to the first semester of college for a student making normal and uninterrupted progress
through school. The vertical axis records the percentage of lottery winners and losers who either are enrolled in either a two-year college (Panel (a)) or a four-year college (Panel (b)) in that period. See Section 3.3
for more details on how we construct these variables.
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Figure A3.2: Cumulative College Enrollment Over Time, By College Type
NOTES: The horizontal axis displays the number of school years after each cohort starts high school. Hence,
4.5 corresponds to the first semester of college for a student making normal and uninterrupted progress
through school. The vertical axis records the percentage of students who have enrolled in a two-year college (Panel (a)) or four-year college (Panel (b)) at any point up to the given time period. See Section 3.3 for
more details on how we construct these variables.
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Table A3.1: Accounting for the Sample

All Lottery Entrants
Older Sibling Enrolled at Noble
Missing Date of Birth
Experimental Sample
Sibling Entered in Same Lottery
No Relevant Siblings

Immediately Accepted
Attended Didn’t Attend
418
90
99
19
6
0
313
71
12
0
301
71

Waitlist Number ≤ 10
Attended Didn’t Attend
15
15
0
0
1
1
14
14
0
0
14
14

Waitlist Number > 10
Attended Didn’t Attend
14
537
0
0
0
5
14
532
0
14
14
518
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NOTES: This table tabulates lottery and attendance results for students subjected to varying admissions policies. Students with an older sibling enrolled at Noble are automatically admitted; hence, they are not included
in the Experimental Sample. We do not observe dates of birth for a small number of students; these observations cannot be matched to the NSC database and are hence dropped from our analysis. Students with a
sibling entering the same lottery have a higher likelihood of receiving an admissions offer. They are included
in the experimental sample, but all regressions include a currentSibling-x-cohort indicator variable to account
for this increased probability of treatment. At the lottery, each student is either accepted immediately or given
a waitlist number. In our empirical work, we define lottery winners as students who are either accepted
immediately or given a waitlist number of at most ten.

Total
1089
118
13
958
26
932

Table A3.2: The Effect of Attending a High-Quality Charter School on Two-Year and FourYear College Outcomes
Control
Mean
(1)
0.427

Panel A. Two-Year Colleges Only
Enrolled in College
Enrolled on Time

0.174

Two Semesters or More

0.266

Four Semesters or More

0.152

Graduated from College

0.035

Panel B. Four-Year Colleges Only
Enrolled in College

0.322

Enrolled on Time

0.266

Two Semesters or More

0.271

Four Semesters or More

0.203

Graduated from College

0.090

ITT
(2)
0.037
(0.033)
−0.015
(0.025)
0.055∗
(0.030)
0.035
(0.025)
−0.011
(0.012)
0.114∗∗∗
(0.032)
0.071∗∗
(0.030)
0.112∗∗∗
(0.031)
0.059∗∗
(0.028)
0.039
(0.026)

LATE
(3)
0.048
(0.042)
−0.019
(0.032)
0.072∗
(0.039)
0.045
(0.032)
−0.014
(0.016)
0.149∗∗∗
(0.042)
0.093∗∗
(0.040)
0.146∗∗∗
(0.040)
0.078∗∗
(0.037)
0.055
(0.036)

NOTES: This table reports the effect of attending a school in the Noble Network of Charter Schools on college
outcomes separately for two- and four-year colleges. Four-year graduation results are not available for the
2005 cohort, though we do include this cohort in the two-year college graduation estimate. See Table 3 notes
for other specification details.
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